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Summary 
 
My PhD thesis studies the role of development banks in financing industrial development and 
particularly in providing the long-term committed finance needed for innovation. The focus is on 
the Brazilian development bank, BNDES, and its leading role in supporting the new Brazilian 
innovation system. I begin by discussing the role of finance in the National System of Innovation 
framework, the literature on development banks and the motivation of my research. The second 
chapter looks at the impact of BNDES disbursements on commercial banks’ disbursement using 
balance-sheet data for the period of 2002-2016. Using dynamic panel data techniques, I investigate 
whether BNDES disbursement for investment in innovation and fixed capital investments 
crowded-in or crowded-out Brazilian commercial banks’ disbursement. The third chapter is a 
micro-analysis of the impact of BNDES disbursements on the R&D intensity of Brazilian 
manufacturing companies’ sector for the period of 2003-2011. In this chapter, I investigate 
whether companies that have received funding from BNDES have increased or decreased their 
commitment in innovation activities.  The findings of this analysis provide new evidence regarding 
the industrial sector activity of the Brazilian development bank, adding on the debate about 
additionality/substitutability of public financial resources. Finally, the fourth chapter provides 
qualitative evidence for the Brazilian pharmaceutical sector, presenting the findings of primary 
collected data on companies’ perceived obstacles for investment in innovation and on 
contribution of BNDES funding in reducing such obstacles. The data have been collected by 
means of a survey, undertaken for a sample of Brazilian companies in the pharmaceutical and 
biotech sector. 
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1. Introduction and general background 
 
My thesis studies the role of development banks in financing industrial development and 
particularly in providing the long-term committed finance needed for industrial innovation. In 
this sense, it puts finance at the centre of the systems of innovation approach. The theoretical 
starting point of this PhD thesis is the Keynesian assumption according to which liberalized 
financial markets are not fully developed; hence, development financial banks are public 
institutions necessary to provide the financial resources for social and developmental national 
goals, generally not supplied by commercial banks. The focus of the analysis is on the Brazilian 
development bank (BNDES henceforth) and its leading role in supporting the new Brazilian 
innovation system, in the context of the recent (since 2004) emphasis on innovation and industrial 
policy.  
The overarching research question of my thesis is about the investigation of the role of BNDES 
in incentivizing greater commitment in R&D activities. In detail, the analysis will investigate 
whether the disbursement of BNDES have either crowded-in/out commercial banks’ activity, 
therefore fostering/hampering the development of the domestic financial market, and whether 
the activity of BNDES have generated greater/lower commitment in R&D activities of 
companies operating in the Brazilian market. I begin by discussing the motivation and the key 
literature on the topic in this chapter. My thesis then looks at three different research questions 
with three different approaches, (i). Macro/meso dimension in the second chapter; (ii). Observing 
the impact at micro level in the third, using secondary data, and (iii). Using primary data collected 
by means of survey in the fourth chapter.  
The second chapter is based on the evaluation of BNDES disbursement for innovation and fixed 
capital investments on Brazilian commercial banks’ disbursement using balance-sheet data for the 
period of 2002-2016. The research question in this chapter is: “Is BNDES an efficient 
government tool to transmit policy decisions without hampering the development of the 
private national financial system?” and specifically analysis whether the disbursement of the 
Brazilian development bank have crowded-in or out financial resources of private commercial 
banks. 
The third chapter is a micro-analysis, for the Brazilian manufacturing sector, on the impact of 
BNDES resources on companies’ own commitment in R&D expenditure. The aim of the chapter 
is to shed light on the crowding-in/out debate evaluating whether BNDES support is able or not 
to encourage firms’ own commitment to R&D-based projects. The research question of this 
chapter is: “Fostering innovation activities of the national industrial system with the 
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support of a development bank: incentivizing greater commitment or displacing financial 
resources?”  
Finally, to complement the quantitative approach, this thesis will also present findings obtained 
with primary data, collected by means of survey, evaluating the impact of BNDES contribution 
in reducing the risk associated to investments in innovation for the Brazilian pharmaceutical and 
biotech industries, two industrial sectors historically highly involved in innovation activities. The 
fourth chapter, referring to the period 2004-2015, will address the following research question: 
“Risk in Innovation: Theory and Evidence from Pharma and Biotech sectors in Brazil: 
what role is BNDES playing?” 
The triangulation of evidence proposed in my thesis with a mixed method approach allows the 
different research questions to complement each other, looking at different aspects part of the 
same overarching research question.  
 
1.1. The role of finance in the National Systems of 
Innovation framework 
Schumpeter (1939) highlighted the importance of credit creation at the centre of the dynamics of 
innovation in a capitalist society; in a stationary state of perfectly competitive equilibrium, credit 
can help entrepreneurs to increase the level of investments in the economy and break the circular 
flow with the introduction of a new product (Schumpeter 1934). The combination of 
entrepreneurial spirit and risk-taking capital market would have therefore allowed the industrial 
sector to introduce innovations in the market (Schumpeter 1934). In this context, Schumpeter 
explained the essential role of banks as “nothing but establishments for the manufacture of means of 
payment”. Finally, highlighting the central role of banks in promoting technological change, the 
author recognised bankers as the “capitalist par excellence”, those creating “new purchasing power out of 
nothing” (Schumpeter 1934). Yet, he did not predict the degree to which finance has ended up 
financing itself, a topic that became more important during the later years (Minsky 1981; Wray 
and Tymoigne 2008; Haldane and Davies 2011; Mazzucato and Wray 2014). 
The long-term strategic commitment required to finance technological change draws attention to 
the kind of finance needed for an innovation-led industrial development. Evidence suggests that 
the long time necessary for innovation to come about and the high uncertainty involved in such 
process, whereby more projects are expected to fail than to succeed, means that the profit-
maximizing commercial banking sector does not supply the adequate amount of resources, as 
stated by Mazzucato (2013a; 2013b). Additionally, commercial banks cannot capture all the 
returns from innovation, which may be disseminated throughout the economy. Government, on 
the other hand, is concerned with maximising total societal returns, so its ‘risk-return’ 
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considerations are different than the ones of commercial banks. For developing countries, 
ultimately, where the financial alternatives (Venture Capital, equity, business angels) are not fully 
developed, the question is where this money should come from (Barone and Spratt 2015), if not 
from multilateral financial institutions, such as World Bank, that however provide financial 
resources that are not necessarily in line with national targets and industrial strategies.    
In a Schumpeterian approach, economic development is the outcome of endogenous and 
discontinuous changes in the economy (Schumpeter 1934); in this context, governments often 
provide both the direction and the patient finance needed to promote these changes, consistently 
with the economic and social phase of development (de Aghion 1999). The literature on National 
Systems of Innovation recognises the crucial role of finance and particularly of a long-term source 
of funding (Freeman 1987; Christensen 1992; Lundvall 1992). However, few authors of 
innovation studies have investigated the different types of finance that have characterised 
different systems of innovation (Tylecote 2007). Mazzucato (2013b) argues that this represents a 
problem since different types of firms require different types of finance, and what finance is 
actually received (stock market, VC, public grants, etc.) affects the kind of investment and 
innovation activities that can be carried out. My analysis will therefore examine how the source 
of finance matters and, more importantly, how a committed source of long-term finance is 
necessary for the cumulative, path dependent, uncertain processes characterising economic 
development driven by technological change (Malerba and Orsenigo 1997; Malerba 2005).   
My thesis will attempt to shed light on the role of mission-oriented development banks in a 
National Systems of Innovation, building on the framework proposed by Mazzucato and Penna 
(2014), focusing on BNDES. The analysis will quantitatively and qualitatively evaluate whether 
BNDES, characterized by an innovation-based developmental mission, has been able to provide 
the long-term committed source of credit needed to allow firms to invest in long-term projects 
aimed at technological change and innovation. In doing so, it will bridge a fundamental gap 
regarding the ‘quality of finance’ in the systems of innovation literature, as well as bridge this 
literature to the macroeconomic work that has evaluated the degree to which public finance crowds-
in or out private finance.  
 
 
1.2. The Literature on Development Banks 
Development banks are financial institutions that have changed their structure and mission over 
the years (de Aghion 1999) and for which there is no consensus on their effectiveness for 
economic growth (Torres and Zeidan 2016). The conditions for the creation of a development 
bank differ from country to country, according to the economic, financial and social structure. 
However, there are few common characteristics applicable cross all countries: i) the uncertainty 
9 
 
of a development process caused by long-term investments as infrastructures and ii) the difficulty 
of private actors to evaluate and incorporate the risk, especially when this is very high (Hermann 
2010). 
From a Keynesian perspective, development banks are necessary because liberalized financial 
markets are not fully developed, and thus are unable to provide the necessary resources for social 
and developmental national goals. This gap means financial markets are unable to support those 
sectors crucial for economic development as infrastructure, funding for innovation and other 
activities characterized by high social returns. 
Initially, the creation of development banks in Europe in the 19th century was caused by fast 
industrialization and by the lack of financial agents providing long-term finance (Diamond 1957; 
Gerschenkron 1962). In the 20th century, the common characteristic that allowed the creation of 
development banks has usually been dictated by the consequences of wars, particularly for 
countries losing the conflicts: after the First World War and in some cases after the Second World 
War, as in Japan and Germany, development banks have been created with the main mission of 
reconstructing the countries, moving to a more long-term finance mission after the reconstruction 
was funded (de Aghion 1999). The German Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), founded in 1948, 
had the major role of channelling the resources for the reconstruction after WWII; in Japan, two 
development banks have been created with two different missions: the Export Bank of Japan (1950; 
Export-Import Bank of Japan after 1952) with the role of promoting the overseas expansion of 
domestic firms and the Japan Development Bank (1951) with the main mission of providing 
resources for the development of heavy industries and infrastructure. In Korea, the Korea 
Development Bank (1954), was originally created to financially support the national industries after 
the Korean War. In countries not having the need of an after-war-reconstruction, the creation of 
development banks found its motivation in other developmental missions: in Brazil, the Banco 
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social BNDES (1953) was created to provide financial 
resources for a national industrialisation; in Canada, the Industrial Development Bank, aimed to 
provide funding particularly for small enterprises. Finally, the most recent successful development 
bank, the China Development Bank (CDB), was founded in 1994 with the main mission of 
supporting economic and industrial development. 
The different cross-country evolution of development banks over the years represents the 
adaptation of these financial institutions to specific national needs, resulting in a diversification 
of roles and sectors of interest. The German KfW, after financing the reconstruction, moved its 
interest towards SMEs, environmental protection, energy efficiency and innovation-based 
industrial development. Similarly to the evolution of the German counterpart, in the 60’s the Japan 
Development Bank focused its resources on industrial innovation. In the ‘70s, the Canadian Industrial 
Development Bank changed its name becoming the Federal Business Development Bank and started 
venture capital operations moving eventually its interests towards industrial innovation in the 90’s 
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under a new name, the Business Development Bank. The Korea Development Bank changed its role, 
focusing on new industrial sectors, after the creation of the second development bank in the mid-
70s, the Export-Import Bank of Korea, having the same mission of the Japanese counterpart.   
Torres and Zeldan (2016), identifying the similarities in the heterogeneous development paths 
undertaken by development banks over the years, proposed a life-cycle hypothesis to justify their 
existence in countries with inefficient financial markets and good quality institutions. In their life-
cycle hypothesis, development banks initially grow together with the development of the State, 
to eventually scale down once the country’s financial markets have developed. Further, as 
summarized in Figure 1.1, the authors identify instruments and possible risks at each stage of the 
lifecycle of the development bank. 
Figure 1.1 – Torres and Zeldan (2016) lifecycle hypothesis of development banks 
                            
    Source: Torres and Zeldan (2016) 
From this thesis’ point of view, what can be argued about Torres and Zeldan’s hypothesis is on 
the role of development banks in the last stage of the lifecycle and, more precisely, at which stage 
development banks must reduce their participation in the economy. First, it should be fully agreed 
when financial markets can be defined as developed and, more importantly, that also financial 
markets widely understood as developed can collapse, as during the 2008 financial crisis. Further, 
if the level of development of financial markets is measured in terms of financial liberalization, as 
widely agreed by the mainstream literature, there is a lack of consensus on whether liberalized 
financial markets automatically lead to economic development. This lack of consensus was 
evident even before the US housing bubble (Minsky 1992; Knight 2005; Rajan 2006). Second, 
there is no guarantee that private banks will start financing long-term and high-risk investments 
once financial markets are developed. It has been historically observed, on contrary, that those 
investments represent the main target of development banks and are generally discarded by the 
private financial sector (Minsky 1981; Haldane and Davies 2011). 
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Nowadays, development banks represents an alternative source of finance, particularly for higher 
risk investments (Rodrik 2004), with participation in a broader range of institutions, all 
complementary to each other, creating a dynamic and innovative National Systems of Innovation. 
The four main roles of development banks (countercyclical, developmental, new venture support 
and challenge-led), highlighted in Mazzucato and Penna (2014), give a framework through which 
it is possible to understand the recent role played by these financial institutions. Together with a 
new narrative of the State, as in Mazzucato and Perez (2014) and Allas (2014), it is possible to 
understand the relationship between finance, innovation and the different agencies being part of 
a National Systems of Innovation. 
The three largest mission-oriented development banks are the China Development Bank, the 
Brazilian BNDES and the German KfW. In 2012, each of these banks disbursed loans accounting 
for more than 10% of their countries’ GDP (Ferraz, Além et al. 2013). All three banks have the 
main mission to provide medium-long term finance for the economic and social development of 
the country (Barone and Spratt 2015) in areas where private finance feels a too-high-risk-to-
intervene (Mazzucato and Penna 2014). 
 
1.2.1. The critiques on Development Banks 
Market Failure Theory allows development banks, and public sector more generally, to operate 
only in those areas particularly affected by market failures. The main critiques moved to these 
financial institutions, as presented in Mazzucato and Penna (2014), are: 
i) Financial repression and crowding-out 
ii) Misallocation of resources due to political biases 
iii) Incapacity to “pick winners” 
iv) Inefficient governmental structure 
The first critique is about the risk of crowding-out generated by the activity of development banks. 
In the literature, there are two different perspectives from which it is possible to look at the 
crowding-out hypothesis:  
i) Crowding out commercial banks’ loans (especially in the most profitable sectors) and 
therefore hampering the development of the domestic financial market because of the 
lower-than-market interest rate applied to their loans (McKinnon 1973). 
ii) Crowding out the disbursement of the companies that, following a disequilibrium of the 
national rate of capital accumulation after the increased public capital, will eventually rely 
only on development banks’ resources, decreasing their own resources (Aschauer 1989). 
Other critiques related to financial repression come from the literature on government ownership 
of financial institutions. La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes et al. (2002) found that higher government 
12 
 
ownership of banks hampers country’s financial development and reduces income and 
productivity growth. Many authors have criticised these findings, arguing about the weaknesses 
of the research strategy (Levy Yeyati, Panizza et al. 2007), on how these results hold only for 
countries with low financial development (Körner and Schnabel 2011), or on how quality of 
institutions matters more than ownership (Andrianova, Demetriades et al. 2008). 
Misallocation of resources due to political bias is generally caused by a non-virtuous crony 
capitalism in which politicians use bank lending beyond economic purposes, altering the 
development of both financial markets and industrial development (Carvalho 2014). Additionally, 
misallocation of resources is also caused by the incapacity of “picking-winners”, or by the willingness 
to “pick-looser”, in a rent-seeking vicious cycle (Robinson and Torvik 2005). 
Finally, inefficient governmental structures are likely to generate governance issues, particularly 
when meritocratic selection is overruled by other criteria. Public financial sector is nowadays 
completely integrated in the regular financial markets and this involves a set of rules and 
constraints to be followed and understood by professional managers (Torres and Zeidan 2016). 
This PhD thesis will primarily engage with the first critique moved to development banks, 
financial repression and crowding-out. As a limitation of this analysis, findings do not provide 
evidence to strongly rule out any of the other critiques.    
 
1.3. The Brazilian industrial policy environment 
In Brazil, a new wave of government intervention on industrial policy resurged at the end of the 
20th century (Pereira, Marcelino et al. 2006).  Brazil’s focus on innovation started at the beginning 
of the 21st century, less than 10 years after liberalization policies promoted by international 
institutions as World Bank and IMF were issued (Wade 2003); these policies, that were supposed 
to offer a greater penetration of Foreign Direct Investments, did not however offer the expected 
results and did not provide the big push Brazilian economic and social sectors were waiting for. 
Since 2004, a new set of industrial and innovation policies started shaping the Brazilian economy, 
as presented in the following Table 1.1.  
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Table 1.1 - 2004/2013 Brazilian Policies 
Industrial Policies 
       2004 - 2007: PITCE - Política Industrial, Tecnológica e de Comércio Exterior 
2008 - 2011: PDP - Productive Development Policy 
2011 - 2014: PBM - Plano Brazil Maior 
Innovation Policies 
2007 - 2010: PACTI - Action Plan for Science Technology and Innovation 
2012 - 2015: ENCTI - National Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy 
2013 - 2014: Inova Empresa 
Fiscal incentives and subsidy programs 
       2004: Brazilian Innovation Law 
2005: Good Law 
2006: Economy subsidy program (administrated by the funding agency FINEP) 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
Since 2004, Brazilian industrial policies have identified targeted sectors able to lead the economic 
development of Brazil through a mission based on industrial innovation and social development 
(for more details, please refer to the Appendix). 
The need of a qualified government intervention with defined missions and targeted goals, aimed 
at technological development and supported by coherent policies dealing with different State 
agencies, is the core of the literature on National Systems of Innovation (Nelson 1993; Freeman 
1995; de Aghion 1999; Pereira, Marcelino et al. 2006). At the same time, the need to revise these 
policies over the years to keep them up to date with the economic cycles is dictated by the 
necessity to account for dynamic and discontinuous changes in the system as the main 
determinant of economic development (Schumpeter 1934). 
 
1.3.1. A quick overview of the interaction between public-
private finance in the Brazilian economy 
Since 1980, the Brazilian economy has been affected by different periods of hyperinflation, as 
consequence of the economic downturn following the energy crisis during the military 
dictatorship. Hyperinflation crises lasted until the beginning of the ‘90s, in correspondence with 
the conclusion of democratic transition of the country; since then, in the last 20 years, monetary 
and fiscal policies profoundly determined the stabilization of the Brazilian economy (Afonso, 
Araújo et al. 2016).  
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As illustrated in the two following figures, the growth of credit operations in Brazil seems to show 
a complementarity between public and private financial sector that could be evidence of a 
crowding in more than a crowding out scenario. Although this might be just an ‘optical’ effect 
(e.g. an effect of common expansion of credit across sources driven by pure economic growth), 
it is interesting to observe the evolution of different sources of credit across different phases of 
Brazilian economic growth. 
Figure 1.2 - Brazil Volume of Credit Operations, in Nominal R$ Billion
    
Source: FEBRABAN 
The marginal presence of the foreign financial sector leaves the Brazilian credit market for public 
and national private financial institutions. The following Figure 1.3 shows the growth rate of the 
nominal volume of credit operations of public and private financial sectors. 
Figure 1.3 - Growth Rate Nominal Volume of Credit Operations 
 
Source: FEBRABAN 
The years in which public and private credit growth trajectories evidently diverged are in 
correspondence of the Argentinean bailout in 2001 and of the more recent subprime mortgage 
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crisis in 2008. From Figure 1.3 is interesting to notice the different roles of public and private 
financial sectors in the two crises. In 2003, private financial sector acted with a countercyclical 
tendency to offset the drop of public credit operations. In the 2008 financial crisis, in line with 
the new countercyclical role undertaken by the main Brazilian financial institutions, the Brazilian 
public financial sector counterbalanced the downturn of private credit operations. 
 
1.4. What is BNDES 
BNDES is a 100% state owned development bank created in 1952 and has been under control 
of the Brazilian executive and the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign trade (MDIC). 
Since its creation and until 1980s, BNDES supported the industrialization process through 
government investment and funding. From the 1990s BNDES took part in the liberalization 
process undertaken by Brazil, changing the country’s financial structure and reducing the bank’s 
developmental role in favour of the private actors (Hermann 2010). In 2004, BNDES went back 
to its primary mission aimed at Brazilian economic development through innovation. The areas 
in which the Brazilian development bank operates are indicated in Table 1.2 below: 
 
Table 1.2 - BNDES Areas of Operations 
Cattle-Raising and agriculture Infrastructure 
Trade, Service and Tourism Innovation 
Culture Environment 
Social and Urban Development   Capital Market 
Industry Exports and international positioning 
Source: BNDES 
Even though innovation accounts for a small portion of the overall disbursement, the strength of 
BNDES activity is evidenced by the existence of an agenda that can be implemented with specific 
tools and a unique target defined by the government (Schapiro 2013). BNDES represents one of 
the largest development banks, with an amount disbursed in 2014 almost double compared to 
what disbursed by the World Bank the same year (Torres and Zeidan 2016). 
 
1.4.1. The change in structure of BNDES over the decades 
until the new mission for innovation 
BNDES priorities have changed over years, following the national priorities indicated by each 
government over decades since its creation.  
In the ‘50s, BNDES commitment was primarily focused on infrastructure, with particular 
attention on transport, energy and on the iron and steel industry. This focus changed in the ‘60s, 
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towards heavy industry, SMEs and consumer goods. In the ‘70s, following the national economic 
priorities dictated by the government, BNDES played a leading role in supporting the import 
substitution process started in Brazil and aimed at the replacement of basic inputs and capital 
goods. Energy, agribusiness and competitive integration became BNDES priorities in the ‘80s 
until the ‘90s when Brazil began its trade liberalization process through the National Privatization 
Program (PND). This was supported primarily by BNDES together with the two other priorities, 
private infrastructure and social and urban development. 
 
1.4.2. BNDES’ role in the recent Brazilian industrial mission 
for innovation 
BNDES works closely with the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (MDIC) 
to stimulate the industrial sector and foreign trade (BNDES 2013). Figure 1.4 shows BNDES 
disbursement for the industrial sector by sector aggregate.1 
Figure 1.4 - BNDES Annual Disbursement by Sector Aggregate 2000-2017 
 
Source: BNDES            
Among the industrial sector, trade and services and manufacturing sector have always represented 
the main receivers of funding from BNDES, leaving a marginal role to the agricultural and 
extractive industries. As also evident from Figure 1.4, trade and services recently acquired more 
importance in BNDES’ targeting decision, increasing their share in the bank’s industrial portfolio. 
The main instruments implemented by BNDES for the industrial sector are: 
 
1 It would have been interesting to compare BNDES figures with similar ones for commercial banks; 
however, to the best of my knowledge, similar data for the commercial banking sector are not available. 
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Table 1.3 - Financial instruments offered by BNDES 
Direct Operations Exim 
Indirect operations Project finance 
Mixed Direct and Indirect Equity investments 
MSME Grants 
     Source: BNDES 
 
Direct operations are operations carried out directly by BNDES or by authorized representative. 
Indirect operations are targeted for micro and SMEs; the analysis is carried out by accredited 
financial institutions in addition to the financing and repayment conditions. Accredited financial 
institutions assume also the risk of non-repayment. Indirect operations finance projects in 
different areas: construction, heavy vehicles, machinery and equipment, exports and agriculture. 
BNDES offers two types of indirect operations: 
▪ Automatic: operations that do not need any prior BNDES assessment. The requests are 
submitted to the accredited financial institutions that, after approving them, ask BNDES 
for approval and release funds. All isolated purchase of machinery and equipment are 
funded with this type of operation, regardless of the amount. 
▪ Non-Automatic: operations requiring prior consultation by BNDES.                   
Finally, mixed direct and indirect operations combine direct and non-automatic direct 
characteristics. The investment risk is shared among BNDES and the accredited financial 
institutions.  
Resources of the BNDES are guaranteed by different sources shown in the capital structure of 
the institution. Since 2010, mainly due to the new countercyclical role assigned to BNDES after 
the 2008 sub-prime financial crisis (Torres and Zeidan 2016), National Treasury has been the 
main creditor and the cost of these resources is largely (if not entirely) pegged to the Long-term 
interest rate (TJLP). The second main contributor is the Workers’ Assistance Fund (FAT) that 
each year transfers automatically 40% of the revenues to BNDES in a quasi-equity funding 
mechanism and it is remunerated at the Long-term interest rate (TJLP). Other voices are 
represented by Fundraising Abroad, the PIS/PASEP fund (social contributions fund for workers’ 
insurance), the FI/FGTS fund (the investment arm of the worker’s compensation fund), 
Repurchase Agreement, BNDESPAR Debentures and Other Obligations. 
BNDES portfolio comprises Corporate Stakes, Bonds and Securities and Other assets.  Cash flow 
per source of resources shows that return on operations account for almost 80% of the total cash 
flow; moreover, BNDES system’s default rate in 2013 was at a record low, reflecting the strength 
of its credit and on-lending portfolio. The percentage was only 0.01% in the first 2014 quarter, 
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lower than the 0.04% registered in the same period in 2013. According to the Brazilian Central 
Bank, the average default rate for the National Financial System was 3% in March 2014. 
 
1.4.2.1. The role of the accredited financial institutions 
The dissemination of accredited financial institutions all over Brazil is crucial to disseminate credit 
to micro and SME’s in all the national territory. Some operations of BNDES are carried out only 
by these institutions, such as investment projects for a value lower than R$ 10 million (with some 
exceptions), separated acquisitions of machinery and equipment of any value and investment 
projects or acquisition of machinery, equipment and working capital financed by only one form 
of indirect funding. 
 
1.4.3. Main critiques on BNDES and the need to look at the 
long-term impact 
Concerning the critiques on BNDES role in the Brazilian economy, previous literature has not 
offered clear predictions about the determinants of allocation of funding and firms’ selection; 
some authors argue BNDES selects firms with good performance to be more likely to be repaid 
(Lazzarini and Musacchio 2011) or highlight the limitations of the picking-winner strategy from a 
“market failures” perspective (Garcia, Oliveira et al. 2011). Forero (2013) discussed about BNDES 
quick growth and the “too” long-lasting intervention in the countercyclical policies. Finally 
Schwartsman (2011) criticised the recent increase in BNDES direct credit lines, adding to the 
already high proportion of subsidized direct credits in the Brazilian economy (more than 30% of 
the total amount of loans) and contributing to limit the role of monetary policy.  
Overall, the main accusation moved to BNDES is to crowd-out private banks in providing long-
term loans (Wheatley 2013), therefore hampering the development of the local financial markets. 
The main reason of crowding-out is the rate BNDES charges on its loans (TJLP for direct 
disbursement, plus accredited financial institutions’ fees for indirect operations) is less than the 
Selic overnight interest rate set by the Central Bank. 
Barone and Spratt (2015) summarized the main critiques moved to BNDES as presented in Table 
1.4 below: critiques are categorized by thematic areas and look at environmental, social, economic 
and accountability issues contested to the Brazilian development bank.  
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Table 1.4 - Summary of critiques moved to BNDES 
Environmental issues Social issues 
 
Adverse impact on 
the Brazilian 
economy 
 
Transparency and 
accountability issues 
The BNDES’s energy 
strategy risks further 
contributing to climate 
change 
Sector-specific 
regulations are 
insufficient in 
practice 
Energy efficiency 
overlooked 
No external assessment 
Not having signed the 
Equator Principles 
Serious violations 
of legal, health 
and safety 
conditions, 
culminating in the 
use of slave labour 
Business interests 
dominate 
No detail on the 
Ombudsperson 
No independent 
evaluation of the 
environmental impacts of 
financed projects 
Invasion of 
indigenous land 
Displacement of 
agricultural crops to 
less productive areas 
No public consultation 
carried out prior project 
finance approval 
  
Reinforcing inequality 
 
  
Crowding-out effect 
 
  
Public money for 
centrally prioritised 
investments 
 
  
Concessionary finance 
raises Brazilian interest 
rates 
 
  Low profitability of 
funded projects 
 
Source: Barone and Spratt (2015) 
The quantitative literature on the impact of BNDES on the industrial sector (particularly 
manufacturing) has seen different scholars trying to establish links with different indicators of 
labour productivity, which however does not represent the only contribution of public R&D 
resources to economic performance (David, Hall et al. 2000). Ottaviano and Sousa (2007) tried 
to establish the impact of BNDES loans on average labour productivity, finding a mixed evidence 
with a three-year lag depending on whether the loans were for small or large scale projects. Ribeiro 
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and De Negri (2009), using TFP as productivity measure, found a limited effect of access to 
BNDES lending for machinery acquisition on the TFP of innovative firms in the manufacturing 
sector from 1996 to 2006; however, the focus is only on one credit line, FINAME because of its 
outlay and the main mission targeted at machinery acquisition. Finally, Lazzarini and Musacchio 
(2011) published a financial analysis on the impact of BNDES loans and equity investments on a 
sample of Brazilian listed firms between 2002 and 2009. They concluded BNDES loans do not 
have any consistent impact on performance and investment.  
 
1.5. The Brazilian financial sector 
Credit in Brazil, until the middle of the 2000s, has been characterized by scarcity, high volatility, 
high cost, high concentration and segmentation (Torres and Zeidan 2016). Despite the 
privatization of financial institution in the 1990s, that contributed to the fast growth and 
concentration2 of the Brazilian credit system from 2004 to 2012, some areas, such as the market 
for long-term funds, are still characterized by supply constraints. That is why Brazilian public 
financial institutions remain an important source of capital in the economy; in 2014, state-
controlled banks have been responsible for 53% of the outstanding loans in Brazil while the share 
of outstanding loans of private financial institutions contributed for only 32% (Lazzarini, 
Musacchio et al. 2011; Rezende 2015). In this scenario, the share of BNDES’ outstanding loans 
represented more than 20% of the total credit to the private sector and the bulk of the long-term 
credit (Lazzarini, Musacchio et al. 2011). 
Although real interest rates declined from 2002 to 2012, from an average of 12% in 2002 to 4% 
in 2012, the difference between short-term lending rates and commercial banks’ funding costs for 
loans is higher relative to the long-term financing activities (Rezende 2015), shifting portfolio’s 
preferences of Brazilian commercial banks towards high-yield, short-term assets rather than to 
long-term assets, characterized by low-risk adjusted returns.  
1.6. Summary 
This chapter has provided a summary on what the role of development banks over the years and 
on the academic debate about the necessity of such financial institutions. Further, this chapter 
introduced the Brazilian development bank, BNDES, and its primary role played in the Brazilian 
economy for the last 20 years, together with the Brazilian political, financial and industrial 
environment.  
 
2 From 1995 to 2012, the share of assets of the 10 largest banks increased from 71% to 89% (Torres and 
Zeidan 2016) 
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Summarizing the following chapters of this PhD thesis, the second chapter looks at whether the 
disbursement of the Brazilian development bank have crowded-in or out financial resources of 
private commercial banks; the third chapter is a micro-analysis of the impact of BNDES resources 
for R&D on manufacturing companies’ own commitment in R&D expenditure and, finally, the 
forth chapter evaluates the impact of BNDES contribution in reducing the risk associated to 
investments in innovation for the Brazilian pharmaceutical and biotech industries. Chapter 5 
concludes the thesis by summarizing the findings of all chapters. 
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2. Is BNDES an efficient government tool to 
transmit policy decisions without hampering 
the development of the private national 
financial system?  
 
I evaluate the impact of BNDES disbursements on Brazilian commercial banks’ 
disbursement using balance-sheet data for the period of 2002-2016. Using dynamic 
panel data techniques, I find BNDES disbursement for both investment in 
innovation and fixed capital investments crowded-in commercial banks’ 
disbursement. Further, the results obtained considering the distribution before and 
after 2008, suggest the beginning of the crowding-in impact together with the 
countercyclical role adopted by the bank at the beginning of the financial crisis. 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The role of public spending in the economy has always represented an academic and political 
topic of debate. With the well accepted paradigm of the role of the State as coordinator of 
industrial and economic strategies (Rodrik 2004), one of the main academic questions remains 
whether public financial resources hamper or foster the development of the national economy 
and of the national private financial sector.  
Since the end of WWII, public financial institutions have represented the main tool for 
governments to address public disbursement and to transmit policies’ decisions to the real 
economy (Mazzucato and Penna 2014). Their role has changed over time to address the economic 
and social challenges faced by the countries at each time (de Aghion 1999); still, the persistent 
critique is about the resource misallocation due to the inefficiencies of the central government, 
(Robinson and Torvik 2005; Torres and Zeidan 2016) and of non-virtuous crony capitalism 
(Carvalho 2014). Further, they are often accused of crowding-out either private companies’ 
disbursement (Aschauer 1989) and private banks’ disbursement (McKinnon 1973). 
The 2008 global financial crisis brought back the discussion about the relationship between 
private and public financial resources in the economy. The necessity of public financial resources 
to support the economies hit by the crisis has not been questioned, yet there is still no agreement 
on which forms of public financial support should be more appropriate. USA enacted the 
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“Emergency Economic Stabilization Act” right at the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008, 
supporting the US economy with an injection of $700 billion mainly addressed to the re-purchase 
of distressed financial assets. The Eurozone announced in 2015 an expansionary monetary policy, 
the quantitative easing, to buy-back roughly €60 billion (€ 80 billion from 2016) per month of 
bonds from the central governments of the euro-area. In other countries, such Brazil, China but 
also Germany, public development banks have represented the government tool to transmit 
countercyclical policies and to direct financial resources towards investments, both private and 
public.  
This chapter, using balance-sheet data of commercial banks operating in Brazil for the period 
2002-2016, looks at the impact of the disbursement of BNDES on their financial disbursement. 
Further, following the new countercyclical role of the bank since 2009, this analysis will also split 
the analysis in two periods, to evaluate possible differences in the impact before and after the use 
of BNDES as a government tool to direct countercyclical financial resources. 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review on the relationship 
between public and private financial resources. Section 3 presents the econometric methodology 
followed by the presentation of the data used in the analysis in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 
presents the results and the following Section 6 concludes the chapter. 
 
2.2. Literature Review 
The crucial role of finance in a country’s development process has been highlighted by 
Schumpeter in “The Theory of Economic Development” (1934), and remarked both in the National 
System of Innovation literature (Freeman 1987; Lundvall 1992; Lundvall 2010) and in the 
literature on economic development (Wade 1990; Chang 2002; Rodrik 2004). Whether public 
financial institutions play a positive or negative role in the economy is a long academic and 
political debate on the relationship between private and public financial institutions that has not 
yet arrived to a clear consensus (Tylecote 2007; Mazzucato and Penna 2014). 
Academic literature has provided different theories and theoretical models to approach the debate 
on the relationship between government, public and private financial institutions. Shaw (1973) 
and McKinnon (1973) have been among the first authors to define the concept of financial 
repression; according to the authors, in both developing and developed countries, government 
interventions, regulations and public ownership of financial institutions have contributed 
throughout the years to hamper the development of competitive national financial systems by 
altering the capital allocation mechanism, therefore causing instability of prices and in the balance 
of payments. High reserve or liquidity ratios, capital controls, interest ceiling and public control 
of financial institutions are identified as the main determinants of financial repression.  
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Looking at the resources to be invested by financial institutions, McKinnon (1973) proposed the 
complementarity hypothesis based on the positive relationship between savings (investments) and real 
broad money balances, particularly in developing countries where domestic savings are equal to 
domestic financed investments because of banks’ self-financing constraints. Shaw (1973), looking 
at countries with developed financial systems, proposed the financial deepening hypothesis. The 
development of a national financial system implies that money assets are not the only resource 
for investments anymore. Cash deposits can now also be used to increase the lending resources 
of financial intermediaries. Non-money assets can be accumulated and used to relax banks’ 
constraints on cash availability and therefore altering the complementarity among savings and real 
money balances proposed by McKinnon. The positive relationship proposed by McKinnon will 
eventually turn into a negative relationship when the country will reach a higher degree of financial 
development, indicating the substitutability among financial and non-financial assets. Both 
authors, besides the different interpretation on the role of deposits, had in common the idea that 
higher interest rate increases deposits which in turn will lead to higher bank lending activity and 
that, particularly in developing countries, the interest rate has systematically been kept below the 
equilibrium level by governments, hampering the economic and financial development of the 
country.  
Contrary to financial repression, academic literature has identified financial liberalization, 
specifically in terms of freely floating interest rate, as one of the most effective government 
measures to support economic development of the countries through the development of the 
national financial systems (Shaw 1973). Empirical evidence on the relationship between interest 
rate and savings is however mixed and in many studies on financial liberalization has been 
associated with a reduced saving rate (Gmech 2003). Further, recent financial liberalization 
together with deregulation policies in the global markets have also led to the worst economic 
crisis the globalized economy ever experienced, raising some questions on the long term 
sustainability of liberalized financial markets (Rezende 2015). Concerns on whether financial 
liberalization would have automatically led to economic development have however being raised 
well before the 2008 economic crisis hit the world economy, particularly about risks of instability 
and excessive levels of risk embedded in complex financial markets (Minsky 1992; Knight 2005; 
Rajan 2006). 
It is possible to distinguish three phases of the empirical literature on financial repression. The 
first phase, following the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, focused on the impact of financial 
repression on investment and savings, particularly in developing countries. Academic interest then 
moved towards other possible impacts of financial repression, namely economic growth and 
poverty. More recently, and increasingly after the 2008 global financial crisis, empirical literature 
started looking at the adverse impact of financial liberalization, particularly when combined with 
deregulated economies. 
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Looking at the history, the scarcity of financial resources provided by the private sector requires 
an alternative source of credit (Mazzucato 2013a; Mazzucato 2013b), particularly in developing 
countries where this scarcity is more exacerbated (Barone and Spratt 2015). Further, for both 
developed and developing countries, this lack of financial resources is more severe for long-term 
and high risks investments for which private financial sector has been proven over the years, at 
best, underbudgeted (Minsky 1981; Haldane and Davies 2011). The patient finance needed to 
promote social and economic development has generally been offered by the public sector (de 
Aghion 1999; Mazzucato 2013a) and in recent scenarios of commercial banks’ credit crunch the 
question is on whether the private financial sector can distribute adequate financial resources. 
Historically, development banks (also called State Investment Banks or more generically public 
banks) have been the main public actors in providing long-term and committed financial 
resources (Rodrik 2004; Mazzucato and Penna 2014; Torres and Zeidan 2016).  
In both “developmental” (Gerschenkron 1962) and “political” (Shleifer and Vishny 1994) views of 
government participation in the economy, public ownership of financial institutions is considered 
as a means to promote government’s goals, more efficient than providing financial resources 
through subsidies or influencing the direction of commercial banks’ resources through 
regulations. However, in the theoretical neoclassical debate, public ownership of financial 
institutions is considered a determinant of countries’ financial repression. This is mainly due to 
the lower-than-market interest rate applied to the loans, inefficiency, creation of distortions in the 
market for capital allocation (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes et al. 2002; World Bank 2012) and 
crowding-out both private financial institutions’ (McKinnon 1973) and companies’ financial 
resources (Aschauer 1989).  
How monetary policy decisions are transmitted to the real economy is a topic that has not yet 
been fully explained (Bernanke and Gertler 1995). The role of commercial banks in the monetary 
policy transmission mechanism has been highlighted in the bank lending channel theory, 
postulating that a monetary policy shock affects not only the loan demand, as stated in the 
standard money view of monetary policy transmission, but also the loan supply through its impact 
on banks’ reserves and consequently deposits. Also, the impact of a monetary policy shock is 
heterogeneous and differs according to the size of the bank. Empirical literature has so far tested 
the existence of a bank lending channel in different countries. Kashyap and Stein (1995; 2000) for 
US, Ehrmann Gambacorta et al. (2001) for the Euro area, Pruteanu‐Podpiera (2007) for Czech 
Republic and, for Brazil, Takeda, Rocha et al. (2005) and Coelho, De Mello et al. (2010) are among 
the authors that have provided empirical evidence in support of the credit channel. 
To understand the degree to which BNDES can have an impact on the credit market, this analysis 
will rely on the model widely used in the bank lending channel literature and adapt it to account 
for BNDES disbursement. 
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Empirical evidence has so far highlighted how public financial institutions may have a crowding-
out impact on the bank lending channel only through increased public borrowing (Hauner 2009). 
To the best of my knowledge, there is no micro empirical evidence on the impact of BNDES 
disbursement on commercial banks’ disbursement. The only empirical evidence on such topic has 
been produced by Arnold (2011) that performed a macro analysis finding “weak” crowding-out 
impact of BNDES disbursement on credit disbursed by private financial institutions.  
 
2.3. Methodology 
The econometric model departs from the specification firstly proposed by Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988) and further developed by Ehrmann, Gambacorta et al. (2001) and, for Brazil, by Takeda, 
Rocha et al. (2005). This model is adapted to the more recent stream of literature on loan supply 
reaction to monetary policy shocks using data on banks characteristics, such as size and 
capitalization, as introduced by Kashyap and Stein (1995). All these authors provided empirical 
evidence on the bank lending channel of the monetary transmission mechanism and analysed the 
reaction of commercial bank loans to monetary contractions. 
Following the work of Ehrmann, Gambacorta et al. (2001) and Pruteanu-Podpiera (2007), I 
specify a preliminary model that describes the indicators likely to affect the growth rate of 
commercial banks’ financing activity, outlined in first differences (Δ) due to non-stationarities, 
excluding banks’ characteristics: 
Δ ln 𝐿𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗Δ ln 𝐿𝑖(𝑡−1) +
𝑚
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝛾𝑗Δ ln 𝑟𝑡 +
𝑚
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜃𝑗Δ ln 𝑦(𝑡−1) +
𝑚
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜑𝑗 𝐶𝑃𝐼(𝑡−1) +𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑚
𝑗=1      (1)       
Where t=1,…,T is a given year and i=1,…,N with N being the total number of banks and m is 
the number of lags. The growth rate of commercial banks’ loans (𝐿𝑖𝑡) in a given year is related to 
its lag; a monetary policy indicator 𝑟 - either interest rate or reserve requirement ratio; two 
indicators of the economic activity: GDP (𝑦) and the consumer price index (𝐶𝑃𝐼). Differently 
than the authors previously mentioned, the monetary policy indicator, calculated as a 12-month 
average, enters in the equation with no lag. This decision is due to the shorter time lag necessary 
for decision of monetary policy to get to get transmitted to the real economy with the interest 
rate. The focus of this analysis will then move to equation (2) with the inclusion of bank 
characteristics3. 
Δ ln 𝐿𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗Δ ln 𝐿𝑖(𝑡−1) +
𝑚
𝑗=1  ∑ 𝛾𝑗Δ 𝑟𝑡 +
𝑚
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜃𝑗Δ ln 𝑦(𝑡−1) + +
𝑚
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜑𝑗 𝐶𝑃𝐼(𝑡−1)  + 𝜆1Δ𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑚
𝑗=1   (2)                                  
Where 𝑥 represents commercial banks characteristic; according to the literature, commercial 
banks characteristics that are likely to affect the amount of financing activity are related to the 
 
3 This analysis not interested in the heterogeneity of commercial banks’ responses, thus this model does 
not present any interaction of banks’ characteristics with the monetary policy indicators. 
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size, liquidity of the financial institution. As in Takeda and Rocha (2005), Pruteanu-Podpiera 
(2007) among others, banks’ characteristics are normalized with respect to the mean across all 
banks to avoid any possible trend as follows: 
                        𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 = ln(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡) −
1
𝑁𝑡
∑ ln(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡)𝑖   (3) 
                        𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑖𝑡
=
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
−
1
𝑁𝑡
∑
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑖                (4) 
Given the primary role played by BNDES in the last 20 years, this paper contributes to the 
literature by identifying to what extent this active participation of the Brazilian development bank 
contributed to foster or hinder the development of the commercial banks’ system in Brazil. In 
detail, the focus of the analysis is on whether BNDES disbursement, addressed to foster the 
development of the Brazilian industrial sector, have stimulated additional financial resources from 
the private financial sector. This evidence would represent a scenario in which public resources, 
addressed to specific national goals such financing productive investments, create an additionality 
in the provision of loans, crowding-in the disbursement of commercial banks. Consequently, I 
add BNDES activity, measured in terms of annual disbursement, as an additional explanatory 
variable in Equations (1) and (2), that gives the following equations (5) and (6) :  
Without banks’ characteristics 
Δ ln 𝐿𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗Δ ln 𝐿𝑖(𝑡−1) +
𝑚
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝛾𝑗Δ ln 𝑟𝑡 +
𝑚
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜁𝑗Δ ln 𝐵𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑆(𝑡−1) +
𝑚
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜃𝑗Δ ln 𝑦(𝑡−1) +
𝑚
𝑗=1
                                          + ∑ 𝜑𝑗 𝐶𝑃𝐼(𝑡−1) +𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑚
𝑗=1                                      (5) 
With banks’ characteristics 
Δ ln 𝐿𝑖𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑗Δ ln 𝐿𝑖(𝑡−1) +
𝑚
𝑗=1  ∑ 𝛾𝑗Δ 𝑟𝑡 +
𝑚
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜁𝑗Δ ln 𝐵𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑆(𝑡−1) +
𝑚
𝑗=1 ∑ 𝜃𝑗Δ ln 𝑦(𝑡−1) +
𝑚
𝑗=1
                                            + ∑ 𝜑𝑗 𝐶𝑃𝐼(𝑡−1)  + 𝜆1Δ𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
𝑚
𝑗=1                            (6) 
As presented above, BNDES disbursement enters the equation with one lag to account for the 
time frame necessary for the financial resources to get first disbursed and further have an impact 
(if any) on commercial banks’ disbursement. The signs of the coefficient (𝜁) relative to BNDES 
disbursement will therefore give an indication on the relationship between commercial banks and 
BNDES activity. In detail, a positive (negative) and statistically significant coefficient would 
represent a situation a scenario in which public resources have “crowded-in” (“crowded-out”) 
additional demand for financial resources from the private financial sector. Alternatively, if 
commercial banks disbursement is not affected by the disbursement of BNDES, the coefficients 
will do not report any statistically significant impact. Thus, this analysis looks at the specific 
research question:  
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“Can a development bank be the government tool to transmit industrial policy decisions 
to the real economy without hampering the growth of the private financial sector by 
crowding-out its disbursement? 
The chapter then proceeds by splitting the sample in two periods, before and after the 2008 global 
financial crisis. The countercyclical role adopted by the development bank at the beginning of the 
global financial crisis should evidence a different impact of BNDES disbursement due to the new 
additional role of the bank. If the use of BNDES as an additional government tool to transmit 
countercyclical policy decisions has been successful, the results should observe a different impact 
of BNDES disbursement before and after the 2008 crisis. Therefore, this analysis will also try to 
answer this following research question: 
“Can development banks disbursement be used as an additional government instrument 
to transmit countercyclical policy decisions to the real economy without crowding-out 
commercial banks’ disbursement?” 
The results will shed light on the impact of public financial institutions used as additional 
government instrument for the development of the private national financial sector. Given the 
model presented in equation (5) and (6) with lagged BNDES disbursement variable, the second 
period of the analysis starts in 2010 due to the beginning of the new countercyclical role of 
BNDES in 2009.  
Concluding, banks with no disbursement have been dropped from the sample together with 
banks above (below) the 98th (2nd) percentile for the distributions of loans that have been 
considered as outliers. The final sample accounts for 123 commercial banks operating in Brazil 
during the years of the analysis.  
  
2.4. Data 
Information on banks characteristics are obtained from the Estatística Bancária Mensal (Monthly 
Banking Statistics), which include information on the balance position of commercial banks and 
multiple banks with commercial portfolio4 in Brazil. The dataset includes information such as 
amount of total financing activity, total and liquid assets, amount of deposits, amount of reserves 
and other balance sheet’s indicators. For the purpose of this analysis, data on bank loans are only 
referred to the financing activity of the banks, defined by the Accounting Chart for Institutions 
of the National Financial System (COSIF)5 as:  
 
4 The data are publicly available at http://bit.ly/2pPseyI   
5 Available at http://bit.ly/2wjPdVr  
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“… operations carried out with specific destination, linked to the verification of the application of resources. 
Examples are the financing of industrial parks, machinery and equipment, durable consumer goods, rural and real 
estate.”  
This analysis will therefore not include other types of credit operations carried out by commercial 
banks, such as loans for working capital, personal loans, advances to depositors and securities 
discount operations. This strategy is explained by the focus of this analysis for the market for 
financial resources for long-term investments due the higher impact of fixed capital investments 
for countries’ economic growth. 
Data on GDP, reserve requirement ratios and interest rates are obtained from BCB-DEPEC, 
whereas information on the inflation rate are produced by IBGE6 and calculated as the 12-months 
accumulated monthly variation of the IPCA, the Brazilian consumer price index. Finally, data on 
BNDES disbursement are publicly available in the BNDES website7. A detailed explanation about 
BNDES data is provided in the following Section 3.1. 
 
2.4.1. Data on BNDES disbursement 
The analysis looks specifically at two types of loans issued by BNDES: loans issued by FINAME, 
one of the three main subsidiaries of BNDES issuing loans for fixed capital acquisitions, and 
loans issued by the entire BNDES system targeted at investments in innovation, including those 
issued by FINAME8. The FINAME disbursement is selected to compare similar indicators for 
commercial banks’ and BNDES’ disbursement, given the nature of BNDES which does not issue 
personal loans or other financial services usually carried by commercial banks. Investments in 
innovation are instead selected because characterized by very high embedded risk which causes 
commercial banks to not supply the necessary amount of financial resources (Mazzucato 2013a; 
Mazzucato 2013b). At the same time, these investments are the main drivers of industries’ long-
term economic growth which in turn stimulates additional demand for financial resources. 
The BNDES system comprises a variety of different financial products and associated financial 
instruments, with determined targets of investments or customers. Further, the innovation 
policies put in place by Brazil including different industrial sectors of the economic scenario, 
made possible for BNDES to have different and targeted products and instruments to financially 
support the companies. Table 2.1 shows the number of loans issued by BNDES listed by financial 
product. 
 
 
6 All the variables are publicly available at http://bit.ly/2wNwOVm   
7 Available at http://bit.ly/2pPakMN   
8 The classification of loans for investment in innovation has been kindly provided by BNDES. 
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Table 2.1 – Number of loans for innovation by BNDES financial products  
BNDES Loans for Innovation 
BNDES AUTOMÁTICO 561 BNDES LIMITE DE CRÉDITO 24 
BNDES FINEM 480 FUNDOS 19 
BNDES FINAME 120 DEBÊNTURES CONVERSÍVEIS 4 
BNDES NÃO REEMBOLSÁVEL 117 OPERAÇÃO FINANCEIRA 3 
BNDES FINAME AGRÍCOLA 59 OUTROS 2 
RENDA VARIÁVEL 54 BNDES FINAME LEASING 1 
   Total        1,444 
      Table 2.1 reports the number of different BNDES’ financial products for innovation disbursed in the period 2002-2016. 
As it is possible to notice from Table 2.1, BNDES mainly relies on four financial products to 
finance investments in innovation. The BNDES AUTOMATICO and FINEM, financing 
indirect and direct operations, represent the two main products used by BNDES, followed by the 
FINAME product, dedicated to fixed capital acquisitions and by the BNDES non-refundable 
disbursements. Table 2.2 shows the top 2 financial instruments associated to the main BNDES 
financial products9. 
Table 2.2 – Number of loans for innovation by top 2 BNDES financial instruments 
associated to main financial products 
 Table 2.2 reports the number of loans of the top 2 instruments associated to the main BNDES product for the year 2002-2016 
As reported above, the variety of targeted products and instruments issued by BNDES allows the 
development bank to differentiate its disbursement throughout most of the Brazilian industrial 
scenario.  
 
9 For the complete list of financial instruments by BNDES product, please refer to Table in the 
Appendix. 
Financial Product Financial Instrument 
BNDES AUTOMÁTICO 
Inovagro 443 
PSI - Inovação 76 
BNDES FINEM 
Bndes Prosoft 166 
PSI - Inovação 86 
BNDES FINAME 
PSI - BK - Tecnologia Nacional 90 
PSI - Inovação - BK Eficientes 27 
BNDES NÃO REEMBOLSÁVEL 
Funtec 109 
Fundo Amazônia 8 
BNDES FINAME AGRÍCOLA 
Inovagro 59 
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Regarding the disbursement of BNDES FINAME, it is composed by three main products: 
FINAME, FINAME AGRÍCOLA and FINAME LEASING. Figure 2.1 shows the overall 
disbursement of the FINAME by product together with the overall disbursement for investments 
in innovation. 
Figure 2.1 –Disbursement in innovation and FINAME by product (r$ Billion) – 2002-
2016
 
 Source: Author’s own elaboration 
BNDES FINAME has by far the largest development, followed by the disbursement on 
innovation, which already includes the disbursement of FINAME for investments in innovation. 
It is therefore possible to notice how the amount of financial resources addressed towards 
innovation represent a very limited portion of BNDES disbursement. Finally, in the recent years 
BNDES disbursement consistently decreased due to the political instability and following changes 
in the economic targets of the new Brazilian administration. However, due to lagged variables 
used in the model explained in the following Section 4, data on 2016 will not be considered. 
 
2.5. Results 
After the financial turbulences during the 90s, characterized by high and volatile interest rate, the 
Selic interest rate had a constant decline until 2013, briefly interrupted at the beginning of the first 
Lula’s administration in 2002. Figure 2.2 shows the evolution of the Selic interest rate together 
with the evolution of commercial banks’ disbursement over the period 2002-2016. 
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Figure 2.2 – Selic interest rate and Commercial banks disbursement 2002-2016
 
  Source: Author’s own elaboration 
As shown by Figure 2.2, commercial banks’ disbursement dropped with the global financial crisis 
to then observe a modest growth between 2009 and 2011, and eventually increased in the 
following three years. In 2013, Brazilian private financial system experienced a second crisis with 
a one year drop in terms of disbursed financial resources. 
Moving the focus on bank characteristics, Table 2.3 presents the main descriptive statistics for 
the commercial banks considered in this analysis by size quartile.  
Table 2.3 – Main descriptive statistics of Brazilian commercial banks by quartile of size 
2002-2016 
 Quartile of Size 
 0%-25% 25%-50% 50%-75% 75%-100% All Sample Total 
Loans (R$ million) 
68 561 1604 5266 1,852 227,796 
Total Assets (R$ million) 2080 12579 47445 530618 145,663 17,916,549 
Total Deposits (R$ million) 4.9 26.5 98.6 188.6 78.9 9,705 
Number of banks 33 31 29 30 123  
Table 2.3 presents the main descriptive statistics of the Brazilian private financial sector by quartile of size for the years 2002-2016 
 
 
Table 2.3 highlights the heterogeneity of commercial banks in the Brazilian private financial 
sector, with remarkable differences between large and small commercial banks in terms of size 
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and disbursement. Large commercial banks lend almost one-hundred times more than the smaller 
private banks and present a higher leverage with respect to both total assets and total deposits. 
Focusing on the model, the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable 
requires the estimation of a dynamic panel data. This analysis implements the Generalized Method 
of Moments (hereinafter “GMM”) designed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This strategy removes 
individual effects by applying a first difference on the autoregressive model and it further 
instruments the dependent variable with its own lagged values. As in most of the empirical 
literature (Takeda, Rocha et al. 2005; Pruteanu‐Podpiera 2007), all other variables are considered 
exogenous. However, in the robustness check section, the analysis will also be performed 
considering banks’ characteristics as endogenous, where the overall results do not change. GMM 
methodology is efficient in presence of large N and small T and in absence of serial correlation 
in 𝜀𝑖𝑡, which is indicated by a significant negative first-order correlation. Further, in presence of 
small number of instruments, the validity of the set of instruments is tested by the Sargan test, or 
in case of a heteroscedasticity, by the Hansen test. Due to different specifications of the individual 
weighting matrix, the model estimates both one-step and two-steps estimates. According to 
Arellano and Bond (1991), the asymptotic standard errors of the two-steps estimator can be 
misleading even though they should be more efficient being based on the one-step residuals. This 
analysis will therefore present the one-step estimates as main results, including the two-steps 
results in the Table A2.11 in the Appendix. Due to the presence of a downward bias caused by 
weak instruments in the first-differenced estimator, the model has been estimated using a forward 
orthogonal transformation as suggested by Blundell and Bond (2000). This analysis observes 123 
commercial banks for the period 2002-2016. Table 2.4 presents the results for the models in 
equations (5) and (6). Correlation coefficients are instead presented in Table A2.11 in the 
Appendix. 
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Table 2.4 – GMM One-step estimation results – All Sample with Selic interest rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝑩𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑺 𝑰𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒕−𝟏  0.144* 0.145** 0.138*    
 (0.076) (0.068) (0.074)    
𝑩𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑺 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑨𝑴𝑬𝒕−𝟏     0.571** 0.641*** 0.548** 
    (0.275) (0.218) (0.268) 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1  0.806*** 0.705*** 0.791*** 0.796*** 0.710*** 0.785*** 
 (0.081) (0.079) (0.078) (0.083) (0.081) (0.080) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1  -1.603 -1.647* -1.476 -3.295* -3.741*** -3.112* 
 (1.015) (0.908) (0.986) (1.707) (1.364) (1.650) 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑐)𝑡  0.008 0.014 0.005 -0.006 -0.001 -0.008 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1  -0.046 -0.039 -0.045 -0.027 -0.019 -0.027 
 (0.029) (0.025) (0.029) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡  
 0.592***   0.594***  
  (0.054)   (0.054)  
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 
  0.140**   0.138** 
   (0.064)   (0.065) 
Observations 940 940 940 940 940 940 
Number of groups 123 123 123 123 123 123 
Sargan p-value 0.0834 0.133 0.0776 0.0588 0.171 0.0608 
Hansen p-value 0.271 0.322 0.231 0.238 0.325 0.233 
AR1 -5.132 -4.930 -5.119 -5.232 -5.078 -5.230 
AR1 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.515 -0.416 0.423 0.480 -0.371 0.394 
AR2 p-value 0.607 0.678 0.672 0.631 0.711 0.694 
Number of Instruments 95 96 96 95 96 96 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
Table 2.4 presents the results of the GMM one-step regressions with exogenous banks’ characteristics. Columns (1), (2) and (3) 
refer to the model with the inclusion of BNDES loans directly aimed at innovation activities. Columns (4), (5) and (6) refer to the 
model with the inclusion of BNDES loans of the category FINAME. 
All model specifications are consistent as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient 
relative to the first order correlation, AR1, ensuring the absence of serial correlation in 𝜀𝑖𝑡 and by 
the non-rejection of the Hansen test that confirms the validity of all set of instruments.  
Results in column (1) and (4) are to be referred to the benchmark model in equation (5), the 
remaining show the results for the model presented in equation (6) with the two different bank 
characteristics. Regarding the main variables of interest, BNDES disbursement for investment in 
innovation and for fixed capital acquisition, the overall significance and positive sign indicate the 
presence of a crowding-in of BNDES disbursement on commercial banks’ financial activity. 
These interesting results provide evidence of a scenario in which the disbursement of public 
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financial institutions did not harm the development of the private financial sector but, on 
contrary, it contributed to the growth of available financial resources in the economy. 
Among the variables accounting for the demand side, GDP has a negative and significant 
coefficient in all specifications except two, whereas the inflation rate does not have any significant 
impact on commercial bank loans. The negative sign of the GDP coefficients can be explained 
by the increased interest of Brazilian banks for financial assets other than loans for investment 
following recent development and globalization of financial markets. Finally, the interest rate does 
not have any impact on the amount of loans disbursed by commercial banks. This quite surprising 
non-significance of the coefficient might however indicate a situation in which the Brazilian 
government have been unable to transmit decisions of monetary policy through changes in 
interest rate. Moving the focus to bank characteristics, as expected bigger and more liquid banks 
tend to lend more as it is shown by the positive and significant coefficients.  
The analysis then moves by splitting the sample into two periods, before and after the 2008 
economic crisis, to assess any possible difference in the impact of BNDES disbursement 
following the countercyclical role adopted by the bank in response to the global financial crisis. 
Table 2.5 presents the coefficients of both BNDES disbursement variables10. As explained in 
Section 4, due to the model specification in difference, the two periods have been divided in two 
subperiods, 2002-2009 and 2010-2016, to account for the disbursement of BNDES in 2009, 
considered as the beginning of Brazilian countercyclical policies. 
Table 2.5 - GMM One-step estimation results – Two periods: Coefficients of Growth 
rate of BNDES Loans 
BNDES Loans for Innovation BNDES FINAME 
Results 2002-2009 2010-2016 Results 2002-2009 2010-2016 
(1) 
-0.005 0.262 
(4) 
-0.544 0.596* 
(0.114) (0.264) (0.774) (0.346) 
(2) 
0.023 0.388** 
(5) 
-0.287 0.720*** 
(0.098) (0.191) (0.710) (0.275) 
(3) 
0.001 0.271 
(6) 
-0.555 0.610* 
(0.112) (0.260) (0.769) (0.341) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Table 2.5 presents the coefficients of the main variables of interest (BNDES loans for innovation and loans from the FINAME 
product) for two-periods split sample. 
As highlighted by Table 2.5, BNDES disbursement for investment in innovation does not have 
any impact if not in the second period, consistently with the main results in Table 2.4, when the 
 
10 For the complete set of results with two periods, please refer to Table A3 in the Appendix 
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model controls for size of the bank. The impact of BNDES disbursement for fixed capital 
investments instead, while not significant in the period 2002-2008, is showing a positive and 
significant impact on commercial bank loans in the second period. This indication of crowding-
in in the after-crisis is particularly interesting in the light of the countercyclical role adopted by 
BNDES during the economic crisis (Mazzucato and Penna 2014). According to the above results, 
the crowding-in impact of BNDES disbursement starts when the bank has been used as one of 
the tools of the government to transfer countercyclical policy decisions to the real economy. 
Before this role, BNDES disbursement had no impact on commercial banks’ financial 
disbursement. As important conclusion, these findings do not show any evidence of crowding-out 
of BNDES activity on commercial banks’ disbursement, even before the 2008 economic crisis 
when the disbursement of the Brazilian development bank did not have any impact in the supply 
of credit of private financial institutions.   
2.5.1. Robustness Checks 
The analysis will now present the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable compared to its 
coefficients in the OLS and Fixed Effect results. In the OLS regression, the lagged dependent 
variable is supposed to be upward biased due to the presence positive correlation with 𝜀𝑖𝑡. On 
contrary, the coefficients of the Fixed Effect estimations, particularly in contexts of small N large 
T are likely to be downward affected by the Nickell bias (Nickell 1981) due to the negative sign 
on 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1. Table 2.6 presents the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable compared to the 
OLS and Fixed Effects results to ensure the right calibration of the model11. 
Table 2.6 –Robustness check – Comparison coefficients Loans Growth Rate (Lagged) 
Results OLS FE 
GMM 
One-step Results OLS FE 
GMM 
One-step 
(1) 0.876*** 0.587*** 0.806*** (4) 0.877*** 0.588*** 0.796*** 
 (0.023) (0.053) (0.081)  (0.022) (0.053) (0.083) 
(2) 0.739*** 0.525*** 0.705*** (5) 0.740*** 0.528*** 0.710*** 
 (0.035) (0.052) (0.079)  (0.035) (0.051) (0.081) 
(3) 0.875*** 0.590*** 0.791*** (6) 0.876*** 0.591*** 0.785*** 
 (0.023) (0.053) (0.078)  (0.022) (0.053) (0.080) 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 2.6 presents a comparison between the lagged loan growth rate coefficients of the OLS, FE and GMM one-step regressions. A correct 
specification of the model implies the GMM one-step coefficient to be between the OLS and FE estimated coefficients. 
In all model specifications, the coefficients of the lagged dependent variable lie between the OLS 
and the fixed effect estimates, indicating a correct measurement of the GMM estimator.  
 
11 For the complete OLS results, please refer to Table A4 in the Appendix 
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In most of the empirical literature and in the model presented in this chapter, banks characteristics 
are considered exogenous to the model. As additional robustness check, as in Ehrmann 
Gambacorta et al. (2001), banks characteristics are considered endogenous and instrumented with 
their lagged values. Table 2.7 shows the GMM One-step results with banks characteristics 
considered as endogenous determinants of commercial banks’ disbursement12. 
Table 2.7 – Robustness check – GMM One-step results with endogenous bank 
characteristics 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
𝑩𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑺 𝑰𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒕−𝟏  0.144* 0.129** 0.135*    
 (0.076) (0.064) (0.073)    
𝑩𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑺 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑨𝑴𝑬𝒕−𝟏     0.571** 0.590*** 0.533** 
    (0.275) (0.204) (0.266) 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1  0.806*** 0.537*** 0.759*** 0.796*** 0.554*** 0.753*** 
 (0.081) (0.071) (0.074) (0.083) (0.071) (0.075) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1  -1.603 -1.092 -1.357 -3.295* -3.109** -2.939* 
 (1.015) (0.889) (1.000) (1.707) (1.305) (1.646) 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑐)𝑡  0.008 0.021 0.007 -0.006 0.007 -0.006 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1  -0.046 -0.034 -0.045 -0.027 -0.016 -0.027 
 (0.029) (0.024) (0.029) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡   0.807***   0.824***  
  (0.082)   (0.084)  
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡   0.092   0.092 
   (0.102)   (0.104) 
Observations 940 940 940 940 940 940 
Number of groups 123 123 123 123 123 123 
Sargan p-value 0.0834 0.000 0.0223 0.0588 0.000 0.0172 
Hansen p-value 0.271 0.652 0.729 0.238 0.677 0.691 
AR1 -5.132 -4.126 -5.167 -5.232 -4.225 -5.269 
AR1 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.515 -0.938 0.456 0.480 -0.837 0.427 
AR2 p-value 0.607 0.348 0.648 0.631 0.403 0.670 
Number of Instruments 95 133 133 95 133 133 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
Table 2.7 presents the results of the GMM one-step regressions with endogenous banks’ characteristics. Columns (7), (8) and 
(9) refer to the model with the inclusion of BNDES loans directly aimed at innovation activities. Columns (10), (11) and (12) 
refer to the model with the inclusion of BNDES loans of the category FINAME. 
As shown by Table 2.7, the overall results do not change if not for the coefficients of liquidity 
that become insignificant once instrumented with its own lagged value. Looking at the main 
variables of interest, results are still consistent with the main model. BNDES disbursement from 
 
12 For the Two-steps results, please refer to Table A5 in the Appendix 
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the FINAME subsidiary is persistently positive and statistically significant, while BNDES 
disbursement for investments in innovation is significant only when the model controls for size.  
The original model presented in Section 3 accounts only for past BNDES disbursement, not 
considering the contemporaneous financial resources disbursed by the public bank. In a scenario 
of perfect substitutability among the two financial resources, the amount of financial resources 
disbursed by public banks are resources that would otherwise be provided by the private financial 
sector. Consequently, an increase (decrease) in public financial resources has a detrimental 
(incremental) impact on the amount of private banks’ disbursement. In this light, as previously 
highlighted in Section 3.1, the size of BNDES FINAME disbursement might represent a source 
of crowding-out of contemporaneous commercial banks resources. The following Table 2.8 
presents the result of the model accounting for both contemporaneous and lagged disbursement.  
 
 Table 2.8 – Robustness check – GMM One-step results - Model accounting for 
contemporaneous BNDES disbursement 
 (13) (14) (15) 
𝑩𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑺 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑨𝑴𝑬𝒕  0.027 -0.126 0.019 
 (0.153) (0.145) (0.151) 
𝑩𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑺 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑨𝑴𝑬𝒕−𝟏  0.559** 0.749*** 0.543** 
 (0.277) (0.219) (0.271) 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1  0.812*** 0.723*** 0.800*** 
 (0.083) (0.080) (0.080) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1  -3.351** -4.025*** -3.179** 
 (1.664) (1.308) (1.610) 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑐)𝑡  -0.005 -0.009 -0.007 
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.022) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1  -0.027 -0.023 -0.027 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.028) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡    0.594***  
  (0.054)  
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡   0.139** 
   (0.064) 
Observations 940 940 940 
Number of groups 123 123 123 
Sargan p-value 0.0441 0.124 0.0447 
Hansen p-value 0.291 0.358 0.275 
AR1 -5.181 -5.085 -5.178 
AR1 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.486 -0.390 0.397 
AR2 p-value 0.627 0.697 0.691 
Number of Instruments 96 97 97 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
Table 2.8 presents the results of the GMM one-step regressions with exogenous banks’ characteristics, accounting for 
contemporaneous and past BNDES FINAME disbursement. Columns (13) refers to the model without banks’ characteristics, 
Columns (14) and (15) refer to the model with the inclusion of, respectively, size and liquidity  
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The results show no relationship between BNDES disbursement and contemporaneous amount 
of loans disbursed by commercial banks. These findings also confirm the previous crowding-in 
indication of past BNDES disbursement on the financial activity of commercial banks.  
Finally, as highlighted by Takeda, Rocha et al. (2005), in a context with undeveloped financial 
markets like the Brazilian economy, other tools such as the required reserve ratio can act as valid 
monetary policy instruments. The main advantage of using in the analysis reserve requirement 
rates over short-term interest rate is given by the fact that the coefficient of interest rate might 
capture the impact on the loan demand effect on the bank loans equation, problem that does not 
arise when considering reserve requirement rates. The following Table 2.9 proposes the GMM 
One-step results with reserve requirements on overall deposit, demand, time and saving deposits 
used as monetary policy instrument instead of the Selic interest rate13.  
Table 2.9 – Robustness check – GMM Two-steps estimation results - Average 
requirement ratio as monetary policy indicator 
 (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
𝑩𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑺 𝑰𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒕−𝟏  0.181** 0.150** 0.172**    
 (0.078) (0.076) (0.078)    
𝑩𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑺 𝑭𝑰𝑵𝑨𝑴𝑬𝒕−𝟏     0.642** 0.671*** 0.604** 
    (0.269) (0.218) (0.262) 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1  0.806*** 0.706*** 0.791*** 0.803*** 0.708*** 0.791*** 
 (0.082) (0.080) (0.079) (0.083) (0.080) (0.080) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1  -2.143** -1.952* -1.941* -3.612** -3.892*** -3.315** 
 (1.076) (1.026) (1.050) (1.587) (1.294) (1.531) 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡  3.437 1.117 3.060 2.542 1.053 2.164 
 (3.838) (3.686) (3.851) (3.471) (3.271) (3.460) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1  -0.048** -0.029 -0.049** -0.040* -0.022 -0.041* 
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡   0.591***   0.594***  
  (0.054)   (0.054)  
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡   0.138**   0.137** 
   (0.064)   (0.065) 
Observations 940 940 940 940 940 940 
Number of groups 123 123 123 123 123 123 
Sargan p-value 0.0892 0.145 0.0819 0.0543 0.174 0.0554 
Hansen p-value 0.353 0.271 0.297 0.235 0.305 0.231 
AR1 -5.235 -5.018 -5.220 -5.376 -5.151 -5.370 
AR1 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.512 -0.443 0.423 0.463 -0.379 0.382 
AR2 p-value 0.608 0.658 0.672 0.643 0.704 0.702 
Number of Instruments 95 96 96 95 96 96 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
Table 2.9 presents the results of the GMM one-step regressions with exogenous banks’ characteristics and reserve requirement as 
monetary policy instrument instead of the Selic interest rate. Columns (16), (17) and (18) refer to the model with the inclus ion of 
BNDES loans directly aimed at innovation activities. Columns (19), (20) and (21) refer to the model with the inclusion of BNDES 
loans of the category FINAME 
 
13 For the two-steps results, please refer to Table A6 
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Results shown in Table 2.9 are consistent with all previous results shown in this chapter, with 
BNDES disbursement for both investment in innovation and fixed capital showing a crowding-
in impact on commercial banks’ resources. 
2.6. Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter has been to evaluate whether BNDES disbursement have contributed to 
the development of the Brazilian private financial sector or hampered it by crowding-out its 
disbursement. Results show that, while during the period 2002-2008, BNDES had no impact on 
commercial banks’ disbursement, the countercyclical role assumed by BNDES at the beginning 
of the financial crisis in 2008 had a positive impact on the amount of financial resourced disbursed 
by Brazilian private banks. Such positive evidence on the use of a development bank as an 
additional instrument for central governments to transmit policy decisions, should encourage 
additional research on this topic. 
These findings shed light on the long debate about additionality/substitutability of private and 
public financial resources providing evidences of a virtuous interaction, in the short-term, 
between these two sources in a country with one of the most active development banks. To 
overcome the impossibility of this study in generalizing the findings for a longer timescale, further 
analysis may investigate the extent to which such virtuous interaction lasts in the long term. 
In terms of policy recommendation, with the recent need of countercyclical policies to offset the 
economic and social downturns emerged since 2008, this chapter provides evidence on how 
development banks, or public banks in general, can be the tool of central government to transmit 
policy decisions to the real economy while directing the financial resources towards national 
targets defined by economic, industrial and social policies. The possibility of having both these 
roles, as government financial instrument and as a support for the achievement of national goals, 
can represent the value added of using development banks’ financial resources instead of changes 
in interest rate when transmitting government decisions to the real economy. In such way, 
government can channel the additional resources to targets that otherwise would not be possible 
to reach using the traditional instruments, as the interest rate or the reserve requirement ratio. 
Finally, if the public financial resources succeed in stimulating additional demand, all scenarios of 
possible crowding-out of commercial banks’ disbursement should disappear due to the increased 
demand for loans faced by private banks. 
This chapter demonstrates that the implicit neoclassical assumption of public resources 
hampering the development of a national private financial system is not always straightforward. 
At least for the Brazilian case, the active role of BNDES after the 2008 financial crisis has 
generated an increase of financial resources from private banks, indicating a crowding-in impact.  
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3. Fostering innovation activities of the 
national industrial system with the support 
of a development bank: incentivizing greater 
commitment or displacing financial 
resources? 
I evaluate the impact of BNDES disbursements on companies’ R&D intensity of 
companies operating in the Brazilian manufacturing sector for the period of 2003-
2011. Using Instrumental Variable (IV) technique, I find a crowding-in impact of 
receiving funding from BNDES on business-funded innovation intensity, resulting 
in an increased commitment in innovation activities for funded Brazilian 
manufacturing companies.  The findings of this analysis provide new evidence 
regarding the industrial sector activity of the Brazilian development bank, adding 
on the debate about additionality/substitutability of public financial resources.  
 
3.1. Introduction 
This analysis evaluates the impact of BNDES disbursement on business-funded innovation 
expenditure for Brazilian manufacturing companies. If crowding-out effect occurs, companies’ 
commitment in innovation activities will decrease after receiving public financial resources. 
Alternatively, in case of crowding-in effects, companies will increase their innovation activities 
due to the receipt of public funding. Figures 1 and 2, looking at to recent evolution of R&D 
expenditure, show that input additionality might have played an interesting role in Brazil. 
Figure 3.1 - Evolution of S&T Expenditure (R&D plus correlated activities), by source 
(Current R$ billion) 
     
Source: MCTI 
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Figure 3.2 - S&T Expenditure (R&D plus correlated activities) as % GDP, by source 
Source: MCTI 
The recent trends of public and private expenditure for R&D seem to show a complementarity, 
or a crowding-in scenario, between the two different financial sources. In this context, the 
Brazilian Development Bank, BNDES, is one of the main actors fostering industrial innovation 
(Ferraz, Além et al. 2013). 
 
3.2. Literature Review 
3.2.1. The degree of complementarity or substitutability of 
public financial resources 
The interest of academic literature on the complementarity/substitutability of public resources in 
the economy has contributed to a long debate that sees different schools of economic thought 
polarized in different positions. 
In neoclassical economic theory, the role of the State is to fix market failures (Mazzucato 2013a). 
Any public intervention beyond this scope would cause a displacement of resources, raising prices 
and interest rates, therefore limiting the investments of the private sector (Sundararajan and 
Thakur 1980). However, this limited role of facilitator precludes the possibility for the State to 
accomplish the role of “opportunity creator” as depicted in Lazonick and Mazzucato (2013), a role 
that needs to be funded with adequate resources. 
Aschauer (1989), found that higher public investments raises the national rate of capital 
accumulation above the equilibrium level chosen by private-sector agents, crowding-out private 
investments. The crowding-out occurs because individuals will decrease their savings and 
investments as a consequence of the disequilibrium in the national rate of capital accumulation, 
eventually leading to a new equilibrium level. At the same time, public investments with high 
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social return can raise the marginal productivity of private capital, crowding-in private 
investments. The crowding-in of companies’ own resources ends when private marginal rates of 
return exceed the social rates of return, a situation in which direct public funding is more likely 
to cause an “investment displacement” (David, Hall et al. 2000). 
When public funding takes the form of loans, crowding-out effect may also occur on the side of 
commercial banks, as discussed in Chapter 2. Particularly for loans in the most profitable sectors, 
the lower-than-market interest rate applied by public institutions hampers the development of a 
domestic financial market (McKinnon 1973). On the other side, liquidity constraints and high 
prudence in intermediating deposits do not allow commercial banks to finance long-term 
investments with high embedded risk (Rodrik 2004). 
The interest on the impact of public R&D funding on companies’ innovation engagement has 
been remarkable in the last decades with, however, most of the studies presenting a potential 
selection bias that might have affected the conclusions of the authors (David, Hall et al. 2000). 
More recent studies correct for this selection bias with different econometric methodologies. 
Aerts and Czarnitzki (2004), Aerts and Schmidt (2008), Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), Czarnitzki, 
Ebersberger et al. (2007), Duguet (2003), Gonzalez and Pazo (2008), Görg and Strobl (2007) 
correct for the selection bias with a non-parametric matching approach; Busom (2000), Hussinger 
(2008), De Negri, Lemos et al. (2006b) implemented a Heckman two-step selection model; Lach 
(2002) implemented a Difference-in-Difference estimator; finally, Wallsten (2000) used an IV 
approach to correct for endogeneity in his model.  
The predominant question taken in exam by the aforementioned authors is whether public 
funding (generally subsidies) crowds-out companies’ investments. Findings have been so far 
ambiguous: Busom (2000) finds positive impact of public funding on Spanish manufacturing 
companies’ R&D activities, however she cannot exclude partial crowing-out for 30% for her 
sample. Czarnitzki and Fier (2002) do not find evidence of full crowding-out for the German 
Service industries. Lach (2002) reports positive effects for small Israeli manufacturing firms and 
no effect on large firms. Wallsten (2000) finds full crowding-out effect for the US program SBIR 
aimed at increasing R&D activities for small and medium companies.  
Regarding Brazil, De Negri, Lemos et al. (2006a; 2006b) found positive impact on firm’s own 
R&D disbursement for two government programs, one for technological development support 
and one for a university-enterprise research program. Lazzarini, Musacchio et al. (2011), using a 
subsample of companies traded on the stock exchange, find no impact of BNDES loans or equity 
investments on the performance of the companies and on their level of investment. Their findings 
on the decrease of financial expenditures have to be mainly attributed to the subsidy applied to 
the loan. Also, the authors do not find any evidence of BNDES selecting underperforming firms, 
therefore excluding any “bailing-out” role of the bank and, further, authors found that companies 
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donating political contributions to the winning candidates, in a scenario where both profitable 
and non-profitable companies donate to political parties, are more likely to receive funding from 
the Development Bank.     
 
3.2.2. The role of the Public Sector and the need of financial 
resources 
The importance of an industrial policy with an active public sector equipped with the necessary 
resources has been profoundly highlighted in the literature (Rodrik 2004; Lazonick and 
Mazzucato 2013; Mazzucato 2013a). Further, an industrial policy targeting innovation activities 
requires a large and constant flow of financial resources particularly if characterized by high risk, 
as investments in industrial innovation.  
As Minksy (1981) wrote, the model in which banks were supposed to establish a long-term 
relationship based on trust and commitment with borrowers is no longer existing. The “loan-officer 
desk” model is now replaced by a new one, in which banks simply sell their loans as assets (to then 
resell them as financial instruments as in the recent home-mortgage securitization in U.S.) through 
the “position making desk” (Wray and Tymoigne 2008). Banks are now more focussed on short-
term profits coming from financial markets rather than in long-term relationships based on trust, 
leaving the market for loans to an impersonal relationship between agents where customers are 
rated according to credit scores methods (Kregel 2008). Given the short-term focus of the 
commercial bank system (Haldane and Davies 2011) and given the higher profitability of the 
financial compared to the non-financial sector (Wray 2011; Kay 2012; Block 2014), governments 
have to find a more reliable source of finance, that does not only rely on the maximization of 
profits in the short run14 and able to supply a constant flow of credit.  
The high uncertainty involved in innovation projects makes long-term finance the central tool to 
obtain resources for investments in innovation, bringing therefore the attention on what kind of 
financial institution is necessary to provide it. Public funding has always been present in different 
forms in all countries. In the United States, the leading role of public agencies as the Defence 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 
and others in financing and creating a new space in the industrial environment has been 
highlighted in Mazzucato (2013a). Public finance institutions, with different targets and missions, 
exist in many developed and developing countries: Canada, Chile, South Africa and Finland, are 
countries in which public financial institutions have performed relatively well (Rudolph 2009); 
 
14 In some economies, there is the further problem of ‘financialization’, spending profits on boosting stock 
prices, rather than on long-run areas like human capital and R&D. For example, an increasing problem 
in advanced economies, is the use of share buybacks (to boost stock options, hence executive pay) rather 
than reinvesting the profits in a long-term innovations (Lazonick and Mazzucato 2013) 
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Latin America, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa are the world regions characterized by a large 
presence of development banks (Levy-Yeyati, Micco et al. 2004). Finally, Mazzucato and Penna 
(2014) argue that development banks are indeed playing a greater role in innovation today than 
before, due to the way in which private financial institutions have become focused on short-term 
gains and following the increasing role of innovation in national missions.  
3.2.2.1. The critiques on an active role of the Public Sector 
Most of the critiques on a direct public intervention in the economy come from the rent-seeking 
literature for which politicians pursue in an active role in the economy to maximise their own 
personal utility (Shleifer and Vishny 1994) or are alternatively captured by interest groups into 
corruption (Ades and Tella 1997). As a consequence, politicians might bail out failing firms for 
particular political interests, or simply select firms with higher and closer political connections 
(Faccio 2006). The neoclassical remedy for these pathologies is the removal of trade barriers and 
a better institutional framework (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003). In some countries and particularly 
in Latin America, these orthodox remedies did not however produce the expected outcomes. 
Countries that largely adopted the policies proposed by the Washington Consensus have 
experienced a worsening of their economic situation (Lora 2012). Being widely understood that 
the adoption of these policies does not automatically produce economic development, the role of 
the State as coordinator of economic and industrial strategies is nowadays recognised by all 
different economics doctrines (Rodrik 2004).  
Another accusation moved to an active participation of the State comes from the monetary policy 
literature, precisely about the neutrality of money. When the State puts financial resources into 
the economy either increases the inflationary pressure or, alternatively causes an increase of the 
interest rate to offset this inflationary pressure (Aschauer 1989).  
 
3.3. Methodology 
The effect of public spending on company’s R&D investment depends on several factors, such 
as the elasticity of supply of private capital, the percentage of the investment funded by public 
resources and the degree of marginality of the loan. The degree of marginality is the most 
important factor in determining company’s own R&D expenditure. Assuming increasing costs of 
capital and decreasing marginal returns to investment, a marginal loan is more likely to increase 
company’s own R&D expenditure and commitment, while an inframarginal loan is more likely to 
increase total R&D expenditure while reducing company’s R&D commitment. If the firm faces 
a perfectly elastic supply of private capital, this will cause the company to decrease its R&D 
expenditure by the amount of the loan, causing a dollar-for-dollar crowding-out of company’s 
own commitment (Wallsten 2000). 
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My analysis will therefore try to evaluate whether BNDES commitment helped firms to go 
beyond their previous investment efforts, increasing their level of financial participation in R&D 
investments. In this study, I present the results for both the entire sample and companies 
reporting positive innovation expenditure, accounting for 72% of the total sample. Further, due 
to the focus of the research question on the impact of BNDES intervention in incentivizing a 
greater commitment in innovation activities, I only consider the impact of receiving financial 
resources at year t. It is reasonable to assume that receiving external financial resources should 
immediately relax companies’ liquidity constraints, because decisions on the amount of resources 
to invest are primarily taken considering the current financial situation and the opportunity to 
extract profit from the investment. Hence, once received credit, companies will in turn decide 
whether to increase or decrease their financial commitment in innovation activities, incentivized 
by the industrial policies in place. 
The study will provide an understanding on the importance of a public financial institution with 
a developmental mission in stimulating greater companies’ commitment in innovation activities, 
particularly for developing countries where the private banking system contributes only marginally 
to high-risk investments as the ones in innovation (Mazzucato 2013a). Further, this study will 
examine the importance of development banks with defined targets and missions coming from a 
broader industrial agenda at national level, with the aim of creating an industrial environment with 
less perceived risk for the companies.  
The analysis will first present the results of an OLS model on the impact of BNDES’ loans on 
companies R&D intensity. Further, to correct for the potential selection bias of being selected by 
BNDES, my study will implement an instrumental variable approach. 
 
3.3.1. The Model 
This section describes the model implemented in my analysis. To show the importance of 
controlling for endogeneity, I firstly run an Ordinary Least Square regression with some measure 
of firm productivity on the BNDES loan received. I therefore estimate: 
                               𝑅&𝐷 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝑋
′𝛿1 + 𝐵𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 𝛿2 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                            (1) 
Where  𝑅&𝐷 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 =  
𝑂𝑤𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 (𝑅$ 𝑀𝑖𝑙𝑙)
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡
, 𝐵𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑆𝑡 is a dummy variable taking value 
1 for companies receiving loans from BNDES. By expressing the dependent variable as a ratio of 
number of employees, I focus primarily on the relative magnitude of financial resources devoted 
to innovation activities. The variable will therefore act as a proxy to indicate the level of 
participation of the company in innovation and whether BNDES stimulated a greater 
commitment. An alternative proxy to measure the level of companies’ R&D intensity has often 
47 
 
been the ratio of companies’ own expenditure in innovation activities over the turnover (De 
Negri, Lemos et al. 2006b; De Negri, Lemos et al. 2006a). However, the higher volatility of 
companies’ turnover over the number of employees suggests this latter indicator as more 
appropriate to use in a proxy measuring the level of R&D intensity. 
The assumption of the model is that, for coefficients 𝛿2 ≠ 0, the BNDES loan is disbursed for 
investments related, directly or indirectly, to industrial innovation. This assumption can be 
retained plausible due to the main mission of the Brazilian Development Bank targeted at 
industrial innovation. Hence, it is quite realistic to assume that the majority of loans disbursed by 
the bank are mainly targeted to projects related somehow to such activities. 
The vector 𝑋′ includes factors that influence companies’ own R&D expenditure as receiving 
financial resources for innovation from other public and private sources, the age (in log), a 
measure of labour productivity expressed as the ratio of turnover on the number of employees, 
the export status, whether the company has a R&D department and performs continuous R&D 
activities.  
In presence of endogeneity, OLS estimator will provide bias results, showing high correlation 
between receiving a loan from BNDES and the error term. 
 
3.3.2. Instrumental Variable Approach 
Section 3.3.2 introduces the instrumental variables used in this analysis to correct for endogeneity. 
The appropriate instruments must be correlated with the endogenous variable and uncorrelated 
with unobserved factors affecting the dependant variable. In other words, all instruments should 
affect the probability of receiving a loan from BNDES without having any direct impact on 
company’s own commitment in innovation expenditure. 
The instruments selected for my analysis are a measure of the “Solvency Indicator” of the 
company, expressed as the ratio between firm’s running innovation expenses funded by 
borrowing and the firm’s turnover (expressed in terms of net sales)15, its square and “Receiving 
tax incentives”  for innovation activities in the last three years before the survey. The use of the 
degree of solvency of the company had already been proposed by De Negri, Lemos et al. (2006a; 
2006b) that, looking at the impact of two different programs of another Brazilian innovation 
agency (FINEP), justified their choice of the exclusion restriction for their Heckman selection 
 
15 The ratio has been calculated expressing the numerator in R$ ’000th and the denominator in R$ million. 
The rescaling of the instrumental variable has been necessary due to the (expected) unproportionate size 
of net sales compared to the other indicator. Nevertheless, the validity and meaningfulness of the indicator 
is not affected by such transformation, simply requiring carefulness in the interpretation of the coefficients 
and in the calculation of the maximum (minimum) of the function.       
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model being solvency one of the criteria of the agency to grant funding. Same argument can be 
used for the purpose of this analysis and specifically in the case of BNDES, given the nature of 
loan of the financial instruments disbursed, which rely on the financial stability of the borrower 
to get repaid. Contemporaneously, having already received financial resources from other 
institutions can also act as a signal to BNDES by indicating those companies that already have 
been successfully screened and selected, hence to some extent, that are reliable. If this latter 
signalling effect dominates the former, the coefficient should report a positive sign and the 
inclusion of its squared term, whether negative and significant, should capture a likely non-linear 
relationship. Alternatively, whether the financial stability argument dominates the signalling effect, the 
degree of solvency indicator will report a negative and significant coefficient with a not-a-priori 
expected significance for the squared coefficient.  
The use of tax incentives as instrument variable instead, and the idea that such instrument is not 
directly related to the dependent variable, is explained by the ex-post nature of this indirect source 
of finance; tax incentives are requested once the investment had already been funded by the 
company and decisions on how to spend the financial resources obtained from the tax incentives  
are made primarily by the companies that might direct those funds towards investments related  
or not to innovation. For similar reasons already used for the solvency indicator, being entitled 
of receiving tax credits might represent a signal suggesting BNDES that the company is already 
involved in innovation activities and has already successfully received financial resources from 
public institutions, although indirectly.  
3.3.3. The Identification Strategy for the Linear Estimator 
To control for endogeneity, I use a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator 
instrumenting for the endogenous variable. The choice of GMM over 2-Stage-Least-Square 
(2SLS) and Limited Maximum Likelihood Information (LIML) estimation method is due to the 
higher efficiency of this estimator under the standard 2SLS assumptions, i.e. strong instruments 
and exclusion restrictions. The process is modelled as follows: at Stage 1 the company decides 
whether to apply to BNDES with a project to fund. At Stage 2 the company knows whether it 
received the loan and alters its behaviour.  
      𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝟏:   𝐵𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑1(𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡) + 𝜑2(𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡)
2 + 𝜑3(𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑖𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   (2)  
     𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒈𝒆 𝟐:    𝑅&𝐷 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝜗𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜉𝐵𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑆̂ 𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝑡                                                                                   (3)   
The set of covariates 𝑋𝑖 includes factors that influence companies’ own R&D expenditure as 
whether the company received any other financial resource for innovation from other public or 
private institutions, the age of the company (in log), the ratio of the turnover on the number of 
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employees as a measure of labour productivity, the export status, whether the company has a 
R&D department and performs continuous R&D activities.  
 
3.4. Data 
The main datasets used in my analysis are the Annual Industrial Survey (PIA), the Technological 
Innovation Survey (PINTEC) both from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), 
and BNDES data on industrial disbursement covering the years 2003-2011. 
PIA contains yearly data by sector of activity on output and expenditure of Brazilian 
manufacturing companies, of which I use data for the years 2003-2011. The three main groups 
of variables contained in the survey can be summarised as follow: 
- Information about longitudinal relations across firms 
- Balance sheet and income statement information 
- Economic information beyond the balance sheet and income statement 
Since 1996, the industrial survey changed its sampling method to include small and new firms 
together with a complete survey of companies with more than 30 workers. The survey contains 
two strata: a non-random sample of all medium-to-large companies with more than 30 workers 
and a random sample of small (5>workers <29) and medium companies. (Muendler 2003). 
Regarding sample selection, the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics IBGE, uses a firm 
register based on the from the tax register office CNPJ, from the Ministry of Labour RAIS and 
other sources. 
The technological Innovation Survey (PINTEC) provides information on technological 
innovation of the Brazilian manufacturing firms, following the European Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS). The survey has been conducted for the years 2003, 2005, 2008, 2011. It contains 
information on firms’ innovative effort (expenditure for internal/external R&D, acquisition of 
R&D, whether R&D activities are occasional or recurrent, presence of R&D department, 
information about number and qualification of individuals working in R&D, etc.) and funding 
resources for innovation (public/private/own). Qualitative variables are collected for a period of 
three years: the survey year and the previous two years; quantitative variables are collected only 
for the year of the survey (Lustosa 2011). The sample is drawn from the list of enterprises with 
more than 10 employees registered and active on the Register of Enterprises Cempre. 
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Finally, BNDES data on industrial commitment contains information on the amount disbursed 
to the company, length of the disbursement, interest rate, date of disbursement, etc. The data are 
publicly available16, however BNDES’ support has been extremely useful in compiling the dataset. 
Merging all the datasets, it is possible to have a representative profile of the Brazilian 
manufacturing sector, knowing whether the firm is innovative, how much is spent on innovation 
and what are the sources, the output structure and the profitability of the firms. 
 
3.4.1. The Brazilian public financial system in the 
economic crisis 
Particularly in a financial crisis, the flow of financial resources is limited by the volatility of the 
markets and/or by liquidity constraints of commercial banks (Mazzucato 2013a; Mazzucato and 
Penna 2014).  
Figure 3.3 shows that the Brazilian private financial system experienced two different crises. The 
first one in 2003 during the short Brazilian recession and the second in 2008 following the more 
recent financial crisis. These two crises have been however of different nature and length. The 
2003 recession is Brazil was caused by the Argentinean bailout together with contractionary 
polices put in place by the newly established Lula administration, with increased interest rates and 
primary fiscal surplus targets (de Carvalho and de Souza 2011).  
Figure 3.3 – Total Financial System Loans to Industry (current R$ billion) 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on data from BCB  
While Brazilian private financial system recovered quickly from the first recession in 2003, the 
2008 worldwide financial crisis hit the Brazilian private banks system with more long-lasting 
 
16 Dataset available at: 
http://www.bndes.gov.br/SiteBNDES/bndes/bndes_pt/Institucional/BNDES_Transparente/Consulta
_as_operacoes_do_BNDES/painel_consulta_diretas.html  
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effects. From Figure 3.3 it is possible to notice how commercial banks loans to industry recovered 
their pre-crisis level in one year, repositioning again above the level of public loans in 2004. The 
impact of the 2008 financial crisis on commercial banks loans to industry has been different. After 
the initial reduction in 2008, the amount of private banks loans to industry grew less than the 
amount of public loans and since 2011 the amount of public loans to industry exceeds the amount 
of private loans. 
The 2008 financial crisis also had an impact on loans for industry targeted to the highest class of 
risk as depicted in Figure 3.4.  
Figure 3.4 – Total Financial System Loans to Industry – Class Risk 2 (current R$ million) 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on data from BCB 
Excluding the drop in 2005, the amount of loans of commercial banks to industry for high risk 
investments has been fairly constant. Since 2008, the amount of commercial bank loans for 
industry targeted at the highest class of risk shows a higher volatility compared to the amount of 
public loans. It is of particular interest to highlight also the countercyclical behaviour of public 
loans to industry in 2009, which practically offset the first reduction in the amount of private 
loans. 
 
3.4.2. Indicator of company’s increased commitment in 
innovative activities 
I aim to investigate whether receiving a loan for investment from BNDES has any significant 
impact on company’s level of R&D intensity, defined as companies’ own innovation expenditure 
(in R$ million) over the number of employees.  
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3.4.3. Data Limitations 
As mentioned above, in the PINTEC, qualitative variables are collected for a period of three 
years: the survey year and the previous two years; quantitative variables are collected only for the 
year of the survey (Lustosa 2011). 
Regarding BNDES data, I do not have any information about companies that applied for a loan 
and did not obtain it, nor do I have any information about ranking or classification of the projects 
made by BNDES in the decision process. Further, data on disbursement are not only for 
investment in innovation but they refer to all disbursed loans. It is however plausible, due to the 
main mission of BNDES targeted at industrial innovation, to assume that all disbursement is 
somehow broadly targeted at innovation activities. 
Finally, I do not know from which other public institutions, if any, the company received 
additional funding for R&D investment for the year it also received BNDES funding.  
 
 
3.5. Contribution to the literature 
The results will contribute to the existing literature by shedding a light on the crowding-in/crowding-
out debate on companies’ level of R&D intensity caused by public financial resource. In addition, 
the results will add to the limited empirical evidence referred specifically to development banks 
and their role in providing financial resources to the industrial department. The overarching 
research question of this chapter is: 
“Given the 2004 decision of the Brazilian government to focus on innovation in the 
industrial sector, what has been the contribution of the main public Brazilian financial 
institutions so far?  Is BNDES relaxing firms’ constraints on R&D expenditure, 
incentivising a greater commitment or crowding-out companies’ resources?” 
The research question will hence examine whether BNDES funding activity have incentivized 
private companies to increase their level of commitment in R&D activities. If so, this would 
determine a crowding-in scenario of BNDES resources denoting a beneficial impact of the Brazilian 
development bank in the light of the innovation-based industrial development proposed by the 
Brazilian industrial policies in the years of interest. 
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3.6. Results 
3.6.1. Descriptive Analysis 
This section presents the descriptive statistics for the companies present in this analysis. Table 
3.1 reports the main companies’ characteristics for the all sample and form companies reporting 
positive expenditure in innovation activities.  
Table 3.1 - Main companies’ characteristics by categories 
 All Sample 
Companies with positive 
Innovation Expenditure 
 BNDES  BNDES  
 No Yes Total No Yes Total 
Number of Employees 
2044 3488 2555 2336 4019 2960 
(4230) (6242) (5080) (4750) (6943) (5722) 
Age 
28.2 27.9 28.1 28.3 28.8 28.5 
(12.9) (14.8) (13.5) (13.1) (14.6) (13.7) 
Export 
61.3% 59.3% 60.6% 67.1% 64.9% 66.3% 
      
Net Sales (R$ Mil) 
1059 1969 1381 1351 2361 1726 
(6401) (8485) (7217) (7580) (9651) (8430) 
Total Expenditure in Innovation (R$ Mil) 
21.2 52.8 32.4 30.0 69.4 44.6 
(107.8) (186.1) (141.2) (127.5) (210.4) (164.2) 
Private financial resources (R$ Mil) for innovation 
0.65 1.37 0.91 0.92 1.80 1.25 
(4.99) (13.7) (9.2) (5.9) (15.7) (10.7) 
Public financial resources (R$ Mil) for innovation 
2.25 10.9 5.34 3.18 14.4 7.35 
(14.1) (44.5) (29.1) (16.6) (50.5) (33.9) 
Own financial resources (R$ Mil) for innovation 
18.3 40.5 26.1 25.9 53.1 36.0 
(99.6) (170.5) (129.6) (117.7) (193.7) (151.1) 
BNDES Disbursement (R$ Mil) 
0.00 57.2 20.2 0.00 66.0 24.5 
 (205.1) (124.8)  (230.1) (143.7) 
R&D intensity (Own Expend R$ Mil\Employees) 
0.44 1.21 0.71 0.62 1.59 0.98 
(2.2) (6.8) (4.4) (2.5) (7.7) (5.1) 
Continuous R&D 
46.4% 51.9% 48.3% 64.9% 66.8% 65.6% 
      
R&D Department 
54.7% 59.5% 56.4% 74.5% 74.5% 74.5% 
      
Tax Incentive 
20.7% 29.2% 23.7% 28.6% 36.0% 31.3% 
      
N 1128 617 1745 797 470 1267 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on PIA (Annual Industry Survey), PINTEC (Technological Innovation Survey) and BNDES 
data on disbursement to manufacturing companies. Standard deviations are reported in brackets 
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Table 3.1 shows that companies receiving a loan from BNDES have higher number of employees, 
higher turnover, spend more than double the money in innovation and are receiving more 
financial resources from both public and private financial institutions with respect to their 
counterparts. Further, they also report higher level of R&D intensity, are more likely to perform 
continuous R&D activities, to have a R&D department and to have benefitted from tax incentives 
in the past three years. This first evidence seems to support the accusation moved to development 
banks (Lazzarini and Musacchio 2011) and in general to all public sector, of selecting companies 
with the best performances following a picking-winner strategy. Regarding the different 
contribution to companies’ overall expenditure in innovation, Table 3.2 reports the origin of the 
different financial resources spent by the companies. The results reported in Table 3.2 are for 
companies with positive innovation expenditure only. 
Table 3.2 - Average Contribution to companies’ total expenditure in innovation 
 
Funded by BNDES  
 
No Yes Total 
Private Financial resources  4.4% 3.7% 4.1% 
Public Financial resources  12.0% 22.3% 15.8% 
Own Financial resources 83.4% 73.9% 79.8% 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on PIA (Annual Industry Survey), PINTEC (Technological 
Innovation Survey) and BNDES data on disbursement to manufacturing companies 
Looking at the ratio of innovation expenditure from different financial sources over the total 
amount spent by the company in innovation, funds from own financial resources represent by far 
the highest proportion of the overall expenditure for both companies funded and not funded by 
BNDES. Financial resources from public financial institutions represent the second source of 
funding for innovation activities, with companies funded by BNDES reporting almost double the 
contribution of these funds. Finally, the proportion of funds from private sources does not 
significantly vary among the funded and not funded companies, representing in both scenarios a 
very marginal contribution to the overall commitment in innovation. The scarce contribution of 
private banking sector to companies’ investments in innovation raises concerns on whether 
private banking sector in Brazil represents an adequate source of finance for these peculiar types 
of investments, usually characterized by high embedded risk. The marginal contribution of private 
banking sector can have two explanations: either private banking sector is crowded-out by the public 
sector or it is too risk adverse. Even though it would be interesting to also investigate the 
relationship between commercial banks and public sector, being an interesting aspect of the 
crowding-in/out literature, this paper does not focus on the causes of this limited role of the 
private banking sector, but only on the crowding-in/out of companies’ own resources. Such topic 
has already been analysed in the second chapter of my PhD thesis, where I find evidences of a 
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positive impact of BNDES disbursement on the amount of Brazilian private banks’ disbursement 
for gross fixed capital investments. Further, results show that one of the major determinants of 
this crowding-in is to be attributed to the countercyclical role played by BNDES since the 
beginning of the global financial crisis. Looking at the size of the companies, the following Table 
3.3 presents the main companies’ characteristics by size and category BNDES funded.  
Table 3.3 - Companies with Positive Innovation Expenditure by Size and Category 
BNDES funded 
 
Size 
 
Small Medium Large 
BNDES Funded No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Number of Employees 64.9 69.1 294 314 3099 4727 
Age 20.9 13.3 25.3 21.6 29.7 30.4 
Net Sales (R$ Mil) 35.64 24.41 168.2 194.8 1793 2775 
Total Expenditure in Innovation (R$ Mil) 2.92 1.88 8.53 18.4 38.3 79.4 
Private financial resources (R$ Mil) for innovation 0.06 0.04 0.17 0.21 1.20 2.1 
Public financial resources (R$ Mil) for innovation 0.89 0.35 1.47 11.20 3.84 15.3 
Own financial resources (R$ Mil) for innovation 1.98 1.49 6.88 7.01 33.15 62.0 
Private Innov Expend (% Total Innov Expend) 2.2% 5.0% 4.1% 3.2% 4.6% 3.7% 
Public Innov Expend (% Total Innov Expend)  19.3% 15.7% 9.6% 30.1% 12.3% 21.2% 
Own Innov Expend (% Total Innov Expend) 78.5% 79.3% 85.9% 66.8% 82.8% 75.0% 
N 33 8 181 67 583 395 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on PIA (Annual Industry Survey), PINTEC (Technological Innovation Survey) and BNDES 
data on disbursement to manufacturing companies 
While BNDES seems to select more efficient medium and large companies, the opposite happens 
for the small samples. Small companies funded by BNDES have a lower volume of sales, spend 
less in innovation (overall and own resources) and receive less funds from public and private 
sources. This evidence can be explained in two different ways: either due to the inability of 
BNDES in targeting the best small companies or due to the willingness to provide financial 
resources to support a catching-up of underperforming companies. 
Another important source of companies’ heterogeneity in Brazil is due to significant regional 
disparities among different macro areas. To support the inclusion of regional fixed effect in the 
model as presented in Section 5, Table 3.4 presents an overview of the Brazilian geographical 
differences among macro regions. 
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Table 3.4 - Main companies’ characteristics by Region 
 Macro Regions 
 Mid-West North North East South South East 
Number of Employees 1256 1754 4046 2483 3155 
Net Sales 395.5 1140.5 1075.2 741.5 2386 
Age 18 20 26 28 30 
Average BNDES disbursement (R$ Mil) 15.97 10.77 21.36 6.37 34.94 
Innov Expend from Private Banking (R$ Mil) 1.34 3.06 0.97 1.65 1.53 
Innov Expend from Public Banking (R$ Mil) 4.17 4.64 12.11 4.05 8.59 
Innov Expend from Own Resources (R$ Mil) 13.70 26.71 13.79 10.31 53.32 
Private Innov Expend\Total Innov Expend (%) 7.0% 8.9% 3.6% 10.3% 2.4% 
Public Innov Expend\Total Innov Expend (%) 21.7% 13.5% 45.1% 25.3% 13.5% 
Own Innov Expend\Total Innov Expend (%) 71.3% 77.6% 51.3% 64.4% 84.0% 
Receiving BNDES Loan 6 5 21 59 147 
N 27 22 101 379 738 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on PIA (Annual Industry Survey), PINTEC (Technological Innovation Survey) and BNDES 
data on disbursement to manufacturing companies 
Differences in companies’ characteristics across macro-areas in Brazil are quite significant as 
evidenced by Table 3.4. One of the main causes of this disparities goes back to the end of World 
War II, when the Brazilian government decided to concentrate most of the industrial incentives 
in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, exacerbating the already existing regional disparities (Enders 
1980). Nowadays, despite government intervention to reduce regional disparities, industrial 
disparities still persist. Companies in the Southeast Region report by far a relatively higher volume 
of sales, higher level of investments in innovation and higher commitment of own resources in 
innovation activities.  
3.6.2. Regression Analysis 
This section begins by presenting results from the OLS model in Table 3.5, focusing on the impact 
of the main variable of interest, BNDES disbursement, on companies’ R&D intensity. The 
analysis will then follow by presenting the results of the second stage of the IV regressions using 
the GMM estimator in Table 3.617. Table 3.5 present the results for the OLS regressions from the 
model specification with no fixed effects to the inclusion of year, macro-region and sector CNAE 
2.0 fixed effects. Due to the endogeneity of the treatment variable, i.e. the receipt of a loan from 
BNDES, which violates the prerequisite of non-randomness of the OLS models, the results 
presented in Table 3.5 are supposed to be biased. The direction of this bias can be of either 
direction, depending on the correlation between the treatment variable and the error term.              
 
17 For the second stage results of the model including each single instrument, please refer to Table A3.10 
in the Appendix 
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Table 3.5 - Regressions Results OLS 
 
All Sample Companies with positive innovation expenditure 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
𝑩𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑺 0.786* 0.752* 0.706* 0.676** 0.697** 0.638** 1.073* 1.024* 0.916 0.944** 0.924** 0.855** 
 (0.438) (0.416) (0.403) (0.275) (0.287) (0.271) (0.585) (0.553) (0.538) (0.379) (0.390) (0.373) 
𝐴𝑔𝑒 (𝑙𝑜𝑔) 0.318** 0.306*** 0.290*** 0.254** 0.241** 0.233** 0.421*** 0.391*** 0.393*** 0.312** 0.328** 0.293** 
 
(0.117) (0.105) (0.088) (0.106) (0.098) (0.105) (0.140) (0.114) (0.097) (0.138) (0.134) (0.138) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑅&𝐷 0.301 0.273 0.316 0.179 0.278 0.226 0.007 -0.006 0.037 -0.132 -0.076 -0.101 
 
(0.490) (0.487) (0.478) (0.460) (0.437) (0.439) (0.561) (0.561) (0.572) (0.547) (0.535) (0.536) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 0.109 0.188*** 0.215** 0.136 -0.021 0.143 0.129 0.276** 0.289** 0.209 -0.036 0.202 
 
(0.112) (0.065) (0.079) (0.113) (0.226) (0.115) (0.186) (0.106) (0.126) (0.154) (0.328) (0.156) 
𝑅&𝐷 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 1.019** 1.061** 1.022** 1.105*** 1.036*** 1.084*** 1.240** 1.273** 1.212** 1.326** 1.263*** 1.298*** 
 
(0.371) (0.403) (0.373) (0.426) (0.368) (0.388) (0.503) (0.545) (0.517) (0.549) (0.471) (0.498) 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 -0.463*** -0.456*** -0.393** -0.403** -0.380** -0.338** -0.500*** -0.487*** -0.416*** -0.434** -0.410** -0.355** 
 
(0.167) (0.161) (0.147) (0.174) (0.173) (0.165) (0.167) (0.157) (0.146) (0.182) (0.184) (0.173) 
𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 -0.364 -0.373 -0.305 -0.423 -0.306 -0.353 -0.493 -0.497 -0.411 -0.567* -0.434 -0.481 
 
(0.351) (0.358) (0.351) (0.290) (0.275) (0.285) (0.406) (0.414) (0.405) (0.327) (0.304) (0.319) 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 0.103** 0.088 0.066 0.028 0.036 0.015 0.199*** 0.181** 0.134* 0.107 0.085 0.070 
 
(0.048) (0.056) (0.049) (0.063) (0.059) (0.063) (0.062) (0.074) (0.067) (0.093) (0.090) (0.092) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 -1.275*** -1.427** -1.518** -1.808** -1.238*** -1.961** -1.633*** -1.848*** -2.040*** -2.276** -1.822*** -2.681** 
 (0.411) (0.539) (0.590) (0.732) (0.471) (0.800) (0.443) (0.619) (0.679) (0.939) (0.679) (1.078) 
Observations 1,742 1,742 1,742 1,742 1,742 1,742 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects   Yes  Yes Yes   Yes  Yes Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects    Yes Yes Yes    Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.032 0.032 0.039 0.048 0.050 0.053 0.028 0.029 0.037 0.047 0.051 0.054 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
Source: Author’s own calculation based on PIA (Annual Industry Survey), PINTEC (Technological Innovation Survey) and BNDES data on disbursement to manufacturing companies 
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Table 3.6 - Regressions Results Second Stage IV – GMM 
 All Sample Companies with positive innovation expenditure 
  GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
 (13) (14) (15) (16)18 (17)18 (18)18 (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
𝑩𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑺 2.116* 2.343* 2.294* 2.032* 2.318* 2.272** 2.270* 2.438* 2.523** 2.202* 3.014** 2.883** 
 (1.238) (1.352) (1.270) (1.109) (1.249) (1.119) (1.262) (1.385) (1.253) (1.164) (1.535) (1.306) 
             
𝐴𝑔𝑒 (𝑙𝑜𝑔) 0.343*** 0.340*** 0.309*** 0.311** 0.306*** 0.310** 0.405*** 0.390*** 0.375*** 0.367** 0.377*** 0.378*** 
 (0.125) (0.131) (0.117) (0.123) (0.114) (0.122) (0.131) (0.123) (0.110) (0.144) (0.133) (0.143) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑅&𝐷 0.740** 0.719* 0.647* 0.632* 0.562 0.518 0.537 0.492 0.336 0.327 0.036 0.043 
 (0.372) (0.378) (0.364) (0.341) (0.356) (0.356) (0.418) (0.425) (0.417) (0.410) (0.479) (0.467) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 0.075 0.084 0.111 0.056 0.001 0.081 0.030 0.081 0.069 0.058 -0.004 0.030 
 (0.118) (0.071) (0.082) (0.128) (0.213) (0.127) (0.183) (0.139) (0.144) (0.185) (0.297) (0.184) 
𝑅&𝐷 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 0.610** 0.563** 0.648** 0.620** 0.734** 0.767** 0.779** 0.720* 0.882** 0.820** 1.102*** 1.104** 
 (0.258) (0.277) (0.259) (0.313) (0.312) (0.325) (0.391) (0.418) (0.393) (0.407) (0.426) (0.441) 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 -0.277 -0.264 -0.229 -0.266 -0.260 -0.240 -0.324* -0.318* -0.271 -0.306 -0.296 -0.265 
 (0.182) (0.178) (0.166) (0.185) (0.184) (0.177) (0.191) (0.190) (0.175) (0.201) (0.196) (0.189) 
𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 -0.761* -0.749* -0.671 -0.857** -0.797** -0.811** -0.859* -0.798* -0.699 -0.968** -0.970** -0.976** 
 (0.420) (0.431) (0.441) (0.376) (0.392) (0.381) (0.442) (0.463) (0.459) (0.402) (0.437) (0.421) 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 0.057 0.082 0.062 0.024 0.022 0.017 0.184** 0.225** 0.187** 0.122 0.113 0.116 
 (0.059) (0.077) (0.065) (0.069) (0.061) (0.065) (0.073) (0.088) (0.080) (0.097) (0.092) (0.095) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 -1.719** -1.592** -1.709***    -1.913*** -1.773*** -2.144*** -2.395** -2.998*** -3.270*** 
 (0.690) (0.639) (0.650)    (0.637) (0.617) (0.613) (0.980) (1.152) (1.218) 
Observations 1,742 1,742 1,742 1,742 1,742 1,742 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Region Fixed Effects   Yes  Yes Yes   Yes  Yes Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects    Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.010 0.002 0.006 0.025 0.018 0.022 0.015 0.010 0.011 0.031 0.014 0.021 
Robust standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
Source: Author’s own calculation based on PIA (Annual Industry Survey), PINTEC (Technological Innovation Survey) and BNDES data on disbursement to manufacturing companies 
 
18 The inclusion of sector fixed effects for the all sample requires the partialling-out of one CNAE2.0 sector (CNAE2.0=58), hence the drop of the constant in columns (16), (17) and (18).  
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Table 3.6 reports the results of the Second-Stage regressions for both samples, starting from the 
base model with no fixed effects up to the inclusion of annual, macro-regional and sectoral fixed 
effects. The main variable of interest associated to the BNDES disbursement reports positive and 
statistically significant coefficients across all different model specifications for both samples. 
These results indicate an increase of companies’ R&D intensity following the receipt of a loan 
from BNDES, hence denoting a crowding-in impact of BNDES loans on companies’ own financial 
resources for innovation. This additionality of BNDES resources on companies’ R&D intensity 
represents the main finding of this chapter and the consistency of the signs and magnitude of the 
coefficients throughout all model specifications indicates a correct model identification strategy. 
The source of this increased companies’ commitment in R&D activities is likely to be generated 
by the increased marginal productivity of private capital as a consequence of the intervention of 
BNDES in projects with possibly high returns, which encourage private companies’ in spending 
additional resources for R&D activities. 
Among the control variables, age (in log) and R&D department have positive and statistically 
significant coefficients in all specifications. On contrary, receiving financial resources for 
innovation activities from other public institutions has a crowding-out impact on companies’ level 
of R&D intensity. This interesting result, highlighting the different impact of receiving funds from 
BNDES and other public institutions, indicates that even financial resources coming from the 
same source (public institutions in general) can generate heterogeneous outcomes. One possible 
explanation can be due to the nature of loans of the financial instruments disbursed by BNDES 
that, compared to other indirect forms of funding disbursed by public institutions as subsidies, 
induce entrepreneurs to dedicate more financial resources to innovation activities. Another 
interesting finding is the non-significant impact of receiving financial resources from private 
financial institutions. The limited financial contribution of these private institutions, also 
presented earlier in Table 3.2, can be one of the explanations of this non-perceived impact of 
private financial resources on companies’ level of R&D commitment. Finally, performing 
continuous R&D, exporting and increases in labour productivity do not have any statistically 
significant impact on companies’ R&D intensity. 
 
3.6.3. First Stage Results and Robustness checks 
This section will present the first stage regressions of the model. The following Table 3.7 presents 
the results for all estimation strategies presented in Table 3.619. To consider the instruments valid, 
the coefficients should be statistically significant in the First-stage. A different scenario would 
 
19 For the first stage results of the model including each single instrument, please refer to Table A2 in the 
Appendix 
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shed doubts on the validity of the model, because it would denote an absence of impact of the 
instruments on the probability of receiving funding from BNDES, hence not correcting for the 
endogeneity in the model. Following Table 3.7, this Section presents the First-stage summary 
statistics by reporting the results for the under-identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM), 
overidentification test (Hansen-J), weak instrument test (Anderson-Rubin Wald) and 
orthogonality tests (Hansen-J and C-statistic) for all the instrumental variables.  
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Table 3.7 - First Stage Results 
 All Sample Companies with positive innovation expenditure 
  GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM 
 (25) (26) (27) (28)18 (29)18 (30)18 (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) 
                 
𝑺𝒐𝒍𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚 0.699** 0.783** 0.757** 0.790*** 0.704** 0.765*** 0.692** 0.789** 0.722** 0.823*** 0.696*** 0.762*** 
 (0.307) (0.325) (0.337) (0.284) (0.274) (0.284) (0.304) (0.327) (0.329) (0.283) (0.269) (0.279) 
𝑺𝒐𝒍𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚𝟐 -0.227 -0.267 -0.258 -0.277* -0.245* -0.266* -0.210 -0.254 -0.225 -0.283** -0.236* -0.255* 
 (0.156) (0.165) (0.178) (0.143) (0.140) (0.144) (0.155) (0.166) (0.174) (0.143) (0.139) (0.143) 
𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 0.083** 0.056* 0.057* 0.075** 0.106*** 0.078** 0.067 0.037 0.037 0.061* 0.094*** 0.065* 
 (0.040) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.044) (0.038) (0.039) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) 
𝐴𝑔𝑒 (𝑙𝑜𝑔) -0.024 -0.036** -0.037** -0.040** -0.036* -0.041** 0.002 -0.016 -0.016 -0.024 -0.011 -0.023 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑅&𝐷 0.009 0.014 0.020 0.005 0.001 0.011 0.037 0.040 0.052 0.026 0.037 0.041 
 (0.054) (0.051) (0.051) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.063) (0.061) (0.058) (0.046) (0.048) (0.046) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 -0.014 0.045* 0.050* 0.040 0.006 0.045 -0.003 0.084** 0.086** 0.086** 0.019 0.089** 
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.032) (0.025) (0.032) (0.030) (0.038) (0.038) (0.042) (0.030) (0.042) 
𝑅&𝐷 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 -0.018 -0.011 -0.014 0.010 0.011 0.009 -0.046 -0.028 -0.035 -0.003 -0.016 -0.006 
 (0.063) (0.060) (0.060) (0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.083) (0.080) (0.080) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 -0.042 -0.035 -0.031 -0.038 -0.046 -0.034 -0.042 -0.033 -0.026 -0.040 -0.045 -0.032 
 (0.051) (0.046) (0.045) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.049) (0.045) (0.043) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) 
𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 0.161*** 0.152*** 0.158*** 0.143*** 0.163*** 0.150*** 0.168*** 0.161*** 0.173*** 0.154*** 0.176*** 0.167*** 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 0.009 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.004 -0.001 0.005 -0.003 -0.010 -0.007 -0.009 -0.012 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 0.370*** 0.204*** 0.260**    0.284*** 0.100 0.169 0.213** 0.506*** 0.265** 
 (0.072) (0.061) (0.104)    (0.103) (0.090) (0.146) (0.095) (0.123) (0.129) 
             
Observations 1,742 1,742 1,742 1,742 1,742 1,742 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 1,265 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Region Fixed Effects   Yes  Yes Yes   Yes  Yes Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects    Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
Source: Author’s own calculation based on PIA (Annual Industry Survey), PINTEC (Technological Innovation Survey) and BNDES data on disbursement to manufacturing companies 
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The characteristics affecting BNDES’ decision on whether to provide financial resources to the 
companies are indicated by the significant coefficients of the results presented in Table 3.7. All 
significant coefficients, including the instrumental variables, have expected signs. The significance 
and positive coefficient of the solvency indicator indicates that a higher proportion of financial 
resources for innovation borrowed from private or other public sources acts as a signal to 
BNDES, reasonably indicating companies that have been already successfully screened by other 
financial institutions. At the same time, the significant and negative coefficient of the squared 
variable evidences a non-linear relationship, indicating that the signalling effect dominates up to a 
certain limit where the financial stability argument becomes of primary importance. Looking at the 
last instrument used in this analysis, having received tax incentives reports a positive and 
significant coefficient, due to the signalling effect previously explained. 
Moving the focus on the other significant variables, the negative and significant coefficient of the 
variable age indicates a preference of BNDES towards younger companies whether having 
received financial resources from other public institutions positively affects the probability of 
receiving funding from BNDES. Being an exporter seems to have a significant effect on the 
probability of receiving a loan, but only for companies with positive innovation expenditure, 
reporting however no significant impact for the all sample. Finally, the non-significant coefficients 
of the labour productivity indicator, used as a proxy of company’s performance, indicate an 
absence of picking-winner strategy by BNDES. Table 3.8 below reports the main tests for the First-
stage regressions for both samples of analysis.     
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Table 3.8 - First Stage Statistics 
 
All Sample 
Companies with positive innovation 
expenditure 
 
(25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) 
F-Test 27.57 22.37 30.3 15.51 14.03 12.46 27.67 24.74 21.43 16.05 11.37 10.55 
Anderson-
Rubin Wald 
0.103 0.079 0.079 0.09 0.152 0.08 0.103 0.079 0.079 0.09 0.152 0.08 
Kleibergen-
Paap rk LM 
0.083 0.104 0.099 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.082 0.108 0.097 0.007 0.001 0.01 
Hansen-J 
Overid 
0.115 0.134 0.177 0.26 0.383 0.355 0.137 0.165 0.24 0.308 0.558 0.499 
Hansen-J  
𝑺𝒐𝒍𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚 
0.399 0.425 0.344 0.507 0.557 0.481 0.459 0.478 0.375 0.504 0.509 0.454 
C-Stat  
𝑺𝒐𝒍𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚 
0.057 0.069 0.109 0.133 0.209 0.209 0.064 0.078 0.151 0.167 0.392 0.362 
Hansen-J  
𝑺𝒐𝒍𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚𝟐 
0.154 0.245 0.221 0.368 0.387 0.374 0.254 0.375 0.308 0.409 0.411 0.395 
C Statistic  
𝑺𝒐𝒍𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒚𝟐 
0.123 0.106 0.161 0.17 0.279 0.257 0.102 0.093 0.178 0.195 0.483 0.414 
Hansen J 
Statistic  
𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 
0.098 0.109 0.141 0.111 0.178 0.177 0.108 0.122 0.193 0.142 0.349 0.328 
C Statistic  
𝑻𝒂𝒙 𝑰𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒏𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒆 
0.206 0.242 0.254 0.688 0.747 0.62 0.238 0.27 0.281 0.651 0.591 0.51 
Year Fixed 
Effects   
 Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Region Fixed 
Effects 
  Yes  Yes Yes   Yes  Yes Yes 
Sector Fixed 
Effects 
   Yes Yes Yes    Yes Yes Yes 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on PIA (Annual Industry Survey), PINTEC (Technological Innovation Survey) and BNDES 
data on disbursement to manufacturing companies 
All First-stage regressions report a F-stat greater than 10, indicating a good fit of the model 
specification. The Anderson-Rubin Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of weak instruments, 
confirming that the coefficients of the instruments in the structural equation are not jointly equal 
to zero. The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM test rejects the null hypothesis of under-identification, 
confirming that the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressor (i.e. 
receiving a loan from BNDES). The Hansen J-statistic does not reject the null hypothesis of valid 
instruments, hence uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the estimated 
equation. Finally, all instruments respect the orthogonality conditions as reported by the non-
rejection of the null hypothesis associated to both Hansen-J and C-stats. 
As final robustness check, Table 3.9 presents the OLS results of the residuals of the Instrumental 
variables model regressed on the set of control and instrument variables. The results reported in 
Table 3.9 are to be referred to the model with the inclusion of all fixed effects, specifically 
Columns (30) and (36). 
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Table 3.9 - Results OLS - Residuals from Instrumental Variable regression 
 All Sample 
Companies with positive 
innovation expenditure 
 (37) (38) 
     
𝐴𝑔𝑒 (𝑙𝑜𝑔) 0.012 0.018 
 (0.101) (0.135) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑅&𝐷 0.067 0.078 
 (0.445) (0.548) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 0.001 0.0129 
 (0.133) (0.182) 
𝑅&𝐷 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 0.029 0.018 
 (0.404) (0.515) 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 -0.019 -0.017 
 (0.186) (0.199) 
𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 -0.067 -0.047 
 (0.264) (0.280) 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 0.015 0.023 
 (0.069) (0.098) 
𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 -1.291 -1.008 
 (1.093) (1.113) 
𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦2 2.389 1.94 
 (2.044) (2.098) 
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 -0.282 -0.323 
 (0.431) (0.478) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 -0.112 -0.1723 
 (0.763) (1.045) 
Observations 1,742 1,265 
R-squared 0.0009 0.0009 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Source: Author’s own calculation based on PIA (Annual Industry Survey), PINTEC (Technological Innovation Survey) and BNDES 
data on disbursement to manufacturing companies 
If the model is correctly specified, all variables should be uncorrelated with the error term. All 
variables of interest presented in Table 3.9 are not statistically significant, hence the equations 
presented in Section 3.3 are correctly specified not reporting any significant correlation between 
the residuals of the Instrumental Variables model and both control and instrument variables. 
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3.7. Conclusions 
This chapter contributes to the empirical literature on the role of development banks in fostering 
industrial innovation and, specifically, in incentivizing greater private companies’ financial 
commitment. By using industrial and innovation surveys’ data on Brazilian manufacturing 
companies for the period 2003-2011, this analysis investigated the impact of receiving a loan from 
BNDES on the level of R&D intensity of the recipients. These important results build on the 
extensive literature on public expenditure and on the more limited literature on development 
banks. The main findings of this chapter highlight a scenario in which companies have increased 
their level of R&D intensity after receiving funding from BNDES. Further, the results highlight 
a heterogeneous impact of financial resources received depending on the source of this credit. 
Public resources coming from public institutions other than BNDES have reported a crowding-out 
impact on companies’ R&D intensity, while funding coming from private institutions have shown 
no significant impact. Through the First-stage regression of the Instrumental Variable strategy it 
is also possible to investigate the determinants affecting BNDES’ decisions on whether issue a 
loan. Results report that BNDES disbursement decisions are primarily influenced by factors 
signalling companies for which other public funding for innovation has already been granted, either 
directly or indirectly, and also influenced by additional attention on the financial stability of the 
beneficiary companies. Further, the non-perceived impact of private financial institutions 
represents another remarkable finding of this analysis. The limited contribution of commercial 
banks’ resources on companies R&D activities, also reported by the non-significant impact of the 
indicator in the treatment equation together with the non-significant impact in the Selection 
equation, denote the marginality of private financial institutions in the Brazilian industrial 
innovation context, highlighting the inadequacy of Brazilian commercial banks in fostering 
companies’ innovation activities. This chapter suggests that BNDES loans’ allocations have had 
a significant additional impact on companies’ investment decisions.  
In conclusion, the role and impact of the Brazilian development bank has to also be understood 
in light of the industrial policy framework in place over the considered time frame. The necessity 
of defined targets and missions of both policies and public financial institutions represents a 
crucial combination to direct financial resources to pre-determined goals.  
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4. Risk in Innovation: Theory and Evidence 
from Pharma and Biotech sectors in Brazil 
 
“In the pharmaceutical industry, the problems of great uncertainty about the outcome of R&D, the length of the 
R&D process (12±14 years), and asymmetric information combine to make the difference between internal and 
external funds especially important.” (Grabowski and Vernon 2001). 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The fourth chapter provides qualitative evidence for the Brazilian pharmaceutical sector, adding 
value to the quantitative results of the previous two chapters. The data have been collected by 
means of a survey, undertaken for a sample of Brazilian companies in the pharmaceutical and 
biotech sector. The results add a different perspective to the findings of the second and third 
chapter that quantitatively evaluates the impact of BNDES funding on the private financial sector 
and on companies’ own resources.   
Particularly regarding radical or breakthrough innovations, the high embedded risk combined 
with high failure rate represent the most important constraints for companies to perform these 
type of activities in the pharmaceutical sector (Robbins and O'Gorman 2015). As a consequence 
of these constraints, available external financial resources are limited and come at high price. 
Further, the long timespan necessary for pharmaceutical innovation to produce results requires 
long-term availability of financial resources that, particularly during economic crisis, is not always 
available. In this context, BNDES played a crucial role in providing countercyclical financial 
resources in Brazil, with sector-specific programs aimed at innovation activities. Understanding 
sector-specific obstacles to innovation activities, particularly during economic downturns, is 
crucial to design policies and financial instruments able to foster the development of the national 
industry.   
The nature of the pharmaceutical industry as a system of networks among different actors and 
institutions at national and global levels (McKelvey and Orsenigo 2001) points the attention to 
the need of a coordinated action among different players in the economy. The discrepancy 
between social and private returns of basic research provides the theoretical ground for an active 
role of the public sector (Nelson 1959). Further, the long-term necessary for basic research to 
produce practical implications and the low appropriability of their returns make public financial 
resources a key tool to deal with the underinvestment of private companies in such area 
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(Cockburn and Henderson 2000; Mazzucato 2013a), particularly in countries like Brazil, where 
alternative private financial institutions, like private venture capital, are absent. 
The focus of the survey is to understand obstacles faced by Brazilian pharmaceutical companies 
while innovating and what role BNDES played in support of those activities. Innovation will be 
examined as product innovation, distinguishing between radical and incremental types of 
innovation, and process innovation. The constraints, building on the list proposed by Kaplan 
(2004) and WBES (2009), are categorized into internal or external depending on whether they 
directly depend on companies’ specific characteristics or on the economic and industrial 
environment where firms operate. 
The survey is divided into 4 parts, looking specifically at companies’ main characteristics, 
perceived obstacles to innovation activities, importance of different financial resources and 
specific projects recently funded by BNDES. The remainder of this chapter is structured as 
follows. Section 2 outlines the characteristics of innovation on the pharmaceutical sector. Section 
3 presents the survey methodology, followed by the study framework in section 4. Section 5 
outlines the findings based on the survey data. Section 6 provides a summary of policy 
implications and concludes the paper. 
 
4.2. Characteristics of Innovation in the Pharmaceutical 
Sector 
Technological innovation in the pharmaceutical sector historically occurred in long waves of 
activity (Achilladelis and Antonakis 2001)20, with the most recent one driven by the discovery and 
application of biotechnology in the production of new drugs. Successful outcomes of innovation 
activities in the pharmaceutical industry can lead to introduction of new products or changes in 
the process by which companies manufacture their products. However, innovation activities in 
the pharmaceutical sector are characterised by high failure rates (Robbins and O'Gorman 2015) 
and low level of returns in R&D investments21 which, in turn, contribute to make finance limited 
and expensive. Other obstacles to innovation activities can be either related to companies’ internal 
 
20 The First generation (1820-1880) started following the Lavoisier “Chemical revolution” at the end of 
the 18th century. The Second generation (1880-1930) has been driven by the new challenges dictated 
from the Industrial revolution and sequent urbanization. Later on, the Third generation (1930-1960) 
produced innovations in organic and natural products chemistry for the synthesis of various elements 
(vitamins, antibiotics, etc.). As a result of the new scientific basis of the pharmaceutical industry, the 
Fourth generation (1960-1980) experienced a shift from chemistry and pharmacology to life sciences as 
scientific bases. Finally, the Fifth generation (since 1980) is still surfing the new wave given by the 
discovery and application of biotechnology in the production of new drugs. 
21 It is estimated that out of 5000 projects only 1 completes the development process (Kaplan 2004), and 
among the successful projects only 3 out of 10 actually returns the R&D investment (Grabowski, Vernon 
et al. 2002).  
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factors, such lack of physical and human capital or shareholders reluctancy towards risky 
investments, or depend on the economic and institutional environment where firms operate. 
Brazil represents an interesting case study particularly due to the institutional environment, 
characterised by strong government’s interest towards industrial innovation activities, in a highly 
bureaucratic and poorly financially developed State. The next Section will first present the 
different categories of pharmaceutical innovation, then the focus will move towards the 
classification of obstacles and main characteristics of the Brazilian pharmaceutical sector.  
 
4.2.1. Innovation Types 
- Product Innovation 
The ever increasing cost of drug development (DiMasi, Hansen et al. 2003) requires more 
resources for the creation of new products having possibly high returns, as the business view of 
the companies would imply. Drug development is a time and resource consuming process, 
composed of different sub-activities before the commercialization of the product. The USA Food 
and Drugs Administration (FDA) defined the drug development process as composed of 
different stages leading to the commercialization of the product (Achilladelis and Antonakis 
2001): 
Figure 4.1 – Drug Development Process 
 
     
 
 
Based on the degree of novelty of the product innovations in the pharmaceutical sector, the new 
drug can present: 
(i). “New Molecular Entities” (NMEs) never approved before in the market, hence radical 
innovations, or  
(ii). Altered but pre-existing molecules, therefore incremental innovations, presenting new 
features (dosage form, route of administration, etc.), so-called “Incrementally Modified Drugs” 
(IMDs).  
Each company in the market has different strategies to create its portfolio and assess its long-
term risk, diversifying the activity among the two types of innovation. IMDs, with their low 
Basic 
Research 
Prototype, 
Design and 
Discovery 
 
Preclinical 
Development 
Clinical 
Development 
FDA 
Approval & 
Launch 
Preparation 
69 
 
 
development cost, high return on investment and high pricing potential, are the ones indicated 
for increasing firms’ profits. 
 
- Process Innovation 
Process innovation are divided into five categories, looking specifically at investment in human 
or physical capital and general within company environment. In detail, investments in physical 
capital include “Acquisition of machinery/plant expansion”, “Acquisition of external R&D (software 
excluded)” and “Acquisition of software”, whereas human capital investments are expressed in terms 
of “Hiring workforce for R&D activities”. Finally, perceptions about performed innovation activities 
are captured by the category “R&D activities performed within the company”. 
 
4.2.2. Risks & Obstacles to Innovation in the pharmaceutical 
sector 
The high risk embedded in innovation activities of the pharmaceutical industry is due to the 
interrelation of different social and economic characteristics. Demographic uncertainty, lack of 
consensus on long term industrial and social policies and on future needs of the public sector, 
together with poor institutional framework, are among the major contributors to this embedded 
risk that, combined with low returns on R&D activities, increase the cost of the limited financial 
resources. The innovative power of the investment is negatively related to the degree of failure of 
the investment, such that companies prefer lower risk types of innovation activities, such 
development of “me too” drugs, showing companies’ risk aversion towards investment that would 
lead to radically innovative outcomes but likely to increase companies’ market share.  
Kaplan (2004) discusses a list of obstacles directly related to product innovation activities, that 
either have origin from institutional factors, such as “Regulatory authority rituals”, “Uncertainty about 
the timing and level of reimbursement decisions leading to uncertainty among stakeholders”, and “Potential 
increases in the cost of doing business due to intellectual property concerns”, or may be related to companies’ 
characteristics, such as “General business uncertainties in drug development”, “Differences in perception of risk 
among different stakeholders” and “Inadequate understanding of basic science”. The WBES identifies 
categories related to the general business environment which, however, presents some overlaps. 
Barriers in WBES can as well be classified depending on whether they are directly related to access 
to finance or land, licensing and permits, corruption, tax, regulation and jurisdictional barriers, 
access to electricity and transport, poor institutions and lack of human capital or competition. 
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4.2.3. The Brazilian Pharma and Biotech industries 
The Brazilian pharmaceutical industry is a sectoral system of innovation that involves a wide 
variety of public and private institutions (McKelvey and Orsenigo 2001). However, weak private 
industrial infrastructures, particularly regarding the innovation chain (Urias and Furtado 2009), 
lack of human capital (Lugones and Suárez 2007) and access to finance (Goedhuys and Veugelers 
2012) represent the main fragilities of the national system. Recently, the Brazilian pharmaceutical 
sector is experiencing an increasing number of domestic firms (Urias and Furtado 2009) and 
innovative domestic firms (Caliari and Ruiz 2010), in an industrial scenario that sees the 
predominance of foreign pharmaceutical companies. Other two major difficulties affecting the 
development of a Brazilian bio-tech System of innovation have been represented by the lack of a 
strong venture capital sector able to fund particularly start-up and medium-size biotech 
companies and by a poor and undefined legislation regarding the development of biotechnological 
products (Marques and Neto 2007): 
Brazilian pharmaceutical market is among the largest and represents an important case study given 
the development in the last decades. In the ‘90s, several factors have changed the structure of the 
industrial sector. Among all, patents for pharmaceutical products became fully operating in 1996, 
import restriction were significantly lowered and generic drugs have been introduced in 1999. 
The introduction of generic drugs increased the participation of domestic industries and their 
competitiveness, changing the structure of the entire industrial sector. In 2009, almost 75% of 
sales in the Brazilian generic markets were made by domestic companies (Urias and Furtado 
2009). Generics are perfect substitutes of trademark medicines previously created with research 
activity and do not usually require research expenditure being only a copy of an already existent 
product, therefore their lower price. However, an industrial system solely dedicated to the generic 
drugs market hardly survive or grow given the low R&D intensity linked to the production of 
these products.  
Brazilian pharmaceutical and biotech industries have been among the major sectors of 
intervention since the first industrial policy of the Lula’s administration in 2004 (PITCE).  It has 
been further confirmed as key industrial sectors for development in the second industrial policy 
(PDP).  Between the two industrial policies, the importance of the pharmaceutical and biotech 
industries has been highlighted by the creation of the PROFARMA program in 2004. Finally, 
both sectors remained among the key strategic sectors in the Plano Brasil Maior (2011). 
Since the first industrial policy in 2004, vertical strategies were adopted by the Brazilian 
government for industrial development, with policies focused on specific industrial sectors in 
which BNDES interpreted a primary role in the provision of financial resources to the companies, 
as shown in Figure 4.2 below. 
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Figure 4.2 - BNDES Disbursement for Pharmaceutical sector 2000-2017 (Current 
R$ Million) 
 
Source: BNDES 
Prior to this, horizontal policies shaped the whole industrial sector in the earlier decades. In the 
nineties, liberalization polices, price liberalization and exchange rate fluctuations brought an 
increase in imports with a stable export rate, in the acquisition of Brazilian companies by foreign 
companies and an increase in prices and stagnation of domestic production. The increased foreign 
competition however did not bring the expected price reduction and increase in consumption 
(Caliari and Ruiz 2010). The attracted foreign and domestic investments have so far produced 
research that barely moved forward to the market. The process of changing a system that until 
1996 predominantly copied foreign products for resale is a slow and a path dependant process. 
The high risk involved given the peculiar characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry, increases 
the risk and obstacles in the industrial structural change. Perceptions about main business 
environment constraints for chemical and pharmaceutical companies (ISIC 24) are presented in 
the following Figure 4.2 and are extracted from the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES), 
conducted in 2009. These perceptions refer to the general business environment and not directly 
related to innovation activities, as addressed in this chapter. Further, perceptions refer to a period 
before the 2008 financial crisis, which might have altered the national economic and industrial 
scenario.  
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Figure 4.3 - Main Business Environment Constraints in Brazil 
 
Source: WBES 2009 
As presented in Figure 4.3, in the top 10 business constraints for Brazilian chemical and 
pharmaceutical companies, only three out of the top 10 main obstacles are not directly attributable 
to public institutions. It is also quite evident how the majority of the companies identifies tax rates 
as the main constraint for their business. Looking at companies’ degree of perceived obstacles, 
the following Figure 4.4 presents companies’ responses based on a 5-points Likert scale from “No 
obstacle” to “Severe Obstacle”. 
73 
 
 
Figure 4.4 – Perceived degree of obstacle for chemical and pharmaceutical companies  
  
Source: WBES 2009 
While the identification of tax rates as principal obstacle for the business environment was already 
previously highlighted in Figure 4.2, it is interesting to notice how more than 70% of the 
companies considers low skilled human capital a severe or high severe obstacle for the business. 
 
4.3. Survey Methodology 
In light of the current industrial scenario in Brazil, and in particular regarding the pharmaceutical 
and biotech sector, I aim undertake a survey to examine companies’ perceived obstacles on 
innovation and whether BNDES financial support help pharmaceutical companies in innovation 
activities. The value added of collecting primary data is to provide more recent findings on 
companies’ perceptions about obstacles to innovation activities combined with an in-depth 
investigation of the funded projects. To the best of my knowledge, there is limited evidence on 
the relation between obstacles to innovation between BNDES funded and non-funded 
companies. 
4.3.1. Survey Design and Sampling Reference 
The questionnaire for the survey was carefully designed to incorporate views from preliminary 
interviews and a pilot survey. A systematic sampling procedure was chosen to draw a random 
sample of firms from two strata, a list of BNDES funded companies and a list of non-funded 
companies from ORBIS. 
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With the assistance of carefully monitored and trained local survey teams (cost around £1800), 
details regarding the survey were sent out via personalised emails to potential respondents. The 
target respondents were managers who were fully aware of investment decisions and investment 
risk analysis.  
4.3.2. Stratified Sampling & Randomization 
I used stratified sampling using two strata; first the list of BNDES’ funded companies and second 
the list based on companies in ORBIS. First, I began with the BNDES list, being representative 
of the population of firms who are funded by BNDES, for a total number of 65 companies. 
Second, the list of companies in ORBIS was used to build another list. The second list was 
constructed by dropping any overlapping firms with the BNDES list, leading to a final number 
of 115 companies. The final list consisted of a total of 180 firms. Therefore, each stratum was 
mutually exclusive. Using the two lists, I was able to draw a representative sample of firms such 
that the broad target population comprised companies that were funded by BNDES and those 
that received no BNDES funding. 
I use a disproportionate sampling procedure, such that I set the final sample size (distributed 
across the two different strata), taking into account two important aspects of costs and precision.  
4.3.3. Final Sample & Limitations 
In total, the survey rendered 77 responses, representing a final response rate of 43 per cent. Some 
responses were incomplete and could not be used. On the whole, in spite of the potential 
limitations of the data, information from the survey helps revealing important insights on both 
companies’ perceived barriers to innovation together with detail information on BNDES funded 
projects. 
 
4.4. Framework 
This Section introduces the three sections of the questionnaire by first presenting the categories 
of obstacles to innovation activities as in Part 1 of the survey. The focus then moves to Part 2 of 
the questionnaire, looking at the degree of importance of different sources of financial resources, 
to then conclude the survey with the last Part 3 on BNDES specific funded projects. 
4.4.1. Obstacles to Innovation 
The survey begins with a focus on main business characteristics and entrepreneurs’ perceived risk 
associated to investments in innovation, providing evidence on the recent pharmaceutical industry 
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environment in Brazil. After the identification of the degree of importance of different sources 
financial supply, the survey proceeds with companies that have received at least one loan by 
BNDES since 2004, investigating the main characteristics of the funded projects. 
For all the categories of pharmaceutical innovation, the interviewed identifies associated perceived 
obstacles based on the presented categories, building on the list of obstacles provided by Kaplan 
(2004) and WBES (2009), with the inclusion of additional questions for the purpose of this 
analysis. The additional questions define additional proxies for obstacles to innovation, both for 
general business environment and regarding the specific project funded by BNDES. Further, 
while categories in Kaplan are directly related only to product innovations, categories of obstacles 
in the WBES are selected with reference to the general business environment rather than to 
innovation activities. Nine categories of obstacles have been identified and are then presented in 
the following Table 4.1.  
Table 4.1 - Categories of obstacles for investment in innovation 
Lack of qualified human 
resources, lack of previous 
investment in R&D 
Shareholder pressure 
High risk of failure involving 
investment in innovation 
Bureaucratic obstacles 
Uncertainty about the 
timing of reimbursement of 
public funding 
Inability to capture returns 
due to inappropriate IPR 
protection 
Lack of tax incentives 
Uncertainty about the 
timing of reimbursement of 
private funding 
Limited access to commercial 
bank finance (availability, 
interest rates, fees, and 
collateral requirements) 
Source: Author’s own elaboration 
Table 4.1 reports the risk categories relative to investment in innovation for the pharmaceutical industry built on the list 
proposed by Kaplan (2004) and WBES (2009), with study-specific additional categories. 
All questions related to the self-identification of the risk will be measured with a Likert Scale as 
follows: 
1. No Obstacle, 2. Minor Obstacle, 3. Moderate Obstacle, 4. Major Obstacle, 5. Very Severe Obstacle. 
 
76 
 
 
Based on the origin of such obstacles, I categorize the obstacles into two types as outlined below. 
- Internal obstacles are defined as any type of constraint to innovation activities generated 
within the company: “Lack of Human Resources or previous investments in R&D”, “Shareholder pressure” 
and “High risk of failure involving investment in innovation” 
- External obstacles on contrary, do not depend on companies’ internal constraints but 
depend either from the State level administration, such as “Bureaucratic obstacles”, “Lack of tax 
incentives” and “Inability to capture returns due to inappropriate IPR protection”, or are related to the 
available financial resources, such as “Uncertainty about the timing of reimbursement of public funding”, 
“Uncertainty about the timing of reimbursement of private funding” and “Limited access to commercial banks 
finance”. 
4.4.2. Sources of Financial Resources 
The second part of the questionnaire looks at the identification of the importance of different 
sources of financial resources, asking also some specific question regarding access to BNDES 
credit. In detail, the first part of Section 2 asks the respondents to identify the degree of 
importance of Public Institutions, Private Commercial Banks, Other Private Institutions and Companies’ own 
resources on a Likert Scale as the following:  
1. High Importance, 2. Major Importance, 3. Minor Importance, 4. No Importance 
The identification of the degree of importance of different financial sources is crucial to 
understand how different players have taken part into companies’ innovation processes. 
Following the identification of the degree of importance, the respondents reported the number 
of projects, if any, that have not been funded by BNDES, whether the company undertook the 
investment after the rejection by BNDES and, in case of project undertaken, the degree of 
importance of the different financial sources for that specific project.  
4.4.3. BNDES Projects 
The analysis will provide an understanding of the obstacles to innovation activities for the 
Brazilian pharmaceutical industry, 10 years after the beginning of the world financial crisis and 
following the intervention of BNDES as countercyclical tool in the economy. Two questions look 
at the extent to which access to finance and failure risk represented an obstacle for the specific 
projects funded by BNDES and are presented below. 
- To what extent was access to finance a problem for the investment you requested the loan for? 
 
- To what extent do you evaluate the failure risk for the project you obtained the fund for? 
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These specific questions aim at providing an understanding of what type of projects are selected 
by the Brazilian development bank, whether it selects projects that are not considered particularly 
risky or whether provides financial resources for projects that were not particularly suffering of 
lack of funding. 
Finally, Section 3 of the questionnaire looks at the specific projects funded by BNDES, identifying 
the magnitude of the received financial support, the degree of complementarity with different 
financial resources, possible alternatives to BNDES financial resources and reasons behind the 
preference over the Brazilian development bank.  
Section 3 ends by asking what the company would have done if BNDES would have not funded 
the project, whether it would have been done in any case, or whether another investment in 
innovation or not in innovation would have been undertaken. Such questions, together with the 
reasons behind the preference of BNDES over other alternatives, are aimed at providing evidence 
on whether BNDES intervention can be accused of crowding-out either commercial banks’ 
activity or companies’ own resources. 
 
4.5. Findings 
4.5.1. Company Profiles 
This Section begins by presenting companies’ main characteristics for the sample (77 companies) 
in the following Table 4.2. These characteristics are defined in terms of age, measured as the 
difference between the year of the survey (2018) and the year in which the company was 
established, number of total workers, by quartile, and number of workers in the R&D department, 
number of companies that export, with ratio of export over annual sales and ratio of R&D 
expenditure over annual sales. 
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Table 4.2 – Companies’ main characteristics 
 N  Mean 
Age 66 23.55 
Number of Workers 74 311.6 
1st quartile 19 10.6 
2nd quartile 18 44.7 
3rd quartile 18 128.8 
4th quartile 18 1089.2 
Number of Workers in R&D Department 65 22.2 
Export 36  
Export/Annual Sales 21 16.8% 
R&D Expenditure/Annual Sales 41 7.49% 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on primary data 
Table 4.2 reports main companies’ characteristics of the respondents. 
As reported in Table 4.2 above, on average companies in the dataset are slightly older than 20 
years, have 311 workers, of which less than 10% in the R&D department. Further, roughly 50% 
of the companies export a quantity of goods equal to 16.8% of annual sales. Finally, companies 
in the sample spend in R&D activities an amount equal to 7.5% of annual sales.  
One of the accusations often moved to BNDES is related to the “picking-winner” strategy adopted 
by the bank to increase the likelihood to be repaid (Lazzarini, Musacchio et al. 2011). On the 
other side, public financial resources are often accused of incapacity in “picking winners” or, 
willingness to “pick-looser”, due to political bias (Robinson and Torvik 2005). To investigate 
whether BNDES strategy can be accused of either of the two critiques often moved by the 
literature, the following Table 4.3 looks at differences in companies’ characteristics among 
BNDES funded and non-funded companies.   
Table 4.3 – Companies main characteristics, by category BNDES funded 
 Not Funded Funded  
 
N Mean N Mean Δ P-value 
Age 33 18.6 33 28.5 -9.8 0.015 
R&D Expenditure/Annual Sales 13 7.6 28 7.4 0.2 0.961 
Export/Annual Sales 5 23.6 16 14.7 9.0 0.628 
Number of workers  36 211.5 38 406.4 -194.9 0.228 
Number of workers in R&D department  31 9.0 34 34.2 -25.1 0.094 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on primary data 
Table 4.3 reports the t-test results on companies’ main characteristics among BNDES funded and non-funded companies. 
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Results from Table 4.3 report that the main difference among BNDES funded and non-funded 
companies lies on the age, with funded companies being older than their counterpart. The other 
difference among companies, although only statistically significant at 10%, is about the number 
of workers in the R&D department, with funded companies reporting more than three times the 
number of employees devoted to innovation activities without, however, showing differences in 
R&D intensity. Although the limited sample for the analysis, it therefore seems that neither of 
the two critiques exposed above (picking-winner or picking-looser strategy) can be attributable to 
BNDES.   
Information on geographical location of the companies, derived from Question “IV” where 
companies are asked to report the location of the plants, are summarized in Figure 4.5 below.22 
Figure 4.5 - Location of companies’ plants 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on primary data 
Figure 4.5 reports the share of plants geographical location by State. 
Half of the plants of the companies of interest are located, expectedly, in the State of São Paulo, 
the economic capital of Brazil. States of Paraná and Rio de Janeiro represent the second and third 
most recurrent plants’ locations, whereas the other companies are distributed across other 
Brazilian States. Regarding companies’ ownership, the following Table 4.4 reports the different 
categories as presented in question “VI” of the questionnaire.   
 
 
22 5 companies have plants in more than 1 location. 
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Table 4.4 – Share of companies by ownership 
 % 
 Purely Domestic 74% 
Foreign 0-20% 2.6% 
Foreign 21-40% 1.3% 
Foreign 41-60% 2.6% 
Foreign 61%+ 18.2% 
Purely Foreign 1.3% 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on primary data 
Table 4.4 reports the share of companies by category of ownership. 
The majority of pharmaceutical companies in the sample is purely domestic, while the second 
highest incidence is registered by companies having more than 60% owned by foreign companies. 
Overall, companies with foreign participation account for 26% of the sample. Regarding the type 
of innovation activities performed by the companies, the following Table 4.5 reports the share by 
type of activity. 
Table 4.5 – Share of companies by innovation activities performed  
 % 
PRODUCT INNOVATION 
Development of a new molecular entity (NME) 28.6% 
Development of an incrementally modified drug (IMD) 26.0% 
PROCESS INNOVATION 
Acquisition of machinery / plant expansion 77.9% 
Acquisition of external R&D (software excluded) 36.4% 
Acquisition of software 39.0% 
R&D activities performed within the company 54.5% 
Hiring workforce for R&D activities 40.3% 
Other product/process innovation 10.4% 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on primary data 
Table 4.5 reports the share of companies by category of innovation activities performed. 
While only slightly more than a quarter of the companies perform product innovation activities, 
process innovation activities represent a more frequent type of performed innovation. Among 
process innovation activities, acquisition of tangible capital and R&D activities performed within 
the company are performed by, respectively, 78% and 54.5% companies of the sample, whereas 
acquisition of external R&D or software represents less performed types of innovation activities, 
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showing a difficulty for Brazilian pharmaceutical companies in acquiring knowledge from outside 
the company. 
 
4.5.2. The recent risk environment in the Brazilian 
pharmaceutical sector  
The analysis proceeds with the identification of two macro categories of obstacles to innovation 
activities, internal and external, based on the origin of such obstacles. Internal obstacles are 
defined as any type of constraint to innovation activities generated within the company and, 
referring to the categories presented in Table 4.2, are “Lack of Human Resources or previous investments 
in R&D, “Shareholder pressure” and “High risk of failure involving investments in innovation”. External 
obstacles on contrary, do not depend on companies’ internal constraints but depend either from 
the State level administration, such as “Bureaucratic obstacles”, “Lack of tax incentives” and  “Inability 
to capture returns due to inappropriate IPR protection”, or are related to the available financial resources, 
such as “Uncertainty about the timing of reimbursement of public funding”, “Uncertainty about the timing of 
reimbursement of private funding” and “Limited access to commercial banks finance”.  
 
4.5.2.1. Internal Obstacles 
Internal obstacles are defined as constraints to innovation activities arising due to company 
specific factors, such as lack of human or physical capital, shareholder pressure or high risk of 
failure embedded in performed innovation activities.  
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Figure 4.6 – Internal Obstacles to Innovation 
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Figures 6 reports the perceived severity of internal obstacles to innovation on a Likert scale:  
”1. No Obstacle, 2. Minor Obstacle, 3. Moderate Obstacle, 4. Major Obstacle, 5. Very Severe Obstacle”.  
Obstacles are classified as “Lack of qualified human resources, lack of previous investment in R&D”, “Shareholder Pressure” and “High risk of failure involving investments in innovation”. 
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Among companies’ internal obstacles to innovation, shareholder pressure is identified as the least 
severe constraint to companies’ innovation activities. A possible explanation for such finding can 
be related to the interest of the shareholders towards innovation activities, in the light of targeted 
policies and lines of credit. Regarding the categories “Lack of human resources or previous companies’ 
R&D investment” and “High risk of failure involving investments in innovation”, the two types of product 
innovation represent the type of innovation with the highest incidence of severe or very severe 
obstacles. 
 
4.5.2.2. External Obstacles 
 
External obstacles are defined as constraints to innovation activities that do not directly depend 
on companies’ internal factors but are related to the economic, financial and industrial 
environment where the companies operate. These obstacles are either related to public 
institutions, such as high levels of bureaucratization of the State, lack of tax incentives and poor 
IPR protection, or arise due to an underdeveloped national financial system, both public and 
private, which brings companies to either not receive adequate financial resources or to be 
uncertain about the timing of repayment.  The following Figure 4.7 presents the perceived severity 
of external obstacles to innovation that can be directly related to public institutions. 
 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on primary data 
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Figure 4.7 External obstacles to innovation related to public institutions 
 
Figure 7 report the perceived severity of external obstacles to innovation related to public institutions on a Likert scale:  
”1. No Obstacle, 2. Minor Obstacle, 3. Moderate Obstacle, 4. Major Obstacle, 5. Very Severe Obstacle”.  
Obstacles are classified as: “Bureaucratic Obstacles”, “Lack of tax incentives” and “Inability to capture returns due to inappropriate IPR protection”. 
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“Bureaucratic Obstacles” and “Lack of tax incentives” represent the most severe external obstacles that 
can be directly attributable to public institutions. In detail, “Bureaucratic Obstacles” are more related 
to product innovation practices, whereas “Lack of tax incentives” represents a crucial constraint also 
with referment to the acquisition of machinery or plant expansion.  The following Figure 4.8 
refers to the categories of external obstacles directly referable to national financial institutions. 
 
 
 
  
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on primary data 
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Figure 4.8 – External obstacles to innovation related to financial institutions  
 
Figure 8 report the perceived severity of external obstacles to innovation related to financial institutions on a Likert scale:  
”1. No Obstacle, 2. Minor Obstacle, 3. Moderate Obstacle, 4. Major Obstacle, 5. Very Severe Obstacle”.  
Obstacles are classified as: “Uncertainty about reimbursement of private fund”, “Uncertainty about reimbursement of public fund” and “Limited funds of commercial banks”. 
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The high incidence of severe and high severe replies relative to the “Uncertainty about timing of 
repayment of public funds” indicates the low perceived reliability of Brazilian pharmaceutical 
companies on public credit lines. It is also interesting to notice the difference between the 
reliability on public and credit funds, where commercial banks are reported to be more accurate 
about the timing of repayment of their credit lines with, however, limited reported availability of 
financial resources. 
 
4.5.3. The degree of importance of different financial sources  
In countries where underdeveloped national financial institutions do not provide adequate credit, 
one of the major companies’ constraints is represented by the availability of external credit, which 
leads companies to mostly rely on their own financial resources. Section 2 of the questionnaire 
points the attention to companies’ perceived degree of importance of different types of financial 
resources, by institutional source. The answers are reported in the Figure 4.9 below. 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on primary data 
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Figure 4.9 – Degree of importance of financial resources, by source
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on primary data 
Figure 4.9 reports the degree of importance of financial resources by source, on a Likert scale: ”1. High Importance, 2. 
Major Importance 3. Minor Importance 4. No Importance”. 
As reported in the above Figure 4.9, Brazilian pharmaceutical companies mostly rely on internal 
financial resources to fund their innovation activities. Public financial resources represent the 
second most important type of credit whereas private financial resources, both from commercial 
banks or other private actors represent the least important type of credit, consistently with what 
expected due to the underbudgeting of the Brazilian private financial system. 
4.5.4. BNDES Specific Funded Projects 
Looking at the specific funded projects, this section presents the main characteristics of projects 
approved by BNDES. In detail, Table 4.6 below reports the share of companies receiving funding 
for at least one project in the last 5 years and their average number of approved projects, the 
average BNDES contribution and degree of complementarity of BNDES financial resources with 
other institutions’ financial resources. Finally, it presents the share of companies with at least one 
project rejected by BNDES in the last 5 years and the average number of projects rejected and 
undertaken after the rejection.  
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Table 4.6 – BNDES approved projects23 
 N Mean/% 
Received Funding by BNDES 77 49.35% 
Number of BNDES approved projects 38 1.84 
Average BNDES contribution 31 57% 
Received Other Financial Support  38 23.8% 
Other Financial Support from Commercial Banks/ Other Private Institution 5 40% 
Other Financial Support from Other Public Banks 3 36.7% 
Other Financial Support from Public Direct 2 32.5% 
Other Financial Support from Public - Indirect Subsidy/Tax Credits 2 35% 
At least one project rejected by BNDES 70 11.4% 
Number of BNDES rejected projects 8 3.25 
Number of projects undertaken after BNDES rejection 5 2.60 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on primary data 
Table 4.6 reports the main descriptive statistics of the companies participating into the survey. 
Roughly 50% of the companies present in the sample received funding for, on average, almost 
two projects in the last 5 years. Almost a quarter of the companies receiving funding from 
BNDES also received additional financial support from other sources, reporting a 
complementarity scenario between BNDES funds and financial resources from commercial 
banks and public institutions. Regarding the stage of the innovation chain of BNDES funded 
projects, Figure 4.10 below reports six stages including all life cycle of a pharmaceutical innovation 
activity, form the “Basic Research” stage, to the “Prototype, design and recovery”, “Pre-clinical development”, 
“Clinical Development” and “Approval & launch preparation” phase. 
 
23 The questions are about the last 5 BNDES funded projects. 
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Figure 4.10 – Stage of the innovation chain of the funded project(s)
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on primary data 
Figure 4.10 reports the number of projects funded by BNDES, by stage in the innovation chain. 
Most of BNDES funded projects have been in the “Approval & launch preparation” stage, showing 
a preference of BNDES towards the commercialization phase of the investment. Findings also 
can be interpreted as a preference of BNDES towards projects that have already been successfully 
through the innovation chain and now are at the final stage, hence carrying a lower risk of failure. 
To investigate the risk profile of BNDES funded projects, the questionnaire asks respondents to 
identify the perceived degree of risk of the innovation activities that received financial support, 
as presented in Figure 4.11 below. 
Figure 4.11 – Perceived risk of failure of BNDES funded projects
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on primary data 
                                   Figure 4.11 reports companies’ perceived risk of failure of BNDES funded projects. 
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The majority of BNDES funded projects are perceived by pharmaceutical companies as 
investments with low embedded risk. Particularly regarding product innovation activities, it is 
quite striking to notice the difference between the degree of perceived risks of general innovation 
activities reported in Figures 7 and 8 and the one associated to the funded projects reported in 
the above Figure 4.11. This difference indicates that BNDES tends to select low-risk types of 
projects, which are generally the type of investments that do not often lead to radical innovations. 
It is however important to highlight that incremental innovations, although not carrying any 
breakthrough outcome, can be important due to the high social returns, particularly in developing 
countries. The case of the “me too” drugs represents an example of the importance of outcomes 
combining very low innovative power together with high social returns. In light of the responses 
presented in Figure 4.11, the role of BNDES in pharmaceutical innovation seems to have been 
more focused towards social returns rather than towards the funding of investments with 
potentially breakthrough-innovative outcomes. Such findings are in line with the developmental 
role of BNDES and industrial policies for the pharmaceutical sector put in place since 2004.  
In developing countries where financial resources are limited and expensive like in Brazil, it is 
likely that even low-risk investments face financial constraints. For this reason, the survey 
investigates the degree to which access to alternative sources of finance was a problem for the 
funded investments, for which results are reported in the following Figure 4.12. 
 
Figure 4.12 – Access to alternative source of finance for the BNDES funded project(s) 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on primary data 
Figure 4.12 reports companies’ the extent to which access to alternative sources of finance was a problem for the BNDES 
funded project(s) 
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Even though projects funded by BNDES seem to not be characterized by particularly high risk 
of failure, the scarcity of available financial resources still represented a major or very severe 
obstacle, particularly regarding the investments in innovative products. It therefore seems that a 
major financial constraint for Brazilian pharmaceutical companies is to be attributed to the lack 
of resources even for low-risk types of investment that are, in turn, funded by the development 
bank. One of the causes of the high perceived degree of obstacle attributable to access to finance 
is represented by the high Brazilian interest rate that makes financial resources highly expensive. 
A way to verify this hypothesis is to see whether companies had alternative sources of finance at 
the time investment but they still preferred BNDES as money lender and the reason beyond this 
choice. The next Table 4.7 reports the responses on the presence of alternative sources of finance 
followed by Figure 4.13 reporting the reasons behind the choice of BNDES regardless the 
presence of possible alternatives. 
Table 4.7 – Alternative to BNDES funding 
Alternative to BNDES funding 
No 29.2% 
Yes 70.8% 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on primary data 
Table 4.7 reports the responses on the presence of alternative sources of finance to BNDES for the funded project(s). 
More than two-third of the companies reported the presence of an alternative source of finance 
for the BNDES funded projects, suggesting that the lack of available resources may be related to 
causes other than purely shortage of funds and more related to other factors such as length or 
high cost of the loans. Figure 4.13 below reports companies’ responses on the reasons behind the 
preference over BNDES finance even in presence of alternative sources of financial resources.  
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Figure 4.13 – Reasons behind preference over BNDES instead of available alternatives
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on primary data 
Figure 4.13 reports the reasons behind preference over BNDES even in presence of alternative sources of financial resources. 
The main reason behind companies’ preference over BNDES seems to be related to the lower 
interest rate applied by the development bank, followed by the length of the loans. Among other 
reasons, bureaucratic simplicity represents, interestingly, a value added of BNDES’ support. This 
scenario can be interpreted in two ways: it might indicate a crowding-out scenario in which the 
preference over BNDES only depends on the lower-than-market interest rate applied to its loans 
or it may also indicate that interest rates applied by commercial banks are too high to leave 
companies indifferent in the selection of the sources of funds. The likelihood of a possible 
crowding-out scenario of BNDES over commercial banks’ resources is positively related to the 
size of the difference between the TJLP, the long-term interest rate at which BNDES loans are 
pegged24 (to which BNDES applies a spread25), and the overnight interest rate, Selic, set by the 
Central Bank and at which commercial banks will in turn have to apply their own spread. The 
following Figure 4.14 reports the development of the Selic, TJLP and average BNDES interest 
rate for the loans issued to pharmaceutical companies and pegged to the TJLP. 
 
24 Not all BNDES loans are pegged to the TJLP. The percentage of BNDES loans to pharmaceutical 
companies pegged to TJLP is equal to 47%. The remaining loans are pegged to the TFB, the BNDES fixed 
rate (25% of the loans), Extended Consumer Price Index, IPCA (18% of the companies), fixed interest rate 
plus variation of the US dollar (12%), Selic (6%), TJ462 equal to TJLP+1% or are issued without any 
interest rate (24%).  
25 The spread in BNDES loans can also be represented by the spread of the commercial financial 
institutions in case of BNDES indirect loans (to know more about BNDES financial instruments, please 
refer to the Introduction of the thesis) 
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 Figure 4.14 – Brazilian interest rates 2004-2017
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on BCB and primary data 
Figure 4.14 reports the development of Selic, average interest rate applied to BNDES loans for pharmaceutical companies 
and TJLP over the period 2004-2017. 
 
Over the period 2004-2013, it is possible to observe a convergence between TJLP and Selic 
interest rate, with a steep decrease of the overnight interest rate that almost halved. After 2013, 
the Selic interest rate observed a rapid increase at faster rate than the long-term interest rate, TJLP. 
Looking at the spread between the average BNDES interest rate applied to loans for 
pharmaceutical companies and the overnight interest rate, it is not possible to exclude the 
presence of a crowding-out scenario of BNDES resources over commercial banks’ activity. The 
interest rate applied by BNDES is consistently 2-3 percentage points lower than the rate at which 
commercial banks fund themselves and to which they will have, in turn, to apply their own spread. 
This situation has the outcome of pushing private financial resources out of market due to the 
higher cost, probably the most typical neoclassical example of financial repression. At the same 
time, the presence of high interest rates, starting from the long-term TJLP rate, should raise some 
questions about companies’ feasibility to invest in projects with high cost, high embedded risk of 
failure and low level of returns in R&D investments. If companies’ decisions on whether 
proceeding with an investment are driven by a cost-benefit analysis, an investment will be made 
only if the costs, including the cost of funding, are not greater than the level of economic returns.  
A way to establish whether public financial resources can be accused of crowding-out is to 
establish whether the same investment would have been anyway done, even without public 
financial resources. The following Figure 4.15 reports companies’ responses on the hypothetical 
counterfactual in which BNDES would have not provided funds for the investment. 
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Figure 4.15 – If BNDES would have not funded this investment, would you have 
invested in the same project? 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on primary data 
Figure 4.15 reports companies’ responses on whether the same investment would have been done even without BNDES 
financial support. 
Responses presented in Figure 4.15 highlight a scenario in which public financial resources have 
not created that additionality public spending is expected to generate. In detail, BNDES financial 
resources seem to have funded investments that would have happened anyway, possibly at higher 
financial costs that would, however, not discouraged companies to still invest in such projects. 
The role of public financial institutions in supporting those investments that are usually discarded 
by the private financial sector (Minsky 1981; Haldane and Davies 2011) and in creating outcomes 
that would have not happened without their support (Mazzucato and Penna 2014), does not seem 
to be appropriate to describe BNDES activity in the pharmaceutical sector in the last 5 years.  
 
4.6. Conclusions 
This chapter presents evidence for innovation activities in the Brazilian pharmaceutical sector and 
the role of the Brazilian development bank, BNDES. Results present companies’ perceived risk 
environment for innovation activities, the degree of importance of different sources of financial 
resources and eventually focus on the specific projects funded by BNDES. 
Innovation activities in the pharmaceutical sector are characterized by high risk of failure and low 
returns in R&D investments, making financial resources scarce and expensive. In developing 
countries like Brazil, the absence of adequate financial resources is even more exacerbate due to 
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the presence of high interest rates and in these contexts, one of the roles of development banks 
is to provide access to credit for companies that would not otherwise have it. In such way, public 
financial resources should contribute in reducing obstacles for activities that would have not 
otherwise happened. At the same time, the presence of development banks can represent an 
obstacle to the development of the private financial system, due to misallocation of resources 
arising from crony capitalism or selection of the best candidates that could have obtained funds 
from commercial banks, hence crowding-out private financial institutions’ activity. 
4.6.1. Obstacles to innovation activities for pharmaceutical 
companies 
The first set of results, looking at obstacles to innovation activities, presents companies’ 
perception about obstacles classified as internal and external, depending on the origin of such 
constraints to innovation activities. Among obstacles directly attributable to company’s internal 
factors, lack of qualified human capital represents the main obstacle for product innovation 
activities while high risk of failure represents an important obstacle to process innovation 
activities. Among external obstacles, high level of bureaucratisation and lack of tax incentives 
represent, equally, the major constraint.  
4.6.2. The importance of different sources of financial sources 
The second set of results of this chapter reports the degree of importance of different sources of 
financial resources, showing companies’ preference towards own financial resources, followed by 
public financial resources and, lastly, resources coming from the private financial sector. The 
preference of pharmaceutical companies towards own financial resources is a signal of low the 
weakness of Brazilian financial institutions in supplying the necessary financial resources.  
4.6.3. The BNDES funded projects 
Finally, the chapter presents findings on the specific projects funded by BNDES showing that, 
while BNDES seems to have not adopted any picking-winner or picking-looser strategy in selecting 
which companies to fund, it seems however that its activity might have not generated 
additionality, in terms of promoting activities that otherwise would have never happened. This is 
shown by the high incidence of respondents declaring that the same project would have anyway 
happened without BNDES’ support. The preference for BNDES resources due to the lower 
interest rate indicates, on contrary, that the activity of the Brazilian development bank might have 
crowded-out both commercial banks disbursement and companies’ own commitment. At the 
same time, this preference for lower interest rates has to be contextualized in the Brazilian 
economy, where high interest rates make financial resources very expensive, which might 
persuade private companies from requesting a loan from the private financial sector. 
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4.6.4. Policy recommendations and concluding remarks 
In terms of policy recommendations, the presented scenario in which public financial resources 
are supporting investments that would have anyway happened, should represent a major concern 
for Brazilian policy makers. If the scope of public financial institutions is to push activities of 
national industry beyond the actual frontier through provision of adequate financial resources, 
public credit suppliers should ascertain the indispensability of their financial resources for the 
activity to take place. On contrary, the risk is that companies will end up preferring public financial 
institutions only because of the lower interest rate applied to their loans, whereas they should be 
addressed towards challenging investments usually disregarded by the private financial sector due 
to the high embedded risk of failure.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
This thesis presented an analysis on the role of the Brazilian development bank, BNDES, with 
its recent role as primary public lender of financial resources for innovation activities, and 
generally, for industrial development, since 200426. Being the second-largest development 
financial institution in the world, BNDES is an interesting case study on the use of a large amount 
of public financial resources targeted towards goals identified by “mission-oriented” industrial 
policies. The overarching research question of the PhD thesis has been about the investigation of 
the role of BNDES in incentivizing greater commitment in R&D resources for both companies 
and commercial banks. More in detail, this thesis engaged with mainly the first accusation moved 
to development banks, as presented in Mazzucato and Penna (2014): 
i) Financial repression and crowding-out 
ii) Misallocation of resources due to political biases 
iii) Incapacity to “pick winners” 
iv) Inefficient governmental structure 
The first chapter presented an introduction about the role of development banks and discussed 
related literature. The following second and third chapters quantitatively evaluated the activity of 
BNDES over the past years. These two chapters have investigated whether BNDES activity have 
crowded-out either commercial banks’ activity or companies’ financial commitment in innovation 
activities. Finally, the fourth chapter proposed qualitative evidence, using primary data, on 
BNDES activity in the pharmaceutical sector, together with companies’ perception on constraints 
affecting innovation activities.  
 
5.1. Summary of Findings: Is BNDES activity crowding-
in or crowding-out financial resources from the 
private sector? 
Findings of this PhD thesis show that, although quantitative evidence does not indicate any 
financial repression and crowding-out of BNDES activity, qualitative findings on the 
pharmaceutical sector reveal that companies mainly prefer financial resources from BNDES due 
 
26 And ended in 2017 
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to the lower than market interest rate applied to its loans and, further, that investments funded 
by BNDES would have anyway been undertaken by the company. 
Results of the second chapter show that, while during the period 2002-2008 BNDES had no 
impact on commercial banks’ disbursement, the countercyclical role assumed by BNDES at the 
beginning of the financial crisis in 2008 had a positive impact on the amount of financial resourced 
disbursed by Brazilian private banks. Evidence from the third chapter highlights a scenario in 
which companies have increased their level of R&D intensity after receiving funding from 
BNDES. Further, while there is no quantitative evidence on crowding-out of BNDES activity on 
both commercial banks’ disbursement and companies’ financial commitment, the qualitative 
evidence suggests that companies in the Brazilian pharmaceutical sector have preferred BNDES, 
in presence of alternative sources of funding, mainly due to the lower interest rate applied by the 
development bank. Pharmaceutical companies also declared that the funded investment would 
have anyway happened in absence of financial resources from BNDES. The combination of the 
findings emerging from the qualitative evidence seems to present an exception on the activity of 
the Brazilian development bank, possibly given by the peculiarity of innovation activities of 
pharmaceutical companies in developing countries, where high interest rates are combined with 
high risk associated to those investments. 
 
5.1.1. The impact of BNDES resources on commercial banks’ 
disbursement 
Findings of the second chapter provide empirical evidence to the debate about 
additionality/substitutability of private and public financial resources. Results presented in the 
chapter show that, for the period 2002-2016, BNDES activity had an additional impact on 
financial resources disbursed to companies by commercial banks. More importantly, results show 
an increase in additionality, simultaneously, with the adoption of a countercyclical role by 
BNDES, at the beginning of the 2008 financial crisis. This evidence presents the Brazilian 
development bank as an efficient government tool that has been able to transmit countercyclical 
policy decisions without hampering, and on contrary fostering, the development of national 
commercial banks. 
 
5.1.2. The impact on companies’ R&D intensity 
The third chapter quantitatively evaluates the impact of receiving funding from BNDES on 
companies’ commitment in innovation activities. Results, over the period, 2003-2011, show a 
positive impact of receiving a loan from BNDES on the level of R&D intensity of the recipients. 
Further, the analysis reports heterogeneous impacts of different financial resources received, 
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depending on the source of the credit, also within different public financial resources, where the 
coefficients associated to BNDES and other public financial resources report opposite signs.   
 
5.1.3. The role of BNDES for the Brazilian pharmaceutical sector 
The fourth chapter provides qualitative evidence on the role of BNDES in funding innovation 
activities for the pharmaceutical sectors. The results, produced with the use of primary data 
collected by means of survey, report companies’ perceived risk environment for innovation 
activities, the degree of importance of different sources of financial resources and eventually focus 
on the specific projects funded by BNDES. Findings report lack of qualified human capital, high 
embedded risk of failure, high level of bureaucratization and low tax incentives as the major 
obstacles to innovation activities in the Brazilian pharmaceutical sector. Further, results highlight 
that companies mostly rely on their own financial resources, indicating scarce access to credit for 
innovation activities. Finally, while BNDES shows to have not adopted any picking-winner or 
picking-loser strategy in selecting companies to fund, it emerges that the main reason why 
companies preferred funding from BNDES, instead of available alternatives, is due to the lower-
than-market interest rate applied to its loans. Further, findings reveal that the projects funded by 
BNDES would have likely happened even without BNDES financial resources. The combination 
of these findings for the Brazilian pharmaceutical sector should encourage further research to 
better understand the financial necessities of companies operating in a peculiar sector as 
pharmaceutical and biotech.  
 
5.2. Limitations and Future Research 
Different limitations emerged, particularly regarding the third and fourth chapter, due to the 
necessity to work with confidential data for the former and collecting primary data for the latter. 
Regarding the third chapter, it would be interesting to test the robustness of the results by 
including the 2014 wave of both industrial and innovation surveys that became available once the 
fieldwork was terminated.  
Regarding the survey conducted for the fourth chapter, budget and time constraints represented 
the main limitations. It would be also interesting to follow-up with the interviews in the next years 
to construct a panel dataset, to be able to reveal changes over time, and extend this analysis to 
other countries. 
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5.3. Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications 
The purpose of this thesis has been to contribute to the debate on the role of development banks 
in providing financial resources for industrial development. The topic belongs to a bigger strand 
of literature on the impact of public financial resources and on how governments should address 
them to the real economy. While the activity of the Brazilian Development Bank did not displace 
commercial banks’ disbursement to the industry, nor companies’ financial resources, it however 
emerges, from the qualitative evidence, that pharmaceutical companies preferred BNDES 
resources mainly due to the lower-than-market interest rate applied to its loans. Further, it also 
emerged that funded projects in the pharmaceutical sector would have anyway happened without 
the financial support from the development bank. Such scenario, other than attracting critiques 
about the displacement of financial resources in the economy and consequent obstacles to the 
development of national private institutions, should concern policymakers about the non-
incisiveness of BNDES in going beyond the actual frontier of investment. In other words, a 
“mission-oriented” type of public finance should address its resources towards investments, possibly 
with high social returns, that otherwise would have not happened due to lack of credit as a 
consequence of the high embedded risk. On contrary, public resources, while still providing 
financial resources to the national industry, will fail in pushing the frontier of investment beyond 
its national threshold, funding investments that would have anyway taken place hence not 
providing that additionality this type of finance is required to generate.      
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Appendix 
 
A1.1 The Brazilian industrial policy context 
In March 2004, Brazilian administration, working closely with BNDES, introduced an Industrial, 
Technological, and Foreign Trade Policy (PITCE), under which government export 
promotion programmes were integrated into industrial development programmes, targeting 
sectors with high innovation capacity and with a view to increasing competitiveness. The priority 
sectors chosen in the PITCE framework were pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, computer 
programs and capital goods (Hermann 2010). According to the Ministry of Development, 
Industry and Foreign trade (MDIC), PITCE’s final goal is to induce economic growth through 
increased competitiveness, technological update and increase in productivity (Federal 2003); the 
agents involved in this new industrial policy are both public and private, all complementary to the 
achievement of economic growth, which will be the result of industrial and social development. 
Industrial policy is therefore part of the bigger economic development plan started by Brazilian 
government and comes together with other development policies issued during the same years. 
According to the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign trade (MDIC), PITCE is 
structured following three complementary axes: 
- Horizontal action lines: focusing on innovation and technological development, 
international insertion, industrial modernization, production capacity and scale. 
- Strategic options: targeting the priority sectors chosen in the PITCE, semiconductors, 
software, capital goods and pharmaceutical. 
- Activities with future perspectives: focusing on the future strategic industrial sectors 
for Brazilian economic development, biotechnology, nanotechnology, biomass and renewable 
energies. 
However MDIC guidelines highlight that without horizontal policies, sectoral industrial policies 
are inefficient because of their transiency and their specific targets (Pereira, Marcelino et al. 2006); 
therefore MDIC guidelines stress the importance of permanent horizontal policies as priorities in 
order to develop a healthy industrial sector. These horizontal measures, for all the industrial 
sectors, are focused on investment on education and infrastructure, to increase flexibility in the 
labour market, to develop the capital market by reducing the interest rate and to provide a fiscal 
reform. 
In December 2004, Brazil passed the Innovation Law, which allowed researchers in Public 
Research Organizations (PROs) and federal universities to leave their post for up to three years, 
maintaining pension benefits and career evolution rights, to create a technology-based start-up 
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and promotes the establishment of technology transfer offices (TTOs) in PROs and federal 
universities among other provisions, which came into effect in December 2005. A major change 
brought about by the Innovation Law and its subsequent regulatory measures was in the realm of 
innovation financing. The law established a new legal framework to allow the provision of 
innovation subsidies directly to firms. Previously the government had to finance corporate R&D 
and innovation projects either through grants to individual researchers collaborating in corporate 
projects or university and public research organizations in cooperative projects with firms 
(Balbachevsky and Botelho 2011). 
In the wake of the Innovation Law, the government launched the Good Law. This Law created 
a set of favourable fiscal incentives and tax regime depreciation schemes for R&D investments. 
It permits automatic use of fiscal benefits for companies that invest in R&D. and are within 
requirements, without any need for a formal request, accelerating and expanding the scope of 
incentives for investments in innovative activities. It comprises deductions from income tax and 
social contributions on net profits. 
In November 2007, the Government launched the 2007-2010 Action Plan for Science 
Technology and Innovation (PACTI). This Plan expresses the new configuration of the 
National Policy of Science, Technology and Innovation and reflects the expectation that the 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT) act in a more intense and crucial way to the economic 
and social development of the country. According to the plan joint initiatives will be strengthened 
between the MCT and other ministries, states of the federation, municipalities and the business 
sector, still counting with the participation of other relevant government agencies and public 
owned enterprises, such as the BNDES and Petrobrás. 
Following the new active interventionist approach, Brazilian government kept on stimulating the 
industrial sector, issuing in 2008 a new industrial policy entirely in line with the previous one’s 
focus on competitiveness and innovation of the Brazilian industrial sector, the Productive 
Development Policy (PDP). PDP aims at increasing public investments and encourage private 
investments in R&D through different kinds of incentives and actions. The priority goal is to 
provide sustainability to the current growth cycle with different actions: expanding supply 
capacity, preserving balance of payment’s strength, improving innovation capacity and 
strengthening SMEs. 
In 2011 a new industrial policy, the Brazil Plano Maior, aimed at increasing industrial 
competitiveness through innovation (“Innovate to compete. Compete to grow”) for the period 
2011/2014. The focus is on innovation and technological development to sustainably create and 
reinforce strategic competencies in the economy, increase productivity and technology density, 
increase domestic and international market share of Brazilian companies. The sectoral programs 
are focused on strengthening the production chains, allowing the creation on new technological 
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and business competencies, to develop the energy supply chain, promoting export diversification 
and R&D of foreign companies and to consolidate competencies in the natural knowledge 
economy. The systemic programs are the cross-sectional priorities involving the whole Brazilian 
industrial scenario. The focus is on foreign trade, incentives for investments and innovation, 
professional education and qualification, sustainable production, competitiveness of SMEs, 
regional industrial development and consumer welfare. 
The National Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy (ENCTI), launched in 2012, 
one year after the previous innovation policy, PACTI, was expired. The strategic sectors indicated 
in the ENCTI are the following: 
Table A5.1 - Strategic industrial sectors in the National Science, Technology and 
Innovation Strategy (ENCTI) 
Common to the Brasil Plano Maior Only part of ENCTI 
ICT Nuclear 
Pharmaceuticals and Health industry Complex Innovation Border: 
Oil and gas Biotechnology 
Defence Industrial Complex Nanotechnology 
Aerospace  
Promotion of green economy (renewable 
energy, climate change, biodiversity, oceans 
and coastal zones) 
 
ST&I for social development (diffusion and 
improvement in science education, productive 
inclusion and social technology, and 
technologies for sustainable cities) 
 
 
Finally, in 2013 the new industrial policy, Inova Empresa aims at increasing the level of private 
R&D, engage companies in riskier technological projects and decentralize the plan 
implementation to reduce bureaucracy and to be more accessible for micro and small enterprises. 
The agents actively participating in the program are FINEP, the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MCTI) and BDNES. Brazilian red tape has always been one of the major constraints 
in the Brazilian economy and to overcome this problem the new policy aims at centralising the 
disbursement of resources for corporate technological innovation by reducing the bureaucracy.  
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A1.2 Brazilian Industrial Policies and targeted industrial sectors 
2004 - 2007: PITCE – Política Industrial, Tecnológica e de Comércio Exterior 
According to the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign trade (MDIC), PITCE is 
structured following three complementary axes: 
- Horizontal action lines: focusing on innovation and technological development, 
international insertion, industrial modernization, production capacity and scale. 
- Strategic options: targeting the priority sectors chosen in the PITCE, semiconductors, 
software, capital goods and pharmaceutical. 
- Activities with future perspectives: focusing on the future strategic industrial sectors 
for Brazilian economic development, biotechnology, nanotechnology, biomass and 
renewable energies. 
 
2008 - 2011: PDP - Productive Development Policy 
Aiming to increase public investments and encourage private investments in R&D through 
different kinds of incentives, the PDP is designed as a 3-level policy where:  
- Level 1: Systemic actions are focused on factors generating positive externalities for the 
entire productive sector. Interfacing with other national policies, they aim at lowering tax 
burden on investments, providing more funds for capital investment at lower interest rate, 
more funds for innovation, reduce Brazilian red tape and improving foreign trade regulation. 
- Level 2: Structuring programs for productive systems are guided by strategic objectives 
taking in consideration the diversity of the Brazilian industrial sector. The areas of interest 
are: 
- Programs for strategic industries: 6 programs: healthcare, ICTs, Nuclear energy, 
defense, nanotechnology and biotechnology.  
- Programs to consolidate and expand leadership: 7 programs: aeronautic, oil, gas 
and petrochemical, bio-ethanol, mining, steel, cellulose and meat industry. Coordinated 
by BNDES 
- Programs to strengthen competitiveness: 12 programs. Coordinated by MDIC 
- Level 3: Strategic highlights: 5 programs, where public policies intervene in strategic 
areas for the long term productive development. Coordinated by the Agency for industrial 
development (ABDI). 
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2011 – 2014: PBM - Plano Brazil Maior 
To increase industrial competitiveness through innovation (“Innovate to compete. Compete to 
grow”) for the period 2011/2014. 
The main actions promoted in the Brasil Maior Plan are regarding: 
- Incentives for investment and innovation: through tax relief, direct and indirect funds 
and a legal framework for innovation 
- Foreign trade: introduction of tax reliefs, trade remedies, financing and guarantees for 
exports and trade promotion 
- Industry and domestic market defence: introduction of tax exemption on payroll, 
special automotive regime, government procurement and harmonization of funding 
policies. 
The priority goals are: 
- Increase ratio fixed investment/GDP from 18.4% in 2010 to 22.4% in 2014 
- Increase ratio corporate spending on R&D/GDP from 0.59 in 2010 to 0.90% in 
2014 (based on the National Strategy for Science and Technology) 
- Increase human resource qualification as percentage of industry workers with at least 
secondary education, from 53.7% in 2010 to 65% in 2014 
- Increase value added in manufacturing as VALUE ADDED/TURNOVER ratio 
(VIT/GVP) from 44.3% in 2009 to 45.3% in 2014 
- Increase percentage of knowledge intensive manufacturing as value added of high-
tech manufacturing/total manufacturing value added from 30.1% registered in 2009 to 
31.5% for 2014 
- Strengthen SMEs enterprises, increasing the number of innovative SMEs by 50% 
from 37100 in 2008 to 58000 in 2014  
- Promote clean production reducing energy consumption per unit of industrial GDP 
(energy consumption in ton of oil equivalent – toe per unit of industrial GDP) from 
150.7 ton/R$ million in 2010 to 137 ton/R$ million in 2014 (at 2010 constant prices) 
- Diversify exports by increasing the country’s share in the global market from 
1.36% in 2010 to 1.6% in 2014 
- Develop the national energy market by increasing the ratio of value added/gross 
turnover of energy-goods manufacturing from 64% in 2009 to 66% in 2014 
- Increase access to goods and services for improving quality of life, by increasing 
the number of urban households with broad band access (National Broad Band Plan), 
from R$ 13.8 million registered in 2008 to R$ 40 million in 2014 
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A1.3 Innovation Policies 
2007 - 2010: PACTI - Action Plan for Science Technology and Innovation 
Four priority axes characterize the PACTI: 
- Expansion and Consolidation of the ST&I System: through the institutional 
consolidation of national ST&I system, human resources capacity building in ST&I and 
support to S&T research infrastructure. The priority goals were expanding state and 
municipal partnerships, increasing international cooperation and increase the number of 
PhD awards per year, focusing on strategic sectors as engineering. 
- Promotion of technology innovation in business: through financial support to 
innovation, technology in support of innovation by enterprises and incentives to start-
ups and consolidation of technology-intensive companies. The priority goal was to 
increase R,D&I expenditure from 0.51% to 0.65% of GDP by 2010, increasing the 
number of instruments in support of technological innovation. 
- R&D in strategic areas: the strategic areas highlighted in the PACTI are:  
▪ Biotechnology and nanotechnology 
▪ ICT 
▪ Inputs for health sector 
▪ Biofuels, electric energy, hydrogen and renewable energies 
▪ Oil, gas and coal 
▪ Agribusiness 
▪ Biodiversity and natural resources 
▪ Development of the Amazon and semi-arid region 
▪ Meteorology and climate change 
▪ Space Program 
▪ Nuclear Program 
▪ National defence and public security 
- S&T for social development 
 
2012 – 2015: ENCTI - National Science, Technology and Innovation Strategy 
The main goals are: 
- Increase GERD by increasing the ratio GERD/GDP from 1.16 in 2010 to 1.8 in 2014 
(same goal of Brasil Maior Plan) 
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- Increase BERD by increasing the ratio BERD/GDP from 0.56 in 2010 to 0.9 in 2014 
- Increase the innovation rate by increasing the share of industrial firms involved in 
innovation from 38.6% in 2010 to 48.6% in 2014 
- Increase the number of firms doing continuous R&D from 3425 in 2008 to 5000 in 
2015 (excluding state-owned firms) 
- Double the number of innovative firms making use of the Good Law from 6130 in 
2009/2010 to 12260 in 2014 
- Increase the percentage of innovative firms that make use of at least one of the 
government innovation support measure from 22.3%  in 2010 to 30% in 2014 
The strategic sectors indicated in the ENCTI are the following: 
- Common to the Brasil Plano Maior:  
- ICT 
- Pharmaceuticals and Health industry Complex 
- Oil and gas 
- Defence Industrial Complex 
- Aerospace 
- Promotion of green economy (renewable energy, climate change, biodiversity, oceans       
and coastal zones) 
- ST&I for social development (diffusion and improvement in science education, 
productive inclusion and social technology, and technologies for sustainable cities). 
 
- Only part of ENCTI:      - Nuclear 
                                         - Innovation Border (biotechnology and nanotechnology) 
 
2013 - 2014: Inova Empresa 
Brazilian red tape has always been one of the major constraints in the Brazilian economy. To 
overcome this problem, Brazilian government in 2013 launched a new policy aimed at centralising 
the disbursement of resources for corporate technological innovation by reducing the 
bureaucracy. The Inova Empresa Plan’s macro goals aim at increasing the level of private R&D, 
engage companies in riskier technological projects and decentralize the plan implementation to 
reduce bureaucracy and to be more accessible for micro and small enterprises. The agents actively 
participating in the program are FINEP, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MCTI) and 
BDNES. 
The targeted sectors are: 
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- Information and Technology 
- Social and environmental sustainability 
- Aerospace and defense 
- Health 
- Oil and gas 
- Energy 
- Agriculture 
 
A1.4 Fiscal incentives and subsidy programs 
• 2004: Brazilian Innovation Law → facilitates private/public research partnerships and 
the transfer of innovation from public research institutions to the private sector 
• 2005: Good Law→ Fiscal incentives to invest in R&D 
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Table A5.2 – Number of BNDES loans by financial product and associated financial 
instrument 
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Table A5.3 – Correlation coefficients 
 
 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑐)𝑡 𝐵𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑆 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1 𝐵𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑆 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑀𝐸𝑡−1 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡 1 
       
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1 0.1459* 1 
      
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1  -0.0692 -0.3527* 1 
     
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑐)𝑡 -0.1270* -0.8004* 0.5151* 1 
    
𝐵𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑆 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1 0.1358* 0.7847* -0.3315* -0.7474* 1 
   
𝐵𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑆 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑀𝐸𝑡−1 0.1443* 0.8073* -0.3700* -0.7773* 0.7376* 1 
  
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 0.0465 -0.0615 0.0243 0.0536 -0.0597 -0.0605 1 
 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 0.6306* 0.0664 -0.0451 -0.0568 0.0564 0.063 0.0131 1 
 
* p<0.05 
Table A2.11 presents correlation coefficients for the variables used in the model. All coefficients are below (the absolute value) 0.811, which is the limit indicated by Kennedy (1985) 
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Table A5.4 – GMM Two-steps estimation results – All Sample with Selic interest rate 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1  0.822*** 0.704*** 0.804*** 0.807*** 0.728*** 0.797*** 
 (0.087) (0.082) (0.085) (0.087) (0.084) (0.082) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1  -1.663 -1.586* -1.585 -3.139* -4.124*** -3.147** 
 (1.048) (0.898) (1.010) (1.624) (1.433) (1.533) 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑐)𝑡  0.011 0.017 0.008 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.020) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1  -0.043 -0.039* -0.043 -0.025 -0.013 -0.023 
 (0.028) (0.023) (0.029) (0.026) (0.024) (0.027) 
𝐵𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑆 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1  0.157** 0.145** 0.153**    
 (0.075) (0.066) (0.072)    
𝐵𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑆 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑀𝐸𝑡−1    0.561** 0.680*** 0.561** 
    (0.247) (0.227) (0.238) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡    0.598***   0.599***  
  (0.055)   (0.054)  
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡   0.158**   0.133* 
   (0.070)   (0.070) 
       
Observations 940 940 940 940 940 940 
Number of groups 123 123 123 123 123 123 
Sargan p-value 0.0834 0.133 0.0776 0.0588 0.171 0.0608 
Hansen p-value 0.271 0.322 0.231 0.238 0.325 0.233 
AR1 -4.123 -3.894 -4.093 -4.221 -3.968 -4.204 
AR1 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.513 -0.425 0.413 0.470 -0.380 0.389 
AR2 p-value 0.608 0.671 0.680 0.638 0.704 0.697 
Number of Instruments 95 96 96 95 96 96 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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Table A5.5 – Gmm One-Step results two periods – All Sample with Selic interest rate 
 2002-2008 2009-2016 2002-2008 2009-2016 2002-2008 2009-2016 2002-2008 2009-2016 2002-2008 2009-2016 2002-2008 2009-2016 
 (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) (5) (5) (6) (6) 
                        
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1  0.887*** 0.769*** 0.795*** 0.701*** 0.869*** 0.788*** 0.878*** 0.838*** 0.790*** 0.764*** 0.860*** 0.868*** 
 (0.091) (0.142) (0.099) (0.115) (0.086) (0.135) (0.091) (0.152) (0.099) (0.125) (0.086) (0.145) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1  -0.950 -1.749 -1.341 -4.145 -0.926 -2.239 1.798 -1.467 0.352 -2.665 1.935 -1.920 
 (1.303) (4.376) (1.092) (3.205) (1.290) (4.410) (4.069) (2.500) (3.706) (2.038) (4.040) (2.578) 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑐)𝑡  -0.025 0.039 -0.025 0.088 -0.026 0.041 -0.028 -0.024 -0.028 0.001 -0.030 -0.025 
 (0.027) (0.066) (0.024) (0.054) (0.027) (0.065) (0.026) (0.040) (0.023) (0.038) (0.026) (0.039) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1  -0.005 -0.073 0.003 -0.052 -0.006 -0.067 0.006 -0.054 0.012 -0.040 0.006 -0.048 
 (0.036) (0.053) (0.033) (0.039) (0.036) (0.052) (0.036) (0.053) (0.034) (0.045) (0.037) (0.054) 
𝐵𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑆 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1  -0.005 0.262 0.023 0.388** 0.001 0.271       
 (0.114) (0.264) (0.098) (0.191) (0.112) (0.260)       
𝐵𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑆 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑀𝐸𝑡−1        -0.544 0.596* -0.287 0.720*** -0.555 0.610* 
       (0.774) (0.346) (0.710) (0.275) (0.769) (0.341) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡    0.495*** 0.775***     0.495*** 0.770***   
   (0.073) (0.131)     (0.073) (0.124)   
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡     0.099 0.348**     0.099 0.360** 
     (0.061) (0.172)     (0.061) (0.169) 
             
Observations 562 378 562 378 562 378 562 378 562 378 562 378 
Number of groups 108 86 108 86 108 86 108 86 108 86 108 86 
Sargan p-value 0.0643 0.0450 0.0183 0.359 0.0647 0.0477 0.0948 0.381 0.0164 0.942 0.0918 0.447 
Hansen p-value 0.116 0.148 0.148 0.183 0.120 0.141 0.157 0.319 0.109 0.335 0.158 0.290 
AR1 -4.887 -4.139 -4.440 -4.172 -4.904 -4.201 -4.982 -4.060 -4.494 -4.101 -5 -4.155 
AR1 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.327 0.583 -0.402 -0.407 0.277 0.387 0.152 0.493 -0.615 -0.595 0.0838 0.258 
AR2 p-value 0.744 0.560 0.688 0.684 0.782 0.699 0.879 0.622 0.538 0.552 0.933 0.796 
Number of Instruments 22 34 23 35 23 35 22 34 23 35 23 35 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Table A5.6 – OLS and Fixed Effects estimation results – All Sample with Selic interest rate 
 
 OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
 (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) (5) (5) (6) (6) 
                        
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1  0.876*** 0.587*** 0.739*** 0.525*** 0.875*** 0.590*** 0.877*** 0.588*** 0.740*** 0.528*** 0.876*** 0.591*** 
 (0.023) (0.053) (0.035) (0.052) (0.023) (0.053) (0.022) (0.053) (0.035) (0.051) (0.022) (0.053) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1  -0.962 -0.650 -0.745 -0.896 -0.938 -0.607 -2.616* -1.926 -2.201* -2.604* -2.601* -1.846 
 (0.801) (0.995) (0.755) (0.875) (0.795) (0.982) (1.467) (1.676) (1.312) (1.356) (1.446) (1.631) 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑐)𝑡  0.013 0.014 0.019 0.020 0.012 0.011 -0.000 0.003 0.006 0.007 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1  -0.049* -0.041 -0.046* -0.035 -0.048* -0.040 -0.031 -0.027 -0.029 -0.018 -0.030 -0.027 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) 
𝐵𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑆 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1  0.139* 0.115 0.138** 0.123* 0.139* 0.112       
 (0.073) (0.070) (0.066) (0.062) (0.073) (0.069)       
𝐵𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑆 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑀𝐸𝑡−1        0.551** 0.437 0.512** 0.532** 0.553** 0.425 
       (0.265) (0.270) (0.236) (0.215) (0.262) (0.263) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡    0.274*** 0.630***     0.274*** 0.632***   
   (0.032) (0.059)     (0.032) (0.059)   
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡     0.080*** 0.127*     0.080*** 0.126* 
     (0.029) (0.071)     (0.029) (0.072) 
             
Observations 1,063 1,063 1,063 1,063 1,063 1,063 1,063 1,063 1,063 1,063 1,063 1,063 
R-squared 0.724 0.328 0.761 0.487 0.726 0.333 0.724 0.329 0.761 0.489 0.726 0.334 
Number of groups  123  123  123  123  123  123 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Table A5.7 – Robustness check – GMM Two-steps results with endogenous bank 
characteristics 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1  0.822*** 0.536*** 0.762*** 0.807*** 0.554*** 0.753*** 
 (0.087) (0.071) (0.074) (0.087) (0.071) (0.075) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1  -1.663 -1.093 -1.375 -3.139* -3.122** -2.937* 
 (1.048) (0.890) (1.004) (1.624) (1.303) (1.648) 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑐)𝑡  0.011 0.021 0.007 -0.003 0.007 -0.006 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1  -0.043 -0.034 -0.045 -0.025 -0.015 -0.027 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.029) (0.026) (0.025) (0.028) 
𝐵𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑆 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1  0.157** 0.131** 0.135*    
 (0.075) (0.064) (0.074)    
𝐵𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑆 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑀𝐸𝑡−1     0.561** 0.592*** 0.534** 
    (0.247) (0.203) (0.266) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡    0.805***   0.824***  
  (0.083)   (0.084)  
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡   0.091   0.093 
   (0.102)   (0.103) 
       
Observations 940 940 940 940 940 940 
Number of groups 123 123 123 123 123 123 
Sargan p-value 0.0834 0.000 0.0223 0.0588 0.000 0.0172 
Hansen p-value 0.271 0.652 0.729 0.238 0.677 0.691 
AR1 -4.123 -3.522 -4.107 -4.221 -3.617 -4.118 
AR1 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.513 -0.932 0.451 0.470 -0.838 0.422 
AR2 p-value 0.608 0.352 0.652 0.638 0.402 0.673 
Number of Instruments 95 133 133 95 133 133 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
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Table A5.8 – GMM Two-steps estimation results – All Sample with reserve requirement rate 
 (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
             
𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1  0.819*** 0.713*** 0.800*** 0.812*** 0.720*** 0.797*** 
 (0.088) (0.079) (0.086) (0.093) (0.086) (0.087) 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1  -2.526** -2.008** -2.361** -3.574** 
-
4.014*** -3.345** 
 (1.117) (0.996) (1.092) (1.490) (1.250) (1.417) 
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑡−1  4.740 1.389 4.110 2.486 0.708 1.946 
 (3.711) (3.626) (3.968) (3.477) (3.337) (3.466) 
𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1  -0.044** -0.026 -0.045** -0.035* -0.019 -0.036* 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.018) (0.020) 
𝐵𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑆 𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡−1  0.213*** 0.155** 0.205**    
 (0.080) (0.077) (0.081)    
𝐵𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑆 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑀𝐸𝑡−1     0.634*** 0.679*** 0.604** 
    (0.244) (0.218) (0.236) 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡   0.596***   0.601***  
  (0.057)   (0.052)  
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡   0.142**   0.124* 
   (0.069)   (0.073) 
       
Observations 940 940 940 940 940 940 
Number of groups 123 123 123 123 123 123 
Sargan p-value 0.0892 0.145 0.0819 0.0543 0.174 0.0554 
Hansen p-value 0.353 0.271 0.297 0.235 0.305 0.231 
AR1 -4.098 -3.915 -4.059 -4.160 -3.934 -4.137 
AR1 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR2 0.514 -0.455 0.427 0.456 -0.391 0.384 
AR2 p-value 0.607 0.649 0.669 0.649 0.696 0.701 
Number of Instruments 95 96 96 95 96 96 
Robust standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1       
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Table A5.9 - Regressions Results Second Stage IV one instrument– GMM 
 
 All Sample 
Companies with positive innovation 
expenditure 
 Solvency Solvency^2 Tax Incentive Solvency Solvency^2 Tax Incentive 
 (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) 
              
𝐴𝑔𝑒 (𝑙𝑜𝑔) 0.353** 0.302** 0.138 0.360** 0.339** 0.204 
 (0.149) (0.127) (0.296) (0.167) (0.156) (0.288) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑅&𝐷 0.151 0.183 0.285 -0.253 -0.205 0.100 
 (0.463) (0.436) (0.451) (0.570) (0.535) (0.679) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 0.015 0.069 0.244 -0.044 0.034 0.527 
 (0.165) (0.131) (0.261) (0.231) (0.194) (0.696) 
𝑅&𝐷 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 1.049*** 1.064*** 1.112*** 1.335** 1.323*** 1.249** 
 (0.405) (0.394) (0.406) (0.523) (0.504) (0.528) 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 -0.237 -0.280 -0.419 -0.258 -0.289 -0.484 
 (0.210) (0.184) (0.262) (0.219) (0.199) (0.338) 
𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 -0.911** -0.675* 0.090 -1.065** -0.880** 0.290 
 (0.430) (0.402) (1.147) (0.465) (0.447) (1.640) 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 0.017 0.016 0.013 0.109 0.097 0.019 
 (0.082) (0.071) (0.068) (0.115) (0.105) (0.175) 
𝑩𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑺 3.596** 2.344** -1.706 3.745** 2.830** -2.967 
 (1.729) (1.136) (5.819) (1.749) (1.337) (8.014) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡    -3.468*** -3.219*** -1.640 
    (1.311) (1.234) (2.576) 
       
Observations 1,742 1,742 1,742 1,265 1,265 1,265 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared -0.040 0.022 -0.005 -0.010 0.024 -0.059 
Robust standard errors in parentheses    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
Source: Author’s own calculation based on PIA (Annual Industry Survey), PINTEC (Technological Innovation Survey) and BNDES data on 
disbursement to manufacturing companies 
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Table A5.10 - Regressions Results First Stage IV one instrument– GMM 
 All Sample 
Companies with positive innovation 
expenditure 
  Solvency Solvency^2 Tax Incentive Solvency Solvency^2 Tax Incentive 
 
(45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) 
              
𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 0.363***   0.378***   
 (0.109) 
  
(0.111) 
  
𝑆𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦2 
 0.151**   0.161**  
 
 
(0.065) 
  
(0.070) 
 
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 
  0.074**   0.061* 
 
  
(0.033) 
  
(0.034) 
𝐴𝑔𝑒 (𝑙𝑜𝑔) -0.037** -0.038** -0.044** -0.019 -0.020 -0.027 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑅&𝐷 0.028 0.027 0.009 0.055 0.054 0.039 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 0.047 0.046 0.043 0.093** 0.091** 0.083* 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
𝑅&𝐷 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 0.013 0.011 0.006 -0.008 -0.011 -0.013 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 -0.033 -0.032 -0.032 -0.031 -0.031 -0.032 
 (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 0.169*** 0.183*** 0.184*** 0.183*** 0.197*** 0.198*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) 
𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 0.001 -0.000 -0.003 -0.010 -0.012 -0.016 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡    0.213* 0.224* 0.305** 
    
(0.129) (0.130) (0.126) 
       
Observations 1,742 1,742 1,742 1,265 1,265 1,265 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
Source: Author’s own calculation 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on PIA (Annual Industry Survey), PINTEC (Technological Innovation Survey) and BNDES data on 
disbursement to manufacturing companies 
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Table A5.11 - First Stage Summary Statistics 
  
All Sample 
Companies with positive innovation 
expenditure 
 (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) 
F-Test 11.05 5.385 4.976 11.58 5.290 3.108 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 0.006 0.03 0.024 0.007 0.028 0.073 
Anderson-Rubin Wald P-value 0.0167 0.0332 0.768 0.00890 0.00966 0.705 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on PIA (Annual Industry Survey), PINTEC (Technological Innovation Survey) and BNDES data on 
disbursement to manufacturing companies 
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A4.1 Consent Form 
 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR PROJECT PARTICIPANTS 
 
PROJECT TITLE: SURVEY ON INNOVATION OBSTACLES AND FINANCIAL 
RESOURCES IN THE BRAZILIAN PHARMACEUTICAL AND 
BIOTECHNOLOGY SECTORS 
Project Approval                                                    
R eference: 
  
ER/MC408/1 
  
I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project being conducted by 
Marco Carreras. I have had the project explained to me and I have read and understood 
the Information Sheet, which I may keep for records. I understand that agreeing to take 
part means that I am willing to be interviewed by the researcher. 
 
I understand that any information I provide is confidential and that no information that 
I disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in the reports on the project, either 
by the researcher or by any other party. The information will be used for quantitative and 
qualitative research only. No data that can identify individual responses will be shared 
with other parties. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part 
or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project without being 
penalized or disadvantaged in any way. I consent to the processing of my personal 
information for the purposes of this research study. I understand that such information will 
be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the Data Protection Act 
1998. 
 
 
 
Name:     
 
Signature     
 
Date:     
 
 
 
Please tick here if you want a copy of the study for your records: 
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A4.2 Participant Information Sheet 
SURVEY ON INNOVATION OBSTACLES AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES IN THE 
BRAZILIAN PHARMACEUTICAL AND BIOTECHNOLOGY SECTORS 
 
 
Marco Carreras, University of 
Sussex, United Kingdom 
 
 
The purpose of this document is to provide a brief background of the survey questions to 
the interviewees. 
The long-term strategic commitment required to finance technological change focuses 
attention on the type of finance that is required for innovation-based industrial 
development. The high uncertainty involved in innovation leads to more projects failing 
than succeeding and means that the profit-seeking commercial banking sector does not 
supply the appropriate amount of investment resources. Moreover, in developing countries 
where the financial alternatives (VC, equity, business angels) are not fully developed, a 
key question is where this investment should come from. 
Pharmaceuticals and biotechnology have been among the major sectors for intervention 
since the first Brazilian industrial policy in 2004 (PITCE). These have been further 
confirmed as among the key industrial sectors for development in the second industrial 
policy (PDP). Between the two industrial policies, the importance of the two sectors has 
been highlighted by the creation of the PROFARMA program by BNDES in 2004. Finally, 
both sectors remained among the key strategic sectors in the Plano Brasil Maior (2011). 
The Brazilian pharmaceutical and biotech industries represent sectoral systems of 
innovation involving a wide variety of public and private institutions. However, observers 
have noted that one of the main fragilities in Brazil is the weak private industrial 
infrastructure, particularly regarding the innovation chain. The industrial setting has recently 
experienced an increasing number of domestic firms and innovative domestic firms, in a 
scenario dominated by foreign pharmaceutical companies. In this context, BNDES has 
sought to provide funding for investment in innovation. In doing so, it seeks to reduce 
the financial obstacles that may prevent companies from investing in areas characterized 
by high risks and unpredictability of results. 
This survey aims to collect information about the role of pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology companies’ perceived obstacles in innovation investment, and information 
about the role that BNDES plays in reducing the risk associated with innovation activities. 
Please note that the information collected here is intended to provide a better evidence 
base concerning private and public roles in pharmaceutical finance. The information 
collected in this survey will be kept strictly confidential and no information that I disclose 
will lead to the identification of any individual in the reports on the project, either by the 
researcher or by any other party. 
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A4.3 Questionnaire  
 
i. Company Name: _ 
ii. Address:    
iii. Size: 
a. Number of workers:    
b. Workers in R&D department:     
 
iv. In which States are your plants located? 
 
 
 
v. In what year was your company established (yyyy)?    
 
vi. What is the ownership of your company? 
a. Domestic  
b.   Foreign 0% – 20%   20% – 40% 40% – 60% 60% or more 
 
vii.   In which stage(s) of the innovation chain is the project you obtained/requested the loan for? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii. What is your expenditure on R&D as a percentage of annual sales? % 
 
ix. Do you export?  
Yes  No  
 
a. If Yes, What is the value of your export as percentage of annual sales? % 
1. Basic research  
2. Prototype, design or discovery  
3. Preclinical development  
4. Clinical development  
5. Approval & launch preparation  
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Risk in innovation investment in the Brazilian Pharmaceutical Sector 
 
Please report the degree of importance of each of the following obstacles for the period 2004–2015 
on the table on the next page. 
▪ Classification of perceived investments risk in innovation for pharmaceutical sector: 
1. Lack of qualified human resources, lack of previous investment in R&D 
2. Bureaucratic obstacles 
3. Lack of tax incentives 
4. Shareholder pressure 
5. Uncertainty about the timing of reimbursement of public funding 
6. Uncertainty about the timing of reimbursement of private funding 
7. High risk of failure involving investment in innovation 
8. Inability to capture returns due to inappropriate IPR protection 
9. Limited access to commercial bank finance (availability, interest rates, fees, and 
collateral requirements) 
 
▪ For the specific project funded by BNDES: 
10. To what extent was access to finance a problem for the investment you 
requested the loan for? 
11. How high do you evaluate the risk of failure for the project you obtained the 
funding for? 
 
The self-identification of the obstacles will be reported with a Likert scale with values in the range from 
0 to 5, representing the degree of importance of the each element. 
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 Product 
Innovation 
 Process 
Innovation 
 
Values: 
1: No obstacle 
2: Minor obstacle 
3: Moderate obstacle 
4: Major obstacle 
5: Very severe obstacle 
 
Development of 
a new molecular 
entity (NME) 
Development 
of an 
incrementally 
modified 
drug (IMD) 
 
Acquisition 
of machinery 
/ plant 
expansion 
 
Acquisition 
of external 
R&D 
(software 
excluded) 
 
 
Acquisitio
n of 
software 
 
R&D 
activities 
performed 
within the 
company 
 
Hiring 
workforce 
for R&D 
activities 
Other 
(please 
specify): 
 
Lack of qualified human 
resources, lack of previous 
investment in R&D 
 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
Bureaucratic obstacles 
 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
 2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
 5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5 
 
 
Lack of tax incentives 
 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
 2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
 5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5 
 
 
Shareholder pressure 
 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
 2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
3 
4 
 5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5 
 
 
Uncertainty about the timing 
of reimbursement of public 
funding 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1
2
6 
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 Product 
Innovation 
 Process  
Innovation 
 
Values: 
1: No obstacle 
2: Minor obstacle 
3: Moderate obstacle 
4: Major obstacle 
5: Very severe obstacle 
 
Development of 
a new molecular 
entity (NME) 
Development 
of an 
incrementally 
modified 
drug (IMD) 
 
Acquisition 
of machinery 
/ plant 
expansion 
 
Acquisition 
of external 
R&D 
(software 
excluded) 
 
 
Acquisitio
n of 
software 
 
R&D 
activities 
performed 
within the 
company 
 
Hiring 
workforce 
for R&D 
activities 
Other 
(please 
specify): 
 
 
Uncertainty about the timing 
of reimbursement of private 
funding 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
High risk of failure involving 
 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
 2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
 3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 
investment in innovation  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4 
 5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5 
 
Inability to capture returns 
due to inappropriate IPR 
protection 
 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
Limited access to commercial 
 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
 2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
bank finance (availability,  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 
interest rates, fees, and  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4 
collateral requirements)  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5 
 
Other (please specify): 
 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
2 
3 
 4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4 
 5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5 
1
2
7 
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Specific to the Project(s) funded by BNDES 
(Please write ONLY in the box related to the type of investment of the project(s) you asked the loan for) 
 Product 
Innovation 
 Process  
Innovation 
 
Values: 
1: No obstacle 
2: Minor obstacle 
3: Moderate obstacle 
4: Major obstacle 
5: Very severe obstacle 
 
Development of 
a new molecular 
entity (NME) 
Development 
of an 
incrementally 
modified 
drug (IMD) 
 
Acquisition 
of machinery 
/ plant 
expansion 
 
Acquisition 
of external 
R&D 
(software 
excluded) 
 
 
Acquisitio
n of 
software 
 
R&D 
activities 
performed 
within the 
company 
 
Hiring 
workforce 
for R&D 
activities 
Other 
(please 
specify): 
 
  _ 
 
To what extent was access to 
 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
 2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
finance a problem for the  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3 
investment you requested the  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4 
loan for?  5  5  5  5  5  5  5  5 
 
 
How high do you evaluate the 
risk of failure for the project 
you obtained the funds for? 
 1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1
2
8 
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Importance of financial resources 
 
▪ Regarding investments in R&D, please indicate the importance of each of the following  sources 
of credit on a scale: 
 
1  =  HIGH  IMPORTANCE,  2  =  MAJOR  IMPORTANCE,  3  =  MINOR  
IMPORTANCE,  4  = NO IMPORTANCE 
 
i. Public Institutions 1 2 3 4 
ii. Private commercial banks 1 2 3 4 
iii. Other private institution 1 2 3 4 
iv. Company’s own resources 1 2 3 4 
 
▪ Did  you  apply  to  any BNDES  program  with  another  project  that  has  not  been accepted? 
 
Yes  No  Don’t know/refuse to answer  
If No, GO TO SECTION 3 
 
a.   If Yes, how many projects have not been accepted?    
 
b.   If Yes, did you undertake the project(s) you were requesting funds for anyway? 
Yes  No  Don’t know/refuse to answer  
If No, GO TO SECTION 3 
 
c. If  Yes,  how  many  projects  have  you  undertaken  after  BNDES  rejection? 
 
 
 
d. If Yes, what kind of financial resources have you used to undertake the project, after BNDES 
did not commit any disbursement? Please indicate the degree of importance of each of the following 
sources of credit on a scale: 
 
1 = HIGH IMPORTANCE, 2 = MAJOR IMPORTANCE, 3 = MINOR 
IMPORTANCE, 4 = NO IMPORTANCE 
 
i. Public institutions 1 2 3 4 
ii. Private commercial banks 1 2 3 4 
iii. Other private institution 1 2 3 4 
iv. Company’s own resources 1 2 3 4 
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For the specific project(s) funded by BNDES 
 
NOTE: The following questions refer to the specific investment project being funded by 
BNDES. In case your company has been approved more than one project, please fill as 
many copies of Section  3 as there are funded projects. 
1. Number of funded projects 
▪ How many investment projects in innovation has BNDES approved for a loan?  
 
 
2. Magnitude of BNDES support for the project 
▪ How  much  did  BNDES  contribute  to  the  overall  expenditure  of  the  project 
(as  a percentage)?: % 
 
3. Complementarity of BNDES Support 
▪ Did you receive any other financial support for this project from external sources? 
Yes  No  
If No, go to Question 4 
 
a. If Yes, from which type of institution did you obtain financial support? 
i. Private commercial bank (as a percentage): % 
ii. Other private institution (as a percentage): % 
iii. Public institutions: 
▪ Direct funding (as a percentage): % 
▪ Indirect funding: 
a. Tax credit  
b. Subsidy  
4. Degree of additionality/complementarity of BNDES support 
▪ Did you have an alternative to BNDES as a supplier of finance for the project? 
Yes  No  Don’t know/refuse to 
answer  
 
a.  If Yes, why did you prefer BNDES? (e.g., maturity, interest rate, other support) 
i. Period of loan  
ii. Interest rate  
iii. Other (please specify):    
 
▪ If BNDES had not funded the project: 
- Would you have had undertaken this investment anyway? 
Yes  No  Don’t know/refuse to answer  
 
- Would you have undertaken any other investment in pharmaceutical innovation? 
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Yes  No  Don’t know/refuse to answer  
 
-  Would you have undertaken any other non-innovation-related investment? 
Yes  No  Don’t know/refuse to answer  
 
SURVEY FINISHED 
Thank you for your 
cooperation 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
